From Race to Faith Relations, the Local to the National Level: The State and Muslim Organisations in Britain' by McLoughlin, SM
 
 
Muslim Organisations 
and the State -
European Perspectives 
Beiträge zu Migration und Integration, Band 1 

 Axel Kreienbrink 
and Mark Bodenstein (eds.) 
Muslim Organisations
and the State -
European Perspectives 
 4 Inhaltsverzeichnis 
Inhaltsverzeichnis 
Introduction 
Axel Kreienbrink and Nilden Vardar 6 
 I. Comparative Perspectives 21 
Muslim Self-Organisation Between Etatism and  
Civil Society: Countries and Concepts 
Sabine Riedel 22 
Muslim Self-Organisation in Europe:  
Risks and Odds of State Intervention 
Sara Silvestri 
  38 
 II. Country Studies 54 
Organisational Developments towards Legal  
and Political Recognition of Muslims in Germany 
Mark Bodenstein 55 
Furthering Muslim Self-Organisation:  
The Task of the German Islam Conference 
Markus Kerber 6 9 
Muslim Organisations and State Interaction in Spain: 
Towards a More Pluralistic Representation? 
Elena Arigita 7 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Inhaltsverzeichnis 
Muslim Self-Organisation and State Interaction 
with Muslim Organisations in Italy
Claudia Mantovan  93 
From a Regulation of the Religious Landscape 

to the “Preacher State”: The French Situation
	
Franck Frégosi 111 
From Race to Faith Relations, the Local to 

the National Level: The State and Muslim 

Organisations in Britain
	
Seán McLoughlin 123 
III . Muslims in Germany:  State of the Art and Open Questions 150 
Through the Maze of Identities: Muslims in 
Germany Trying to Find Their Way Between Religion, 
Traditionalism, Nationalism and the Question 
of Organisation
Martin Engelbrecht 151 
The Turkish Bias and Some Blind Spots: Research on 
Muslims in Germany
Jörn Thielmann 169 
List of Contributers  196 
6 Introduction 
Introduction 
Axel Kreienbrink and Nilden Vardar 
Muslim communities in Europe have a long history. Their 
origin can be traced back into the 8th century when Al-Andalus 
started to become a centre of global economic and cultural 
significance. In the South-Eastern part of Europe the history of 
coexistence between Muslims and non-Muslims shaped today's 
Muslim life in Bosnia. The diversity among Europe's Muslim 
communities emerged along different historic circumstances 
like the colonial past of some European countries, immigration 
for economic reasons (the so called „guest workers“) and more 
recently the increased arrival of asylum seekers/refugees or 
students and highly skilled professionals. Today it can be stated 
that Muslims belong to one of the fastest growing population 
groups. Hence, their societal and political significance in Euro-
pean societies is steadily increasing, albeit the forms of coexist-
ence differ across Europe. 
Only in the last decade awareness of the need for con-
scious integration efforts for the Muslim communities in Eur-
ope rose as, after September 11, non-existing or failed integra-
tion policies were identified as a problem. Questions on Muslim 
societal and political participation and representation as well as 
Muslim self-organisation became more important. Subsequent-
ly, this resulted in respective discourses on specific problems 
and issues connected to the relationship between the State and 
religious minorities. 
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In 2006 the German state started an official dialogue with 
„the Islam“ or better saying with Muslim communities, and thus 
institutionalised the dialogue on a broad basis. As institutional 
frame the former Federal Minister of the Interior, Wolfgang 
Schäuble, launched the German Islam Conference (Deutsche 
Islam Konferenz). In doing so, Germany followed a path which, 
in one form or another, several European states like Italy, Spain, 
Austria, France, Belgium, the Netherlands or the United King-
dom had chosen earlier. All these countries, each with its differ-
ent State-church laws, policies on religion and societal frame-
works, undertook the task to institutionalise a dialogue partner 
on the national level. 
In Austria, for example, Muslims had the possibility to 
revert to the so called “Islam Act” of 1912, which facilitated the 
constitution of the Islamische Religionsgemeinschaft in Österreich
as a public corporation in 1979 enormously. Belgium recognised 
already in 1974 Islam as religious community and thus created 
the legal base for religious education. After the failure of the 
Islamic cultural Centre in Brussels, dominated by Saudi-Arabian 
influence, as single dialogue partner the Éxecutif des Musulmans 
de Belgique evolved in 1998. In France the Conseil Français du 
Culte Musulmans de France was elected in 2003 on the initiative 
of the Interior Minister and with the support of the four big-
gest Muslim organisations in the country. The national council 
is supplemented by 25 regional councils. In Spain Muslims are 
represented by the Comisión Islámica de España, which was 
funded under considerable pressure from the State in 1992 out 
of two rival associations and which concluded – parallel to the 
protestant church – a cooperation agreement with the Spanish 
State. 
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But also in Germany the efforts on the federal level had 
been preceded by such on the regional or Länder level. Most of 
them emerged from attempts to regulate the question of reli-
gious education. In Lower Saxony, for example, round tables 
have been installed. In other places such as Baden-Württem-
berg so called steering groups were set up together with most 
of the relevant Muslim corporations and associations.  These 
approaches had in common that the representatives of the state 
tried to create an institutionalised dialogue partner and to emu-
late to a certain degree an Islamic religious community. 
Meanwhile, the Muslim communities themselves under-
took some attempts to create a nationwide umbrella organisa-
tion, like in 1988 with the Islamischer Arbeitskreis in Deutschland
(Islamic Working Group in Germany), to which belonged all 
the major Turkish-Islamic corporations plus the Islamic Centres 
of Munich, Aachen and Hamburg. In 1994 this working group 
was transformed into the Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland
(Central Council of Muslims in Germany). Endeavours to use a 
judgement of the Federal Administrative Court of 20051 as “in-
struction for the building up of an Islamic community under the 
conditions of German constitutional law” (Graulich, judge at 
the Federal Administrative Court) can be seen in the same logic. 
Regional associations (e.g. called Schura) try to reach a federal 
association SCHURA Deutschland, though negotiations with in 
the Muslim communities did not prosper until today. 
1 Judgement BVerwG 6 C 2.04 of 23 February 2005 concerning the entitlement 
of religious communities for implementation of religious education (cf. www. 
bundesverwaltungsgericht.de/media/archive/2857.pdf). 
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The different initiatives in Germany and other European 
countries give some reason to believe that one of the core prob-
lems of acceptance of a central representation lies in the plural-
ity of Muslims and associations and it seems that a reasonable 
cooperation is apparently hampered due to ethnic, religious 
and political differences. It is always a crucial question who 
forms the representations and who feels represented by them. 
In the given examples across Europe this problem arose several 
times, be it for ethnic-religious differences between believers 
of Turkish and Moroccan origin like in Belgium, be it because of 
the exclusion of secular Muslims due to the fact that the repre-
sentation is based on the mosque communities like in France, or 
be it for differences between newly created Muslim immigrant 
communities and established representations led by native con-
verts like in Spain. If the problem of coming to terms lies within 
the Muslim communities, then the fundamental question arises 
whether it should be always only one representation represent-
ing the diversity of Muslim tendencies. But if for reasons of con-
stitutional law only one representation is necessary, how can it 
be organised in a pragmatic way to represent at least a majority 
of Muslims? The solution of such problems is necessary if a sin-
gle umbrella organisation shall be functional and shall really 
reach the Muslims allegedly represented. 
To achieve the objective of identifying adequate repre-
sentatives by the dialogue process of the German Islam Confer-
ence, a differentiated look at the experiences of other European 
countries is worthwhile. But to classify the experiences it is 
necessary to have a look into the institutional structures of each 
society, because they predetermine forms of political mobilisa-
tion of migrants. It is likely that self-organisation will only take 
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place within the frame set by expectations of the respective 
states in the field of State-church laws and policies on religion. 
Taking this as starting point it is import-ant to have a look on 
existing Muslim organisations under the perspective whether 
their structures follow their own Islamic concepts of corpora-
tion or whether they are geared on other “successful” organisa-
tional forms in the field to get acceptance. What are the respec-
tive outcomes on the feeling among Muslim populations of 
being represented? Does a specific form of representation affect 
the willingness of the State to accept the body and its speaker as 
dialogue partner? And eventually there is the question why mi-
grants at all want to (or should) organise themselves in form of 
religious communities and what the interest of the States could 
be to have an institutionalised religion? 
These and other questions constituted the frame for an 
expert seminar with European Scholars and Government of-
ficials involved in the German Islam Conference, organised 
by the Research Group of the Federal Office for Migration and 
Refugees and held in November 2007 in Nuremberg. Based 
on presentations given at the seminar the articles of this book 
provide insights into different approaches for coming to terms 
with a form of self-organisation which is able to establish a solid 
basis for interlocution with the State. In presenting the different 
experiences in European countries this volume wants to provide 
an overview of approaches and policies in Europe not only re-
ferred to Muslim self-organisation in Europe but also to the rela-
tionship between state and religious groups in general. 
Sabine Riedel opens the comparative part one of the 
volume with a chapter on the role of state and civil society. She 
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states that it was the lack of appropriate institutional/public 
support and efficient integration policies that led to the emer-
gence of migrant Muslim organisations and their increased 
role in European countries. She argues that even engaged self-
organisations remain limited when there is no or hardly any 
support by state institutions. The role of civil society for the inte-
gration of Muslim communities in Europe is seen as crucial, but 
it remains a central question how and to what extent Muslim 
representatives can and should be involved in political decision-
making processes. Any answer depends on the relationship 
between state and church in the respective state. Comparing 
the cases of Great Britain, where the perspective is shaped by 
the idea of multiculturalism, France with its etatist State-church 
relations and Germany with a more socio-cultural approach, 
lines out the contrasting character in the different understand-
ings of State-church relations and the accompanying concepts 
of Muslim self-organisation (closely linked to the historical, 
political and societal background of each state) and weighs up 
advantages and disadvantages of each approach with regard to 
their effects on Muslim self-organisation. 
Given the European diversity of concepts to Muslim Self-
Organisation, each type of State-church-relationship bears op-
portunities and challenges for social cohesion. In this context, 
Sara Silvestri analyses the challenges of state intervention on 
Muslim self-organisation. She identifies a profound structural 
and institutional disruption of Islam as religion in European 
public sphere. Hence, a process of “institutionalising” Islam in 
European societies aiming at the official recognition of Islam 
seems inevitable for the author. Such a process is already tak-
ing place and it will face challenges not only due to differing 
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concepts of religious leadership, different notions of integra-
tion and various mechanisms of representation but also due to 
specific characteristics of Islam as a religion. In this regard the 
emergence of “national Muslim councils” in European coun-
tries at the beginning of the 1990s is identified as a new form 
of institutionalisation, often evolved through intervention of 
governments. Three different types of councils are categorised 
based on the mode and degree of state intervention, which are 
exemplified again by experiences in Great Britain, France and 
Germany. Silvestri argues, inter alia, that European States are 
compelled to rethink their ways of addressing religious minor-
ity groups, such as Muslims. The awareness that Islam in Europe 
is a plural and versatile entity, which comes along with a great 
diversity of opinion, is crucial for this revision. 
The second part of the volume is dedicated to some coun-
try studies to give a deeper insight into the specific approaches 
to Muslim self-organisation as well as their distinct challenges. 
Mark Bodenstein elaborates especially on the organi-
sational developments in Germany. After a short historical 
overview of Muslim presence in Germany, Bodenstein describes 
the legal framework of German State-church relations within 
which religious communities are entitled to gain official rec-
ognition. While no specific legal provision for the general rec-
ognition of religious communities exist in Germany, any form 
of official recognition is connected to the application of certain 
laws with regard to distinct issues such as mosque building or 
halal-slaughtering of animals. The only more general refer-
ence is given in Article 7, Section 3 of the German constitution 
(Grundgesetz) with regard to the introduction of religious in-
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struction in public schools. Although Muslim self-organisation 
has developed along the requirements of this Article and with 
regard to the (requirements of the) introduction of religious 
education, Bodenstein points out that existing organisations 
are yet far from meeting these conditions, such as a high degree 
of organisational structures and transparent decision-making. 
This holds true for all three types of Muslim organisation in 
Germany which the author classifies according to their underly-
ing approach as “Top-Down”, “Bottom-Up” and a mixed form of 
both as “In Between”. The author describes the two main forms 
of state interaction with Muslim organisations and communi-
ties, which are taking place at federal (German Islam Confer-
ence) and state level (Round Tables). Bodenstein concludes 
that the common aim of religious education in public schools 
has strongly furthered the organisational structure of Muslim 
groups in Germany. However, he states that there are still provi-
sions to be made with regard to the alignment/adjustment of 
Muslim self-organisation to an equal status with Churches and 
Jewish communities. 
Subsequently, Markus Kerber clarifies the aim of the Ger-
man Islam Conference and the role of the German Government 
within it. The Conference initiated by the former Federal Minis-
ter for Interior, Wolfgang Schäuble, aimed at creating a forum 
as well as starting a process “for more dialogue, better under-
standing and growing cooperation” between the Government 
and the Muslim communities. At the same time the Conference 
also enhanced the dialogue among Muslims themselves. The 
(then)2 preliminary results of the Conference proved that it had 
2 The contribution was written before the official end of (the first) German Confer-
ence on Islam in mid 2009. 
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evolved as an instrument of productive dialogue strengthening 
social cohesion in Germany. 
In the case of Spain, presented by Elena Arigita, Muslim 
presence in the country is relatively recent, irrespective the 
historical presence of Islam in al-Andalus in the Middle Ages. 
The case of Spain is an example of how the institutionalisation 
of Islam was enforced by government. As a result of self-organ-
isation processes two major Muslim associations had arisen 
in 1989 and 1991, which had contrasting ideology and profiles 
– dominated, on the one hand, by native Muslim converts and, 
on the other hand, by nationalised Muslim migrant groups. 
But as the government stipulated only one single umbrella or-
ganisation as interlocutor, the two organisations were forced 
in 1992 to constitute the Comisión Islámica de España (CIE) as 
a single representative body and official voice of the Muslim 
community, being this a prerequisite to sign the cooperation 
agreement between the Spanish Muslim community and the 
Spanish state. The agreement of 1992 was perceived as a success, 
given the rather early stage of recognition of Islam as a religious 
community (in comparison to other European countries). How-
ever, as a result of this top-down process internal fragmentation 
within the CIE still prevails today and Muslim representation 
remains only as a institutionalisation at state level with lit-
tle repercussion on local Muslim communities. According to 
Arigita, the process of state-driven institutionalisation can be 
questioned since genuine representation cannot be achieved. 
She argues that only the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 led 
to a paradigm shift with regard to the public debate on Islam, 
bringing about two major effects: on the one hand, the Spanish 
government has started a new phase of interlocution with the 
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Muslim community by launching a renewed dialogue not only 
with the CIE but also other Muslim organisations. On the other 
hand, these new steps taken by the government after 2004 led 
to a change within the landscape of Muslim self-organisation. 
An authentic awareness of genuine representation among 
the Muslim community seems to grow and subsequently, the 
search for new ways of participation can be observed, especially 
among the recently immigrated Muslims. According to Arigita, 
this process may well constitute new forms of leadership among 
Spanish Muslims. 
In contrast to Spain, the institutionalisation and self-or-
ganisation process within the Muslim community in Italy took 
place almost a decade later, as described by Claudia Mantovan. 
The diversity of Islam in Italy, which was primarily fed by immi-
gration in the 1980s and 1990s, generated several Muslim organ-
isations and associations. One of the ways Italy is regulating its 
official relations to other religious groups (beyond Catholics) is 
an agreement called Intesa (similarly to the Spanish model). De-
spite attempts made by several Muslim organisations to reach 
such an agreement, the initiatives failed due to their internal 
discord. Subsequently, as in the aftermath of 9/11 the need for 
communication with the Muslim community became urging, 
the Government took the initiative for identifying a representa-
tive interlocutor. The result was the creation of the Consulta per 
l’Islam Italiano in 2005, a body which can be described as an 
advisory board to the Ministry of the Interior. In this top-down 
solution the members were nominated by the Minister (follow-
ing in a certain way the French model). However, the effort re-
mained unsuccessful due to its limited representativity of Mus-
lim life in Italy, given the multilevel heterogeneity and compet-
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ing structures within. But Mantovan goes further and questions 
the whole struggle for a single representation proposing a 
resources orientated approach, which would enable Muslims at 
the basis to accumulate necessary resources essential for social 
participation. The result would be the capability to better rep-
resent themselves and pursue their interests. Concomitantly, 
there would be no essential need for an Intesa if already existing 
laws were applied more effectively. 
In contrast to Catholic dominated Italy or Spain, discourse 
on Muslim representation in France is heavily influenced by the 
idea of laicité, as Franck Frégosi elaborates in his contribution. 
He argues that despite strict separation between religion and 
state being proclaimed, the state is regularly interfering with  
religious affairs when it comes to Muslim-related issues. The 
reasons for this exclusive intervention are rooted in several fac-
tors: first, like in many other countries Muslim communities are 
fragmented and no central representation does exist. Secondly, 
there is (apparently) a struggle for influence going on among 
the governments of countries of origin of Muslim migrants in 
France. Eventually, the security question after the events of 
9/11 has also been a crucial reason for tackling Muslims as an 
exceptional case apart from other religious communities. Con-
sidering this, state intervention seems to be a legitimate means 
to create a “necessary interface” between the various Muslim 
organisations and public powers in order to enable Muslim rep-
resentation on the grounds of freedom of religion. Frégosi criti-
cises state intervention, which is aimed at a tailor-made repre-
sentation in the name of the Muslim interlocutors. But in reality, 
he argues, the government tries to create a tailor-made Islam as 
a means of social control of the Muslim population in France – 
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severely putting religious neutrality of the state at stake. Thus, 
Frégosi favours an alternative, putting forward that any mod-
ernisation or adjustment of Islam to modern conditions needs 
to evolve from within the Muslim community and should not be 
state-induced. 
The last of the country studies is dedicated to the United 
Kingdom. Seán McLoughlin examines the New Labour govern-
ment’s emphasis on civic renewal and the related emergence 
of what he calls the “faith relations industry”. In this context the 
engagement of Muslim organisations with the state shifted over 
the past few decades. The nature of Muslim organisations de-
veloped from a more ethnically-oriented local level repre-
sentation in the 1960s to a “professionalised” national level 
representation of Muslims as “Muslims” from 1989 onwards. 
After elaborating on the implications of this trend McLough-
lin exemplifies the difficulties in developing a nationwide di-
asporic Muslim leadership in the context of global conflicts and 
challenges of the “War on Terror” after 9/11, which holds also 
true for most other European countries. Dispersed authority 
structures within the Muslim community impeded the efforts 
for public and political recognition. The author argues that the 
British approach of facilitating the self-organisation of Muslim 
representative bodies (instead of state intervention into their 
affairs) was accompanied by two further processes: On the one 
hand, anti-Western imaginaries of the diasporic Muslim public 
spheres were put under greater critical scrutiny. On the other 
hand, Muslim groups/representatives critically questioned their 
avoidance of secular politics and began to engage within the 
secular frame in order to gain religious leadership. 
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The final part of the book comes back to the specific situ-
ation in Germany. A deeper insight into the question of identity 
of migrant Muslims and its organisational implications in Ger-
many is given by Martin Engelbrecht. Taking into account the 
national and historical background of Turkish migrants, the 
overwhelming majority of Muslim migrants in Germany, the 
author describes the circumstances under which Turkish domi-
nated religious life and organisations have evolved. Engel-
brecht points out the correlation between religiousness on 
the one hand and factors such as education, language and in-
tegration on the other hand. He argues that there are distinct 
patterns in Turkish migrant’s convictions, which either help or 
hamper integration: tradition versus traditionalism, universal-
ism versus fundamentalism, nation versus nationalism. The dif-
ference between tradition and traditionalism refers to religion 
being perceived/expressed either in a constructive and integra-
tive way (tradition) or in a reluctant and destructive way (tradi-
tionalism). The second pattern of universalism vs. fundamental-
ism towards the understanding of religion is described by the 
phenomenon in which “universalistic” Muslim migrants try to 
find new ways between modern and traditional values. Within 
the context of nation vs. nationalism, the national bonds of 
Turkish migrants to their country of origin – which are natural 
and necessary up to a certain extend – can take shape in a sect-
arian way, if there is no constructive commitment to the new 
state and society. Hence, Engelbrecht sees Turkish nationalism 
as a destructive factor, when combined with religiousness and 
a traditionalist understanding of religion. He concludes that 
tendencies towards a universalistic Muslim identity, which em-
braces German society, ought to be strengthened in opposition 
to Islamist and Turkish nationalist positions. Nonetheless, he 
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states that Muslims in Germany are making considerable efforts 
to develop a self-reliant Islam – a trend that could be supported/ 
promoted best at the individual level (identity building) as well 
as at the organisational level by bottom-up processes. 
Further research is needed in order to better understand 
integration processes and the creation of adequate structures 
and conditions for operating Muslim self-organisation. A great 
leap towards this aim has already been taken as Jörn Thiel-
mann can show in his final look at the current state of research 
on Muslim migrants and Islam in Germany. He identifies “a 
Turkish bias” as an obstacle for comprehensive research on this 
issue because most of the studies conducted on Muslims in Ger-
many – no matter whether quantitative or qualitative – mainly 
concentrate on the majoritarian population of Turkish back-
ground. Such studies therefore do not reflect the existing diver-
sity within Muslims and Islam in Germany in leaving out the 
dynamics of small Muslim migrant denominations with differ-
ent ethnic backgrounds. But these non-Turkish Muslims account 
for a share of almost 40 percent of all Muslims in Germany, so 
that such a Turkish bias can distort results crucially. Eventually, 
Thielmann identifies some blind spots that need to be explored 
by further research: Muslim organisations, institutions and 
networks and Muslim diversity as such, intellectual production 
and perception of Islamic knowledge, Muslim media, religious 
practices and conversion from and to Islam. 
As the contributions in this volume show, European so-
cieties have made considerable progress in organising their 
relationships towards their Muslim communities. Nevertheless, 
there seems still a long way to go in order to optimize Muslim 
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self-organisation and representation in the respective countries 
since Europe can not be imagined without the Muslim presence 
anymore. Here, effort and creativity with regard to attaining 
pragmatic and efficient solutions are needed from both state 
institutions and Muslim religious organisations. Keeping this in 
mind, further research on the relationship between Islam and 
the state in Western societies will remain a crucial task. By pre-
senting the European state of the art on this issue the volume 
aims to give suggestions and thereby contribute to this task. 
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Muslim Self-Organisation 
Between Etatism and 
Civil Society: 
Countries and Concepts 
Sabine Riedel 
In the 70s of the last century various Muslim immigrants 
living as guest workers in different European countries decided 
to stay in the new host countries for giving their families a bet-
ter perspective of life. Little by little, new non-governmental 
organizations founded by Muslims became a part of the so 
called civil society. Their activities today are not focused only 
to religious services but also to socioeconomic engagements in 
founding educational, cultural and business associations as well 
as self-help groups. Today nearly all Muslim umbrella organi-
sations – for example in Germany the Turkish-Islamic Union 
(DITIB), the Muslim Council as well as the Central Council of 
the Muslims in Germany (ZMD) – have their own associations or 
working groups for Muslim youth or Muslim women, for special 
social services, research and educational centres.1 
1 See for example the Centre for Social Support (Zentrum für Soziale Unterstüt-
zung) of the DITIB: www.ditib.de/ [Accessed 25 March 2009]; or the Women’s 
department an Youth department of the Islamic Community Milli Görüş (Isla-
mische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş - IGMG), which is the greatest Organisation 
of the Muslim Council (Islamrat): www.igmg.de/verband/islamic-community-
milli-goerues.html [Accessed 25 March 2009]; see also the Central Council of 
the Muslims in Germany (Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland – ZMD): www. 
zentralrat.de [Accessed 25 March 2009]; in: Lemmen (2000). 
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Because of the lack of sufficient public support and a 
consistent integration policy in the last decades these net-
works of Muslim organisations became more important and 
at least indispensable for Muslim immigrants. They give them 
further information or assistance for managing the demands 
of everyday life, education and working environment and on 
this way gained an essential influence over key questions of so-
cial integration and finally of political participation. After the 
September 11 attacks European governments have realised the 
consequences of their failed integration policies as there are the 
low level of education under Muslim population, the high rate 
of illiteracy and unemployment and the appearance of parallel 
societies which are at risk of poverty. It is obvious that the best 
engagement of self organisations is limited if there is no add-
itional backing by state institutions. 
1.	 Concepts of Civil Society and Models 
of Church-State Relation 
Therefore the starting point of the discussion about bet-
ter integration measures is the question how far Muslim repre-
sentatives of the civil society could or should be involved in the 
process of policy making. The answer depends primarily on two 
factors: the meaning of civil society and the relation between 
state and church. Firstly we have to take into consideration 
different definitions of civil society from which two are the 
most important: Civil society could be understood either as a 
third sector between state and market, between the political 
and economic system or on the contrary as a social movement 
which became a part of the political system. In the first case civil 
society is defined as a corrective element enabling the control 
of state representatives of democracies as well as authoritarian 
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regimes. This definition allows us to explain the beginning of 
the transformation processes in the former socialist countries 
of Eastern Europe in the late 80s of the last century (Rieger 
1998: 736). In the second case organised parts of the civil society 
are cooperating with state institutions and at least are able to 
substitute them in some public spheres. This concept became 
popular under the name cooperative or deliberative democracy 
which aims to incorporate base policy and arise the legitimat-
ing of lawmaking. 
The question how far political integration concepts are 
also seeking the participation of Muslim Civil society is above 
all connected with the existing models of state-church rela-
tions and the acceptance of an equal treatment. Whereas all 
EU-member states are engaged to guarantee religious freedom 
and equal treatment by the European Convention on Human 
Rights and by the European anti-discrimination legislation so 
that Muslims as individuals are well protected against any form 
of disadvantages2, Muslim communities do not enjoy the same 
rights as Christian religious groups. The reason for that is well 
known but mostly neglected by the current interreligious dia-
logue: Up to the foundation of modern European democracies 
at the beginning of the 20th century, state and church institu-
tions were closely intertwined. For European monarchs Chris-
tianity was an ideological source to justify their absolute power 
over state and society. By the so called divine right they defined 
their rule by the will of God which enabled them to control the 
2 See details of the EU’s Equal Treatment Directives and the progress in imple-
menting in: European Commission. Directorate-General for Employment, Social 
Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 2006. 
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public as well as the spiritual sphere. The secularisation process 
which started in various European countries about hundred 
years ago has brought different results so that state institutions 
and Christian churches today are more or less separated or 
independent. The three main models in Europe are the state-
church model, the cooperationist and the secular model (Riedel 
2008: 252). It is obvious that integration measures for Muslim 
immigrants concern these current church-state relations in the 
sense that they are able to support a development in interest of 
a future equal treatment of religious communities or, in the op-
posite, to defend existing privileges of Christian churches seek-
ing to prevent any changement. 
2. The Multicultural Approach in Great Britain 
The case of Great Britain shows us how the political ap-
proach of integration policy depends on the model of church-
state relations and the understanding of civil society. After the 
British parliament in 1965 has adopted its first Race Relations 
Act to prevent discrimination the idea of a multicultural so-
ciety became more and more popular under the influence of 
Canadian and US-American philosophers. Their theory of com-
munitarianism assumes that the society is divided into different 
communities by culture, language, ethnicity or religion and 
that their recognition could lead to solution of interethnic ten-
sions or conflicts. Firstly conservative politicians regarded this 
approach as an instrument against nationalism which demands 
from immigrants a totally cultural assimilation. Finally in the 
90s, the concept of a multiethnic British society was completed 
by New Labour in regarding religious consciousness as impor-
tant as ethnic or racial identity (McLoughlin 2005: 58). The gov-
ernment of Tony Blair initiated the amendment of the Equality 
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Act in 2006 which protects people against any form of discrimi-
nation on grounds of religion or belief (Equality Act 2006). 
With its multicultural approach the British government 
supported representatives of the Muslim community to concen-
trate their activities on integration measures appealing on their 
social autonomy and their own responsibility for a stronger 
engagement of “their” part of civil society for a better educa-
tion, employment and social welfare. The result was not only 
the institutionalisation of Muslim organisations in the United 
Kingdom but also the affirmation of the current church-state 
relations with an established church. As Seán McLaughlin shows 
us in his publications, “Muslims have benefited from the pres-
ence of a Church of England which not only legitimates space 
for religion in public life but has also been hospitable to sharing 
that space with others” (McLoughlin 2005: 57). On the other side 
we can realise that also the established church has benefited 
from an increasing importance of Muslim identity. The state-
ment of the archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, saying 
“the adoption of certain aspects of Sharia law in the UK ‚seems 
unavoidable’” 3 , can be interpreted as an attempt to defend the 
existence of religious law in general and privileges of the estab-
lished Church of England in particular. 
After the London bomb attacks of July 7 and 21, 2005, 
the multicultural approach of the British government got a lot 
of stick. It was said that the four Muslim immigrants founded 
guilty of plotting are naturalized as British citizens although 
3 Sharia law in UK is 'unavoidable', in: BBC News, 7 February 2008, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7232661.stm [Accessed 25 March 2009], also: Entrüs-
tung über Scharia-Ideen des Erzbischofs von Canterbury, in: Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung, 9.2.2008, p. 2. 
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they lived in parallel societies influenced by so called hate 
preachers. New research publications are pointing out that 
multiculturalism has demanded for Muslims the right to be 
different so that religiosity is growing amongst the younger 
generation and “Islamist groups have gained influence at local 
and national level by playing the politics of identity” (Mirza/Sen-
thilkumaran/Ja'far 2007: 6). The multicultural approach ignores 
the fact that British Muslims are not a homogenous group but 
individuals with a diversity of opinions. Other critics are coming 
from British liberals accusing the government of disregarding 
basic civil rights by its new anti-terror-laws (Riedel 2005: 3). The 
consequence of the bomb attacks should not be the closure of 
mosques and bookshops but a discussion about alternatives 
measures of integration. 
3. The Etatistic Approach in France 
The French approach to Muslim self-organisations is the 
exact opposite to the British policy of multiculturalism. The 
political system of France is characterized by a strict neutrality 
of state institutions concerning cultural, ethnic or religious con-
sciousness. One important legal basis is the “Law on the Separa-
tion of the State and the Church” (1905) which emphasises in its 
first paragraph that “The Republic neither recognizes, nor sala-
ries, nor subsidizes any religion”.4 This indifferent attitude of 
the French state to the cultural, ethnic or religious affiliation of 
its citizens can not be described as a doubt about the existence 
of such differences or their communities. It is more a symbol for 
the republican principle of equal treatment which has to avoid 
4 See: “La République ne reconnaît, ne salarie ni ne subventionne aucun culte”, in: 
Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Eglises et de l'Etat. Version 
consolidée au 01 janvier 2006. 
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and persecute any form of social discrimination. Therefore, the 
French government affirms that its prohibition of wearing reli-
gious symbols like the headscarf at schools is in accordance with 
the European anti-discrimination legislation.5 
The neutrality in cultural, ethnic or religious matters 
concerns also the understanding of civil society, which is de-
fined by various French researchers as something which is in 
opposite to state institutions: “[…] le terme de société civile est 
opposé à celui d'Etat” (Daucy 1986: 117). In this meaning, civil 
society could become a competing power for the ruling elite, 
not as a part of the political system but as a social movement 
with an anti-etatistic orientation. This is an explication for the 
etatistic approach of the French authorities in creating its forms 
of dialogue with Muslims in France. Their greatest fear is that 
the activities of Muslim self-organisations in the long run could 
undermine the existing political system. Franck Frégosi shows 
us in his contribution in this volume on the situation in France 
how this perception of a anti-etatistic or “subversive” Islam has 
produced a “preacher state syndrome” and the illusion that a 
state control over the building of Islam institutions and their 
financing would reduce this danger. 
Under the impression of the civil unrest among immi-
grants in October and November 2005, the increasing state in-
fluence by the former home secretary Nicolas Sarkozy in found-
ing the French Council of the Muslim Faith (Conseil Français du 
5 See: Loi n° 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de 
laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse 
dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics. 
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Culte Musulman, CFCM) met with criticisms. On the one hand 
this etatistic approach is contradictory to the principle of neu-
trality of state institutions in religious matters. Furthermore it 
was argued that an institutionalisation of the Islam in France 
has produced the opposite result activating only the organised 
part of the Muslim civil society which is dominated by Muslim 
associations with an islamist orientation and foreign financing 
(Riedel 2007a: 21f.). This critical remark was affirmed in June 
2008 when the CFCM has elected new representatives and its 
new leader Mohammed Moussaoui. The imam and mathemat-
ics lecturer at the University of Avignon is the vice president of 
the Moroccan Federation of French Muslims (Rassemblement 
des musulmans de France, RMF) which won about 43 percent.6 
More influence with about 30 percent gained also the Union of 
French Islamic Organisations (UOIF) which is closely linked to 
the Muslim Brotherhood. 
4. The Socio-Cultural Approach in Germany 
The German concept of a political approach to Muslim 
self-organisation was created in 2006 by the minister of interior 
Wolfgang Schäuble. It was the first attempt of a German govern-
ment at all to initiate a long-term dialogue with Muslim com-
munities and followed the new immigration and integration 
policy. Since this time all political parties had accepted the fact 
that Germany is an immigration country and “Germany needs 
immigrants” for its future (Independent Commission on Migra-
tion 2001: 1). The reforms started in 1999 with an amendment 
6 Tom Heneghan: New French Muslim Council leader pledges reform, in: Reuters 
News, 22 June 2008; Moussaoui nouveau président du CFCM, in: Le Figaro, 23 
June 2008. 
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of the nationality law (1999) giving immigrants better condi-
tions for naturalization and acquirement of the same rights and 
duties as all German citizens (Federal Ministry of the Interior 
2005a: 87). German nationality today depends no longer on 
cultural criteria like heritage, ethnic or religious consciousness 
but is determined by political preconditions confirmed by law 
and the constitution. For avoiding discrimination on grounds 
of religion or belief German policy is oriented to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and integrated in the European 
anti-discrimination legislation. 
In contrast to France and Great Britain the German ap-
proach to Muslim self-organisation could be described as a 
socio-cultural approach. It is distinguishable on the one hand 
from a culturalism based in German history on the linkage be-
tween ethnicity and nationality and on the other hand from 
the multicultural concept which divides society in different cul-
tural, ethnic or religious communities. Like in France the Ger-
man state institutions are also neutral concerning the religious 
consciousness. As the publication of the German Ministry of the 
Interior “Welcome to Germany” underlines: “Germany is a secu-
lar state and does not have a state religion” (Federal Ministry of 
the Interior 2005b: 54). In reality the German church-state rela-
tion is more complicated because of the specific role of churches 
in civil society: Faith is defined not as a private but as a public 
affair, so that some churches (mainly the Protestants and Catho-
lics) are enjoying the legal status as a public body or corporation 
with their own social and educational institutions. In this point 
the German socio-cultural approach like the British multicul-
tural one allows church organisations to become in some 
spheres a part of the political system. 
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The new initiative of the German Ministry of the Inter- 
ior for integrating Muslims has established a special form of 
dialogue in form of the “German Islam Conference” (Deutsche 
Islam Konferenz, DIK) (Federal Ministry of the Interior 2007; 
Kerber in this volume). This national framework aims to avoid 
the negative affects of the French etatistic approach in reject-
ing any support to institutionalise an “Islam of Germany” and 
the dominance of organisations influenced and financed by 
foreign countries. In answer to the question, who represents the 
Muslims in Germany, the DIK includes in its dialogue not only 
representatives from the five largest Muslim umbrella organisa-
tions, but also ten so called “secular Muslims”, that means immi-
grants without a special religious or political affiliation but with 
an cultural islamic background. The other fifteen German state 
officials of the Islam Conference are acting as mediators. The 
socio-cultural approach is criticized by Muslim organisations as 
well as by politicians and the public opinion. Whereas the rep-
resentatives of the organised Islam are calling for recognition of 
their leadership, some critics are asking, how far these Muslim 
organisations are connected to the Muslim bases (see the contri-
bution of Mark Bodenstein). Another problem is that the socio-
cultural approach is missing an open dialogue with the Islam as 
a religion so that a greater audience of the German society is not 
able to know that a separation of state and religion could be also 
possible and acceptable by Muslims (Riedel 2007b: 36-45). 
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5. Pros and Cons of the Various Political 
Approaches 
The comparison of the various political approaches to 
Muslim self-organisations has to take into consideration that 
they have been developed under specific historical, political 
and social conditions. As explained above, the regarding Euro-
pean countries have different understandings of civil society 
and models of church-state relation. Therefore it would be quite 
difficult to transfer a successful approach from one country to 
another. Furthermore, we have to be aware that there is not 
one straightforward solution for the integration of Muslims in 
European societies. Under these circumstances, why an analysis 
nevertheless could makes sense? The unassuming answer is 
that we must learn from each other to prevent negative results. 
As the following country studies illustrate a careless disregard 
of these experiences could, in the worst case, produce the oppo-
site affect that means a strengthening of islamist ideas and their 
political actors. This paragraph intends to give some statements 
provoking a fruitful discussion. 
The most convincing pro argument for the British multi-
cultural approach is its engagement to evoke more sensibility 
and tolerance for cultural, ethnic and religious diversity in our 
modern societies. This liberal position that every individual has 
the freedom of cultural, religious or political consciousness has 
been changed by the ideas of communitarianism. Reviewing 
the lack of social cohesion this concept offers us the binding 
power of culture or religion. But at least a contradiction of mul-
ticulturalism remains: it postulates cultural communities as the 
main principle of social cohesion whereas their representatives 
are tending to oppose an integration of “their community” into 
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common society. One obstacle for questioning the produced 
deficits is that state institutions have come to an arrangement 
with their communities: They are respected as a part of civil so-
ciety but have to bear more responsibility for social affairs sup-
porting the withdrawal of public support. Some researchers are 
pointing at the experience of other countries where the absence 
of functioning state institutions constrains the development of 
civil society at all, so that there is no hope for any further democ-
ratization (Hillebrand/Birle 1997). A last contraction concerning 
the multicultural approach has to be mentioned: The unsolved 
integration deficits have recently produced an increasing fear 
of terrorist threat so that Great Britain as the country of origin 
of liberalism is going to restrict fundamental human rights and 
to refuse the “Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union” which prohibits also “Any discrimination based on […] 
religion or belief“.7 
In contrast to Great Britain, the French approach is ori-
ented to strengthen the anti-discrimination policy on European 
level. This consequent course for a policy of equal treatment is 
the most convincing aspect of the etatistic approach, because 
it makes no allowances for any restriction of human rights. But 
we have to notice a greater difference between this normative 
framework and the French social reality which is the reason for 
civil unrests among young immigrants. In this context Nicolas 
Sarkozy recommended a so-called “rupture” that means a break 
of the existing political system in favour of a new church-state 
relation. He wants to finance the great churches by state giving 
7 See the Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
in: Official Journal of the European Union, 14 December 2007. 
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also Muslims the same public support. As it was discussed above, 
the great disadvantage of this idea is the problem that state 
institutions could abuse such a new financial dependence for 
a political control over faith-based organisations. Therefore of-
ficial representatives of the French Catholic church are not con-
vinced remembering the state dominance over religions during 
the rule of absolutism and the authoritarian regimes. Whereas 
the “Law on the Separation of the State and the Church” (1905) 
has broken with this tradition, the political rule in the French 
colonies of the Muslim world continued in controlling the reli-
gious institutions and organisations. So the French etatistic ap-
proach to Muslim organisations is actually in danger to fall back 
in this period of state dominance. 
In opposite to France and Great Britain the German socio-
cultural approach respects the independence and autonomy of 
religious groups on grounds of the recently history of Nazism. 
The self-determination of churches and other organisations 
of the civil society is one of the key benefits of the democratic 
system after the National Socialist dictatorship and the socialist 
regime of the former GDR and therefore the most convincing ar-
gument for this approach. But like in other countries, there are 
also in Germany contradictions producing social tensions. The 
great Muslim umbrella organisations for example are demand-
ing an equal treatment with the status as a public body or corpo-
ration. Behind the negative answer of state institutions stands 
the juridical problem that many Muslim self-organisations are 
more cultural associations than religious groups so that they 
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have no legitimacy for calling such an equal treatment. Never-
theless, German officials cannot avoid this sensitive topic and 
have the duty to verify this question for every single Muslim 
organisation. An interesting example for Germany could be 
Austria where the Islamic Religious Community is recognised as 
a representative body. Another way for guarantee equal treat-
ment between Muslim organisations and Christian churches 
could be a reduction of church influence on spheres where 
public interests are concerned. As other European countries 
like Spain, Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands demonstrate, the 
models of church-state relations are in motion and could be 
changed in favour of the autonomy and self-determination of 
faith-based organisations. 
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Muslim Self-Organisation in 
Europe: Risks and Odds of State 
Intervention 
Sara Silvestri 
1.	 Introduction 
This paper examines the risks and odds of state interven-
tion in the recent process of institutionalisation or self-organi-
sation of Islam in Europe. In order to do so it first looks into the 
reasons that make Islam important to European governments. 
Second, it considers the implications of the crisis of leadership 
in Islam for the development of Muslim representative bodies in 
Europe. Third, it examines the process whereby Muslim councils 
were semi-artificially created in Europe and, fourth, it tries to 
categorise and compare them in order to assess their effective-
ness and the different roles states play in these organisations. 
2.	 The Concern with Islam 
The first decade of the 21st century has been characterised 
in Europe by increasing attention, on the part of state and inter-
national institutions, as well as of the general public, to the issue 
of Islam. This concern has been essentially driven by five factors: 
1. 		 The awareness that European legal and political sys­
tems should be adjusted in order to fully implement 
the principles of equality, anti-discrimination, free­
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dom of religion and that this does better govern di­
verse and interconnected societies where ethnic and 
religious pluralism is growing. 
2. The acknowledgement that a transnational religion 
with a strong universalist message – Islam – is not just 
increasingly “visible and assertive” in Europe, but has 
obviously become a “feature” of Europe since large 
numbers of Muslims have settled permanently in Eu­
rope and are in fact “European citizens”.1 
3. The need to respond to the causes and consequences 
of terrorism and violence stemming from Islamist 
groups and ideologies.2 
4. The appearance of discussions around the application 
of Sharia law in Europe and its implications for Mus­
lim believers and for secular society.
1		 The Muslim inhabitants of European countries with a large Muslim demograph-
ic presence (like Great Britain, France, Belgium or Holland) tend to hold the 
legal status of “citizens”. The majority of Muslims living in Italy and Spain (two 
countries that experienced only recently large influxes of individuals coming 
from Muslim regions of the world) and quite a few Muslims in Germany are still 
“immigrants” although naturalisation is increasing. 
2		 I use interchangeably the terms “Islamism” and “political Islam” to indicate 
political movements that resort to a narrative and symbolic repertoire based on 
the history and key doctrinal concepts of the religion of Islam. Such movements 
originated in North Africa, the Middle East and Asia at the beginning of the 
20th century, in the context of a political and ideological confrontation with the 
West and the consequences of decolonisation. Although several groups borne 
out of these movements ended up implicated in bloody situations, it would be 
inaccurate to establish a direct correlation between faith-based political en-
gagement and terrorism. 
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5.		 The emergence of pro-democracy reform movements 
in the Middle East and North Africa coming from the 
Islamist tradition. 
This attention to Islam and Europe’s Muslims has been 
articulated in various ways. These include: general calls for the 
“integration” (whether social, economic, cultural, or juridical) 
and “political participation” of Muslim minorities; endeavours 
to steer existing Islamic institutions (e.g. mosques, schools, 
sharia councils) and other forms of “Muslim self-organisation” 
(e.g. ethno-cultural associations, advocacy groups, networks 
providing social services, Muslim media) and incorporate them 
fully into European society; dilemmas as to whether to engage 
in political dialogue with Islamist parties in the Muslim world 
(cf. Asseburg/Brumberg 2007); attempts to strengthen “Muslim-
Government relations” in Europe, both by looking domestically 
and internationally; initiatives in the field of intercultural dia-
logue. In order to tackle the issue spelt out in the title of this pa-
per, it is important to start by expanding a little on these last two 
concepts of Muslim-Government relations and of intercultural 
dialogue. 
In the decade spanning the late 1990s and the early 2000s 
the idea of “Muslim-government” relations often translated 
into attempts to establish in Europe, in a rather artificial way, 
“representative” and “consultative” Muslim bodies. Such enti-
ties – made up of Muslims who are either European citizens or 
long-term immigrants – were expected to function as official Is-
lamic “interlocutors” with European state authorities as well as 
with other religious and civil society groups. However, the idea 
of “Muslim-Government” relations can also refer to a different 
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thing. For about two decades before the idea of national Muslim 
councils came up, establishing official relations with Muslims 
based in Europe – especially as long as these individuals were 
simple “immigrants” and not “citizens” in the countries where 
they were residing and working – almost automatically implied 
diplomatic contacts. Such contacts were either with these im-
migrants’ countries of origin or with prominent political ac-
tors like Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC), i.e. three major poles of attraction in terms of 
religious authority and of economic influence for the Muslim 
(Sunni and Shia) population across the globe. This means that 
the Muslims of Europe did not have a chance to engage with 
or express directly to European society their own concerns and 
claims, which were instead filtered by non-European govern-
ments. 
As the notion of “intercultural dialogue” gained currency 
in the run up to 2008 (established by the EU as the “Year of Inter-
cultural Dialogue”), a current of opinion developed in certain 
European countries according to which engaging in “intercul-
tural dialogue” at the end of the day meant establishing formal 
mechanisms for governments to relate to Muslim communi-
ties, for instance by promoting the creation of national Muslim 
councils. Whereas it is important to include such initiatives 
as one of the many facets of intercultural dialogue it is never-
theless crucial to realise that intercultural dialogue is not just 
about developing institutional and political relations that are 
sensitive to issues of culture, religion and identity. Intercultural 
dialogue entails a broader effort implying a change in mental-
ity directed towards a more “human” or ethical dimension of 
politics (beyond concerns with power, economic interest, and 
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security); it means adopting an “intercultural mindset” in what-
ever individuals and institutions do. We could argue that inter-
cultural dialogue helps to refocus both on individual and on 
societal responsibility in a way that is in line with the concepts 
of “cosmopolitan citizenship” and “cosmopolitan democracy 
(cf. Archibugi/Held/Köhler 1998). 
3.	 Structural	Difficulties	that	Hamper	Easy	
Engagement 
Before looking into the pros and cons of establishing 
Muslim councils in Europe let us explore the difficulties that 
hamper or delay the engagement of European institutions with 
the Muslim communities of Europe. The following pages show 
how most of the problems are actually due to historical devel-
opments and “structural” difficulties rather than to a clash of 
values or civilisations, as the Huntingtonian thesis would like us 
to believe.3 
The emergence of Islam in the European public sphere is 
evident but is happening in a disorganised way and across an 
ummah (the global community of the faithful) that is fractured. 
This is because, as with Protestantism, Islam is a faith focused 
on the direct relationship between the believer and God, and 
without significant intermediary figures and hierarchical struc-
tures comparable to those of the Catholic or Orthodox churches. 
Moreover, Muhammad left no instructions as to how to select 
his successor to lead Muslims (religiously and politically) after 
his death. In the absence of Muslim institutions with a wide 
recognition and legitimacy from across the variety of Muslim 
3 The following two paragraphs draw on  Silvestri 2007: 170ff.  
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communities, European governments have experienced consid-
erable difficulty in relating to and addressing the needs of their 
Muslim populations. 
The nature of these difficulties is rooted in a combination 
of legal, structural and political issues, as well as perceptions. 
The socio-political dominance exercised by the Church in Eu-
rope throughout the centuries, combined with Enlightenment-
driven notions of secularism, has also shaped the way bureau-
cracies, public authorities and legal systems all over the contin-
ent have dealt with, and still relate to, religion in general and 
with Islam more specifically. On the one hand, European states 
enthusiastically support equality and religious freedom whilst 
operating within the framework of the separation between pri-
vate and public sphere. On the other hand, the way states have 
developed their relations with religious groups is still shaped 
by corporatist models and by the traditional pattern of church-
state relations, which still reflects, if anything in this very ter-
minology, the privileged position enjoyed until recently by the 
Christian churches in this part of the world. 
4. The “Normalisation” of Islam and the 
Establishment of National Muslim Councils4 
Before the presence of an increasingly strong, and yet 
multiform, unstructured and a-cephalous Islam in the public 
sphere, European states found themselves facing two op-
tions. Either they had to rethink altogether the way they relate 
(through their legal and administrative provisions) to this grow-
ing minority religion; or they could engineer and speed up 
4 This section draws on Silvestri 2007: passim. 
  
44 Muslim Self-Organisation in Europe: Risks and Odds of State Intervention 
the process whereby state agencies grant official recognition 
to minority religions by proactively “institutionalizing” Islam, 
i.e. by promoting the establishment of Muslim representative 
institutions, whether from scratch or by drawing upon existing 
resources and forms of self-organisation. 
There is an expectation that such institutions should be in 
place if Muslims want to “earn” a place in the complex mechan-
isms of governance in EU institutions and member states. This is, 
first, because Muslims are perceived – and often tend to present 
themselves, by insisting on the unity of the ummah – as a bloc, 
as a community sharing fundamental values, sensitivities, and 
perspectives which are often discriminated against or ignored. 
Second, a structural problem comes into play when we talk of 
Muslim engagement and representation with European states 
and societies; that is, the idea that Islam should “fit in” with the 
criteria that regulate relations with the dominant faith groups. 
Such criteria are rooted in at least three basic expectations: 
1.		 Islam should behave like an “organised” belief, with 
mechanisms of representation and religious lead-
ers in clear positions of power. This is based on the 
assumption that the traditional church-state model 
within the secular framework of the separation be-
tween public and private sphere would work for Islam 
too. 
2.		 There is a somewhat abstract notion of “integration” 
which de facto differs between various multicultural, 
assimilationist, or mixed practices adopted by Euro-
pean states. 
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3.		 Muslim organisations should be representative both 
of the demographic and of the doctrinal characteris-
tics of the Muslim populations of Europe.
In short, Muslim communities are implicitly expected to 
adopt and adapt to the existing pattern of relations between the 
state and ethnic and religious communities in order to engage 
with the social and political context where they live. As a conse-
quence, new forms of institutionalisation of Islam (other than 
mosques and Islamic schools) have begun to appear in Europe, 
often through the direct intervention of European govern-
ments. 
Elsewhere I have illustrated the emergence of “national 
Muslim councils” (Silvestri 2005: 101-129; Silvestri forthcoming 
2009). These bodies are created with the expectation that they 
constitute official interlocutors available for consultation and 
capable of representing the Muslim community and acting as 
bridges between the grassroots level and the state. This process 
inaugurates a “domestication” or “normalisation” of a Euro-
pean version of Islam shaped around the idea that a “moderate” 
(and artificial) form of Islam should be supported in order to do 
justice to Muslim minorities, but also to stem radicalisation. 
The two decades bridging the 20th and 21st centuries have 
witnessed the establishment and spreading of this common 
pattern of institutionalisation of Islam within the borders of 
the EU. This has been mainly a top-down, state-driven dynamic, 
although a mutual interest in formalising relations is clearly 
visible among many Muslim groups and individuals living in 
Europe too. There are various motivations behind this move and 
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security concerns are certainly top of the list. However, beside 
the necessity to maintain law and order and to counter terror-
ism (i.e. to control specific social, ethnic and religious groups at 
risk of “radicalisation”), there is also a genuine intention to fa-
cilitate communication between state institutions and Muslim 
individuals in order to do justice to the principles of freedom 
of religion and non-discrimination. In this way, the state seeks 
– or at least claims to be able – to respond better to the needs 
of European Muslims and to protect them from abuse and dis-
crimination. Several Muslim individuals and organisations, for 
their part, though critical of the security aspect of this exercise 
and of the continuous use of the words “moderate” and “Islamic 
extremism” and “Islamic terrorism” seem to welcome the pro-
spective of a platform (with money and public visibility at-
tached to it) to channel their concerns. 
5. Typologies of Muslim Councils 
Islamic “commissions” and “councils” started to emerge 
in Europe from the early 1990s: the Comisión Islámica de España
in 1992, the Exécutif des musulmans de Belgique in 1996, the 
Muslim Council of Britain in 1997, the Conseil Français du Culte 
Musulman in France in 2003, the Italian Consulta in 2005; the 
Deutsche Islam Konferenz in Germany in 2006. 
Although many similarities can be found in the motiv-
ations of Muslim individuals and of state institutions to establish 
these bodies, their functioning, the structural conditions of the 
specific countries, and the strategies adopted by each country 
and Muslim group differ slightly. Factors that determine these 
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differences include: the variety of versions of Islam that exist 
across Europe; ideologies; the geographical and national ori-
gins of the people involved; the socioeconomic circumstances 
of the local Muslim population; cultural and historical features 
that characterise specific European countries and their ap-
proach to secularisation; national and EU provisions concerning 
immigration and citizenship; patterns of church-state relations; 
and attitudes towards foreigners and minorities in individual 
countries. 
Another major difference is due to the role of the state 
behind the establishment of these Muslim councils. Broadly 
speaking one could categorise them into three types: 
a.		 Councils that came into being thanks to a hard top-
down approach of the state (typically where in the 
country concerned there were little or weak forms 
of self-organisation). 
b.		 Councils that were essentially the outcome of a 
strong civil society – bottom-up – mobilisation and 
where the state remained officially behind the 
scenes but encouraged the initiative. 
c.		 Councils that were the outcome of a mixed ap-
proach, that is where the state openly encouraged 
the formation of a representative Muslim body and 
even offered some logistical structures. 
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To clarify this categorisation let me give some examples.5 
The Italian experience falls under (a). As organised Islam there 
was both fragmented and weak, the Minister of the Interior es-
tablished the Consulta by decree and personally appointed the 
few worthy of becoming members. 
The British case appears to fit into example (b) because the 
Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), a large and well-run umbrella 
organisation but not a “representative” one in demographic or 
theological terms, was never officially endorsed by the govern-
ment and yet was regarded for quite some time as a privileged 
interlocutor and as a protégé of New Labour. With time, and es-
pecially after the London bombings of 2005, however, the MCB 
increasingly lost its appeal and credibility (many ordinary Mus-
lims began to accuse its members of being self-appointed politi-
cal opportunists not caring for the young who were ending up 
in terrorism circles) and other competing Muslim organisations 
emerged, like the Sufi Council of Britain, which allegedly has 
stolen the support of the government. However, the only time 
the British government attempted to coordinate somehow the 
different Muslim groups and movements that exist in Britain 
was in the post-crisis context in the summer of 2005, when it 
called for a task force on British Islam composed of a variety of 
people with the most diverse backgrounds to reflect upon the 
various aspects of Islam in Britain and on the prevention of rad-
icalisation. 
Although membership into the French Muslim Council 
works by election and membership into the German one takes 
5 These issues are tackled more in detail in Silvestri, forthcoming 2009. 
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place by a careful system of appointments and proportional 
representation, both models actually appear to fall under cat-
egory (c). In both countries a number of separate groups were 
already “self-organised” and each government simply provided 
a platform to bring them together by allowing a degree of inde-
pendence to the organisations involved and their members but 
at the same time by restricting the membership (through elec-
tions in France, through quotas destined to each organisation 
in Germany). The Ministry of the Interior is behind both cases, as 
also in Italy. 
None of these models is perfect or provides the right 
recipe to proceed. I would even argue that these councils are 
useful only in the short term and un-necessary in the long-term 
because they promote a segmentation of society. However it is 
important to note their existence and they should be appreci-
ated as “experiments” of governments and of Muslim individ-
uals that are trying to explore the appropriate method to gov-
ern religious pluralism. In addition, what is particularly inter-
esting and innovative in the German case is that the architects 
of the Islam Konferenz made sure that ordinary individuals of 
Muslim faith (and in some cases even simply of Muslim “back-
ground”), not affiliated to any Mosque or Islamic organisation 
are involved. 
In general four caveats should spelt out in relation to 
these Muslim councils initiatives. First, not all Muslims might 
want to identify themselves with such bodies. In particular indi-
viduals who are already fully “integrated” into European society 
might regard these initiatives as steps backs that propose sectar-
ian identifications. 
50 Muslim Self-Organisation in Europe: Risks and Odds of State Intervention 
Second, governments should be aware that these councils 
are vulnerable to the monopolisation of Islamist groups who 
are better organised and resourced than ordinary individuals 
and civil society associations. The problem here would not lie 
in the fear that Islamist groups involved in these councils could 
support terrorism (in fact the Islamist groups who are involved 
in these councils tend to be quite liberal and have quite modest 
agendas, typically focused on combating discrimination and 
promoting religious freedom, whereas hardline Islamists are 
not involved altogether as they reject a priority engagement 
with a Kufr political system) (cf. Silvestri 2006; Klausen 2005). 
The problem is more that of guaranteeing diversity of views 
in these Muslim councils. Vocal groups with a clear political 
agenda may in the long term put to silence less politicised indi-
viduals in the council and may impose their own ideological or 
prescriptive religious views on the others and pretend to speak 
on behalf of all the Muslim population. 
Third, there is a risk that political parties and coalitions 
jump on the boat of Islam for political opportunism, whether 
to support or to condemn Muslims, as it is evident in Italy, from 
the left’s strategic support of Muslims in order to undermine the 
Catholic forces, or the vitriolic opposition to Islam from certain 
wings of the right and from the Lega Nord. Vice versa, political 
opportunism can also appear when Muslim individuals aspiring 
to power, visibility, and leadership enter into political compro-
mises driven by personal gains rather than in the interest of the 
community. 
Fourth, the amount of attention (and resources) Muslims 
have received on the part of European policy-makers recently 
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could in the long term cause societal tensions. The issue of 
competition between ethnic and religious groups in Britain 
for instance was matter of great concern for the representa-
tives of non-governmental organisations and local authorities 
that attended a major conference in Manchester, in November 
2008, on the future of social cohesion in Britain. Black minor-
ity communities in particular felt that now their own voice and 
concerns were not heard and that all the attention and public 
money was going to Muslims or to faith-based initiatives. Al-
though one would have to check whether these complains are 
a reality or a perception of it, it is important to be aware of the 
emergence of these perceptions and to try to prevent the emer-
gence of such polarisations in society. 
6. Conclusions 
So, faced with the vocal presence of Islam in the public 
sphere, European states are compelled to rethink the way they 
relate to minority religious communities such as Islam. Muslim 
communities, for their part, can decide whether to adapt to the 
existing pattern of religion-state relations in order to engage 
with the social and political context where they live, or whether 
to adopt the more market-driven and perhaps more effective 
path of remaining “disestablished” actors in the world of pres-
sure groups, which is perhaps the option that would give them 
more leeway. We should also always remember that Islam in 
Europe is a plural entity, and that the possibility of disagree-
ment between the Muslim actors is high. Hence the scenario 
of Muslims splitting into two or more strands, some working 
through the state, some remaining independent associations, 
and both claiming and fighting for authority and recognition, 
is not unthinkable. Should the preferred path be that of insti-
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tutionalising Islam through the state, both the state and the 
Muslim communities involved should be aware of the following 
considerations: 1) evaluate the feasibility of the enterprise, in 
terms of economic and human resources; 2) be aware of and re-
flect on the complex variety of interpretations that exist in Islam 
within and outside Europe and the influence of transnational 
movements; 3) remember that governments and coalitions wax 
and wane and that the priorities and approaches (including 
towards Islam) of political parties can also change. But, above 
all, the short and long term benefits as well as the consequences 
of establishing such an institution should be taken into consid-
eration. 
To summarise, the crucial questions are: What is the 
ultimate purpose of these Muslim institutions? What are the 
consequences of establishing them? Once governments have 
created these institutions and raised expectations among Mus-
lims to be able to influence the political process, will govern-
ments be able to maintain their neutrality and to listen to and 
to stand the weight of the empowered Muslim bodies that they 
have produced? 
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1.	 Historical	Context 
Muslim historiographers trace the presence of Muslims 
in Germany back to the 18th century at least (Abdullah 1981; Ab-
dullah 1993).1 But the first really noticeable and vivid Muslim 
community can be located in Berlin during the Interwar period. 
At that time several smaller Muslim associations were estab-
lished, among these, the German branch of the Islamic World 
Congress. Due to the political involvement of some Muslims in 
the Nazi era, and the instrumentalisation of the Muslim associ-
ations during the Second World War, all associations were dis-
solved after the war. The few remaining Muslims in Berlin, who 
gathered around the oldest mosque in Germany in Berlin-Wil-
mersdorf, were in the subsequent years as isolated as Berlin was. 
Although we have first postwar communities around the 
Shiite Islamic Centre in Hamburg in 1961 and in the following 
years with the Islamic Centres in Aachen and Munich, which 
were at least personally connected to the Muslim Brotherhood, 
the so called ‘New Islamic Presence’2 was primarily a conse-
1 Differing on this: Lemmen 2002: 15.
	
2 This concept was introduced by Gerholm/Lithman 1988; and currently revived 

by Tiesler 2006: 36-72, and Tiesler 2007. 
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quence of the immigration of so called ‘guest workers’ from 
countries with relevant Muslim population like Turkey, Mo-
rocco, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia, during the 1960s and 1970s. 
As late as in the middle of the 1970s, with increasing fam-
ily reunification and thus changing perspectives, which lead 
to the necessity of organising cultural and religious affairs, 
Muslim immigrants started increasingly to establish mosque 
associations and organisations. These associations have been 
mainly organised along boundaries of ethnicity, culture, or lan-
guage until today. We do not want to focus on the shift in the 
general perception of immigrants with a Muslim background to 
Muslims with an immigration background. This ‘emergence of 
“Muslim” as a political category’ (cf. Adamson 2005) or the pro-
cess of ‘constructing Muslims as ethno-racial outsiders’ 
(cf. Bleich 2006) has been mentioned and sociologically ana-
lysed a few times before. In our context we might shed some 
light on the consequences for their self-organisation. 
To give a short impression of the statistical data on Mus-
lims in Germany, we can state that as far as we can estimate 
now, around 4 million Muslims live in Germany. Herein Muslims 
with a Turkish origin are by far the largest group, followed by 
Muslims from Southeast Europe, Middle East, North Africa and 
Muslims from South/Southeast Asia. Thus, Muslims form the 
second largest group after Christians, who mainly consist of 
Roman Catholics and Protestants. But Muslims for their part can 
be roughly classified as Sunni (2,964,000) - the majority -, Shiite 
(284,000), Alevi (508,000) and Ahmadi (68,000). Looking at the 
latter two groups, there are more than theological debates in 
their respective countries of origin, as well as in Germany, about 
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whether they belong to Islam any longer. Put this aside, of all 
these Muslims only a small number of about 20 per cent are or-
ganised in mosque associations (cf. Haug/Müssig/Stichs 2009: 
80, 96f., 167). 
2. Muslim Self-Organisation 
Since the 1980s we could notice that most Turkish mosque 
associations joined organisations on the national level, such as 
the Association of Islamic Culture Centres (VIKZ), the precur-
sor of todays Millî Görüş, and the Turkish-Islamic Union for 
Religious Affairs (DITIB), in order to represent their common 
interests towards German authorities and politics. Later on, the 
Islamic Council of Germany and - as successor of the Islamic 
Working Group - the Central Council of Muslims in Germany 
followed. These two can be described as umbrella organisa-
tions, with organisations like Millî Görüş as members. 
But what are the intentions and necessities leading to 
the establishment of such a nationwide religious association? 
Surely, the acceptance and recognition of Muslim presence in 
Germany plays a certain role in this process, beside the formal 
access to various fields of the public sphere. 
As example serves here - and perhaps it is the main 
battlefield - the introduction of Islamic religious instruction in 
public schools. According to the German constitution (Grund-
gesetz, GG) “religious instruction shall be given in accordance 
with the tenets of the religious communities concerned” (art. 7 
sec. 3 GG). Although there is a kind of consensus on the necessity 
of Islamic religious education as a step towards integration and 
equality of Muslim immigrants - besides the expected effects 
  
 
 
 
58 Organisational Developments towards Legal and 
Political Recognition of Muslims in Germany 
on security issues -, it leads automatically to the question about 
who the concerned religious community on the Muslim side is. 
Religious community in - at least - two meanings: 1. in a legal 
sense and 2. in a more general sense, asking for the potential 
members of such a community. 
2.1 Legal Framework 
At this point, we have to look at the legal framework of 
German state-church-relations.3 First of all, no legal provisions 
are made for a general ‘recognition’ of religious communities, 
and there is no legally prescribed, fixed organisational form. 
Any such recognition is connected with an application of cer-
tain laws, e.g. a quite abstract Muslim religious community 
without any organisational structures has been recognised in 
the sense of para. 4 a of the Law on the Protection of Animals in 
the question of halal-slaughtering. 
But with reference to the recognition of a Muslim reli-
gious community in the sense of the previously mentioned art. 7 
sec. 3 GG on religious instruction in public schools, there is obvi-
ously the demand for a high degree of organisational structure 
and inner constitution, usually applied for the recognition as 
corporation by public law according to art. 140 GG in conjunc-
tion with art. 137 WRV.4 This organisational and legal form of a 
public corporation provides various far-reaching rights, which 
require clear structures including transparent procedures for 
decision making and one or more reliable bodies which authen-
3 For an overview with reference to Muslims, see Rohe 2004; Rohe 2001. 
4 Constitution of the Weimar Republic. The articles of this constitution referring 
to State-church relations are implemented into the Fundamental Law (GG). 
  
59 Organisational Developments towards Legal and 
Political Recognition of Muslims in Germany 
tically and authoritatively decide about doctrine and order (cf. 
Vöcking 1993: 100, 103). 
Muslims in Germany are by now quite far from fulfilling 
these prerequisites. Additionally, one should notice that espe-
cially for religious instruction in public schools, these require-
ments must be met on state-level. 
2.2 Top-Down 
To meet these demanding requirements for recognition, 
several attempts were made on the Muslim side to come to 
an united (umbrella) organisation for the whole of Germany. 
Starting in 1988, all larger Turkish-Islamic Associations and 
the Islamic Centres in Munich, Aachen and Hamburg besides 
others were members of the ‘Islamic Working Group in Ger-
many’ (Islamischer Arbeitskreis in Deutschland, IAK), which was 
transformed into the ‘Central Council of Muslims in Germany’ 
(Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland, ZMD) in 1994, but frag-
mented at the same time. 
In recent history, the decision of the Federal Administra-
tive Court from February, 23 2005 (BVerwG 2005) on religious 
instruction and umbrella organisations as religious commu-
nities, provided ‘a manual for reconstruction of the Muslim 
community under the conditions of the German constitutional 
law’, as one of the judges put it (Graulich 2005: 80). This pushed 
on with the efforts to come to a national association, called 
Schura Deutschland, which should reach down to the individual 
members of mosque associations via state (Bundesland) associa-
tions. The internal negotiations went on since January 2005, 
without any signs of visible success. Rather, the largest organi-
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sation, DITIB, did not officially cooperate at all, whereas the 
Süleymancis (VIKZ) resigned from this ambitious project in the 
beginning of 2006. This might serve to illustrate the seemingly 
insurmountable difficulties to come to a single, institutionalised 
interlocutor on state level, eventually nationwide. 
Alternatively, during the festivities on the occasion of 
the birthday of the prophet Muhammad in the Cologne Arena, 
April 2007, thousands of Muslims could witness the announce-
ment of the newly formed ‘Coordination Council of Muslims in 
Germany’ (Koordinierungsrat der Muslime in Deutschland, KRM), 
an umbrella group combining the leading Muslim organisa-
tions, namely the Islamic Council (IR), the Turkish-Islamic Union 
for Religious Affairs (DITIB), the Central Council of Muslims in 
Germany (ZMD), and the Association of Islamic Culture Centres 
(VIKZ) (Spiegel Online: 2007a; Spiegel Online: 2007b). 
Since the headquarters of all these organisations are situ-
ated in Cologne, one of their foci is the installation of Islamic 
religious instruction in state schools in North Rhine-Westphalia 
(NRW) according to art. 7 sec. 3 GG. In this matter, the state gov-
ernment of North Rhine-Westphalia had proposed to install lo-
cal models of Islamic religious education preferably in Cologne 
and Duisburg in accordance with local Muslim communities, 
consisting of Round Tables of numerous mosque associations. 
Herewith bypassing the larger organisations and especially the 
new Coordination Council. 
With a look at the media coverage on this new umbrella 
organisation and its development, one could assume that this 
approach could lead to one representation of at least those 
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Muslims, who are organised in mosque associations. If we 
would take – as it was proposed by the speakers of the KRM – the 
number of organised mosques and the number of Muslims visit-
ing these mosques, e.g., for Friday prayers, as base for our esti-
mations up to 80 percent of all active Muslims were represented 
(Köhler 2008). In contrast to the KRM-statement, the recent rep-
resentative study “Muslim Life in Germany” conducted by the 
research group of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 
finds that only just over a third of the interviewed Muslims at-
tend religious events or worship several times a month or more 
frequently. At the same time results show that Muslim associa-
tions in Germany do not represent the majority of Muslims in 
Germany. Less than 25 per cent of all Muslims feel that their 
interests are represented unreservedly by Muslim umbrella and 
head associations represented in the German Islam Conference. 
(Haug/Müssig/Stichs 2009: 161, 175f.)  But as a decisive negative 
factor we still have to notice that the necessary linkage of the 
Coordination Council with state-based religious communities 
reaching down to individual members, according to the before 
mentioned ruling of the Federal Administrative Court, is still 
missing. 
2.3 In Between 
But, as mentioned before, the attempt for a nationwide 
representation like Schura Deutschland included plans to reach 
down to the individual members of mosques associations via 
association on state level. This level is necessary because reli-
gious and cultural affairs, e.g. religious education in schools, 
are matters of the Federal States. This has led and still leads to 
the creation of umbrella organisations in various Federal States, 
or is based on previously founded ones respectively. But also 
  
 
 
62 Organisational Developments towards Legal and 
Political Recognition of Muslims in Germany 
the Islamic Religious Community in the state of Hesse, which is 
based on individual membership, but also suspected of islamist 
tendencies, could not succeed, after several years of litigation, 
to be recognised as religious community in the sense of art. 7 
sec. 3 GG to become co-responsible for Islamic religious instruc-
tion in state schools there. 
2.4 Bottom-Up 
Beside these examples for the top-down approach, last 
manifested in the KRM, we can notice several examples of a 
bottom-up approach, of establishing religious communities on 
local level. The most prominent example seems to be the ‘Islam-
ic Religious Community Erlangen’, just a few kilometres from 
Nuremberg. They succeeded in the establishment of Islamic re-
ligious instruction in two schools now, in close cooperation with 
the respective parents, the local authorities, and the University 
of Erlangen-Nuremberg. The latter could finally set up an insti-
tute for Muslim teacher training. This local approach seems to 
be widely accepted - also by the appropriate state ministry - and 
recommended as example worth following for communities 
with similar prerequisites, such as Nuremberg itself. 
Additionally, mosque associations in some other cities 
like Dortmund (islam.de 2007) and Bonn (Lyffyt 2006; Rashid 
2006) have unified to local councils or umbrella organisations 
to speak with one voice in questions of common interest. 
3. State Interaction 
With the intention to establish Islamic religious instruc-
tion in its state schools, the states of Lower-Saxony and Baden-
Württemberg convened so-called Round Tables, which should 
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represent more or less the majority of the respective Muslim 
population. The difficulties showed up, as the Alevi group left 
the Round Table in Hanover (Lower Saxony), because it could 
not comply to the basics of Islam agreed upon for the curricu-
lum. Also in the case of Baden-Württemberg, the Round Table 
dissolved, so that further steps had to be postponed and new 
cooperation partners to be found. 
On the federal level the Federal Ministry of the Interior, 
the German federal state has started an official dialogue with 
Muslim Organisations and individuals in September 2006. Al-
though its official aim is not to organise a Muslim Representa-
tion on federal state level, it did, as a side effect, catalyse the for-
mation process towards the nation-wide ‘Coordination Council 
of Muslims in Germany’. Additionally, several Muslim function-
aries expect and demand from the Islam Conference to provide 
the Muslim organisations with a set of guidelines for official 
recognition. This happened, because some German politicians 
questioned the quality of the new umbrella organisation with 
regard to possible recognition (Spiegel Online 2007c). A speaker 
of the Federal Ministry of the Interior even added that they had 
no need of talking with the council, because all included organi-
sations also took part in the Islam Conference (WDR 2007). 
With a look on Muslim media, we can see obvious criti-
cism on the process itself, but also on the non-information 
policy of the Muslim organisations (Özkan 2007). This leads to 
the conclusion that the proclaimed representativeness of the 
Muslim representations is not connected to the Muslim basis. 
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4. Résumé 
Muslim self-organisation has made a great leap forward, 
caused to a high degree by advice from the legal sphere, and 
soft pressure from the political sphere. Although, none of the 
attempts shown leads to an ‘official’ recognition, mainly for 
reasons like the missing individual membership in a relevant 
number, and the suspicion of islamist tendencies inside Millî 
Görüş and others. One common aim, the introduction of Islamic 
religious instruction, leads to the necessary organisational 
forms and structures for a rather virtual recognition as religious 
community, according to the respective opportunity structures 
in the counties, and according to the personal and organisation­
al possibilities of the Muslim groups involved. 
Looking especially at the question of religious education 
in public schools, we can theoretically explain for what reasons 
the state - at various levels - is interested in Muslim self-organisa-
tion: The German Federal State has recognised and accepted the 
presence of Islam in Germany, and has to make provisions for 
the Muslim participation in the public sphere now. Because the 
religious communities have the duty to lay the ethical-moral 
foundations of the state, due to its concept of secularity, also the 
Muslim religious community should take part in this corporat-
ist system. Thus we might understand the reluctance to accept 
organisations, suspected of islamist tendencies, as part of this 
system. 
Looking at these developments through the glass of the 
neo-institutionalist theory, we find the Muslim associations in-
side the organisational field of Churches and mostly Christian 
and a few Jewish communities, most of them ‘recognised’ as re-
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ligious communities or even as corporations by public law. To be 
on equal footing with these organisations seems to demand the 
imitation of their structures, in the sense of ‘mimetic isomor-
phism’. But just the imagination of so-called church-like struc-
tures has led to vivid disputes within Muslim communities. Due 
to this unease, Muslim Organisation unintentionally resisted 
the normative and coercive isomorphism, just by their inability 
to find a consensus among all organisations. To what extent the 
institutional framework, according to the theories of neo-insti-
tutionalism, has relevant influence on further self-organisation, 
which leads to more than virtual recognition, will be revealed in 
time and has to be in the focus of further research. 
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Muslim self-organisation, or – it seems – a lack thereof as 
compared to other religions in Europe is indeed a good starting 
point to explain the German Islam Conference (Deutsche Islam 
Konferenz, DIK). The German Islam Conference has been delib-
erately set up by the Federal Interior Minister Dr. Schäuble to 
engage with Muslims living in Germany, most of whom are not 
members of one of the Islamic umbrella organisations. In a situ-
ation where we as western societies and governments clearly 
need to better communicate and interact with our Muslim 
communities, the Islam Conference is a necessarily imperfect 
response to a dissatisfactory situation: 
	 First, although most Muslims live well integrated and 
quite happy within our political, economical and so-
cial framework, clearly a growing number – mostly of 
the second or third generation – finds it difficult to set-
tle into our society.
	 Second, while Muslims have grown in numbers as a 
part of our population, until now there has not been 
enough interaction between community leaders and 
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the State to tackle the negative trend in terms of inte-
gration and cohesion. 
	 Third, Muslims live their faith freely and under protec-
tion of our democratic constitution but have not yet 
organised themselves in a coherent manner – a form 
of organisation that would qualify for the kind of part-
nership the German state is engaged in with other reli-
gious groups, especially the Christian denominations.
Our response to that situation is a pragmatic one. It ac-
knowledges the existence of each of these factors rather than 
ignoring it and builds a platform for debate and joint action on 
the challenges mentioned above. It accepts Muslim diversity 
rather than neglecting or even denying it. By doing so, the Islam 
Conference is creating a venue for dialogue also among Mus-
lims themselves. In fact, the German government does not ad-
here to any single narrative of what is Islam, who is Muslim and 
hence who should be excluded from contacts between Muslims 
and the State they are living in. With the German Islam Confer-
ence, we have created both a forum and a process for more dia-
logue, better understanding and growing cooperation. 
A brief outline of how the conference actually works will 
highlight and explain that complexity. The DIK convenes on 
two levels: First, in a plenary made up of 15 Muslim representa-
tives and 15 State representatives from the federal, the Länder 
and the communal level of government. Second, in three work-
ing groups and one discussion group, each of which is staffed 
by Muslim and State representatives as well as scientists and 
experts on the issues dealt with. 
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These issues range from general to specific aspects of 
Muslim life, integration and cohesion, from the foundations of 
our society to the question of Islamic religious tuition and also 
the threat from extremist tendencies within Islam. In short, the 
Islam Conference deals with all issues of concern to those who 
need to be willing and able to foster a positive and lasting rela-
tionship: the people. 
This has certainly slowed down the process and made it 
more difficult for all participants to agree upon joint positions. 
There are, however, not only steps forward, by real results. At 
the plenary session in March of 2008, the Islam Conference 
agreed on recommendations concerning issues central to our 
co-existence, from building and using mosques to the introduc-
tion of Islam classes at state schools. All participants in the Islam 
Conference have declared their allegiance to Germany’s system 
of democracy and to the values enshrined in our Basic Law. The 
Muslim organizations also recognize their responsibility to 
work with the state and German society to fight extremism. 
These results demonstrate how productive the dialogue 
is for social cohesion. There is, however – as one might expect – 
also criticism for the process. One is, that the Islam Conference 
is mixing issues of politics and religion. Indeed it is obvious that 
there is no way of overlooking that exact politicization is one of 
the challenges we need to confront – not by ignoring it, but by 
sorting out the issues and fostering common sense. 
Another point of criticism, and that will also not come 
as a surprise, has been the choice of participants in the Confer-
ence, especially the plenary session. One could argue: what is 
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the legitimacy of individuals to speak on behalf of their fellow 
Muslims or even Islam? The simple answer is: No more than that 
of other individuals, except if they can offer expertise and in-
sight on the issues debated and if they, as a group, represent the 
plurality and diversity of a community that has simply not yet 
organized itself in a representative way. 
The question of organization then, it seems, is both an 
impediment and a rationale one for a structured intercultural 
dialogue that aims at furthering Muslim self-organization ra-
ther than exploiting diversity. While all the criticism mentioned 
will be directed at the Islam Conference time and again, no one 
can credibly deny that the very forum and process has led to a 
very fruitful and productive debate in our society, one – as Min-
ister Schäuble envisioned in his declaration opening the confer-
ence – in which Muslims are welcomed as a part of this people 
and also one in which Muslims tend to identify themselves more 
with the society they are living in. 
Summing up the personal experience I have gained by 
listening and talking to many Muslims, participants of the DIK 
or not, I could not agree more with what one of them recently 
said: It should be one of the goals of this process, that Muslims 
will be represented differently in five years from now than they 
are today. 
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Visibility of Islam in contemporary Spain is a relatively 
recent trend, compared to other Western European countries. 
When measured against its neighboring countries however, 
Spain has one of the first institutional arrangements in Europe 
that recognises Islam as a minority religion and establishes an 
official representation. In 1992, a time when the presence of 
Muslim communities was not considered very relevant in terms 
of statistics, or visible in the public sphere, Spain provided a 
legal frame for religious practice that continues today. 
This early institutionalisation of Islam may be explained 
by a progressive government policy that was following with 
interest the growing relationship between Muslim communi-
ties and the State in other European countries. More important-
ly, this meant another big step in the process of democratisation 
in Spain and the consolidation of civil rights. For the Spanish 
collective imaginary, 1992 is a key year. Spain celebrated several 
different historical events during that year but possibly the most 
outstanding was the 500 year anniversary of the “discovery” of 
America (now renamed “The encounter”).  But there was one 
other significant commemoration that the country could not 
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forget: the decree of expulsion of the Jews signed by the Catho-
lic Kings. With the Agreements of Cooperation signed with the 
three main religious minorities, Jews, Evangelicals and Mus-
lims, the Spanish government was re-reading and re-writing 
an age-old legacy1 in the light of the new democratic system, 
completing a process of 20 years of development of religious lib-
erties that had begun at the end of the 1960s. 
Broadly speaking, the process of institutionalisation of 
Islam through the recognition of religious liberty had been 
determined as a first step at a time when visibility of the Mus-
lim community was almost non-existent. The law of Religious 
Liberty in 1967 opened the door to the constitution of the first 
associations in Ceuta and Melilla, two Spanish cities in North 
Africa with large Muslim populations, as well as in Madrid and 
Andalucia. Thus, the various associations were at a very forma-
tive stage at the beginning of the 80s and were being stimulated 
by nationalised Muslims from the Middle East and Spanish con-
verts that had mainly known Islam through the teaching of the 
Morabitun movement, whose influence was extending to differ-
ent European countries. 
At this time, another trend determining the actual con-
figuration of Spanish Islam was taking place. A decade later, an 
1 It was a condition for the recognition of the Muslim minority that it fulfilled the 
legal condition of “being clearly established” (notorio arraigo). This means that 
the Muslims needed to prove that they had a certain organisation in the country 
as well as a significant number of members. As this was not the case for the Mus-
lim community at the end of the 1980s, in 1989 the clear establishment of Islam 
in Spain was legally approved by taking into account the Muslim legacy as “one 
of the spiritual beliefs that has formed the historic character of Spain” (Jiménez-
Aybar 2004: 68ff.). 
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economic boom made Spain a new destination for immigrants, 
mainly from North Africa and more concretely from Morocco 
due to its close proximity. The immigration law of 1985 opened 
borders to reunite immigrant workers with their families.  This 
in turn facilitated an associational fabric which became the 
answer for community necessities such as education, religious 
practice, etc. through to the next decade. This economic im-
migration allowed the Muslim community to acquire a demo-
graphic weight and to become the visible force in Spain that it is 
today. 
The process of institutionalisation that took place from 
the end of the 80s until the signature of the Agreement in 1992 
is far from being representative of this new reality. From the 
beginning, the contacts between the State and the Muslim 
community were the result of political desire more than a real 
process of interaction. In other words, the priority of signing an 
Agreement lacked a real process of interlocution with the com-
munities. The Agreement was organised in accordance with the 
recognition of the other two religious minorities, following a 
model used for all three. Discussions were conducted at a very 
institutional level, meaning that only the associations inscribed 
in the official Register of Religious Entities were present in the 
process. The government also made it a condition to have one 
unique interlocutor, leading to the constitution of the Islamic 
Commission of Spain. This action provoked internal conflicts 
among the Muslim associations involved that were organised 
since 1989 in one umbrella organisation, the Federation of Reli-
gious Islamic Entities of Spain (FEERI), from which split a second 
federation, the Union of Islamic Communities of Spain (UCIDE) 
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in 1991.2 Both entities have shown irreconcilable positions since 
the establishment of the Commission. Thus, the twofold nature 
of the Islamic Commission, with two General Secretaries, and 
even two legal addresses, was a very significant reason for the 
fragility of this representation. For 15 long years, representation 
was left in the hands of the same outstanding personalities who 
monopolised interaction at the national level and were the only 
authorised official voice of the Muslim community to the State. 
On the one hand, this official leadership led to a paralysis that 
precipitated important changes that began to take place post 
March 11. On the other hand, it responded to a very specific and 
contested profile based mainly on ideology and with which the 
larger Muslim immigrant community does not identify. 
This model of official representation in front of the State 
is often perceived very negatively by those who are outside of 
the official structure of the Islamic Commission. Their positions 
indicate that the reason for this failure is perceived as a result 
of the internal fragmentation of this representative body that 
has lead to a situation of inability to coordinate the needs and 
claims of the communities at the local level. 
From the government’s perspective, the Agreement of 
1992 was not a beginning but an end to its interaction with the 
2 This second federation arose from the split of the Muslim Association of Spain, 
which had delegations in various cities around the country. With the aim 
of counteracting the power of the FEERI, this Association registered all of its 
branches as independent associations and so created this second organisation. 
The first Federation was in the hands of Spanish converts, although the associa-
tions ascribed to it are very heterogeneous. The second one also represents a 
varied group of associations, and it has been, since its creation, headed by a 
nationalized Syrian. 
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Muslim minority. The signature was felt as a success by both 
sides, but at the time of the implementation of the law, it was 
obstructed mainly due to the internal problems that emerged 
within the Commission during the process, but also because the 
signature of the Agreement had somehow fulfilled the ultimate 
aim of completing the process of recognition of religious lib-
erties for minorities. Thus, the legal arrangement was – and still 
is – considered very positive and advanced at the time of its sign-
ing. This idea remains not only in academic literature  (Ferrari 
2006: 14), but also among the Muslim leaders that witnessed the 
process. However, its implementation with regards to the needs 
of a growing immigrant community was almost non-existent to 
the point that we find several criticisms regarding the arrange-
ment among Muslim leaders at large today. 
On top of all of this, the events of 9/11 and more strongly 
the terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004 have deeply 
influenced the public debate about Islam in Spain due to issues 
of security and immigration control.  But, there has also been 
an effect inside the Muslim community which is more and more 
aware of its visibility in Spanish society and its need for repre-
sentation. And with representation comes the issue of who is 
speaking in the name of Muslims, i.e. who has the authority to 
represent Islam and respond to challenges to Islamic belief and 
practice in Spain. 
1.	 The Setting Up of Muslim Organisations 
During the 80s and 90s 
The fabric of Muslim associations began in the late 1960s 
as an immediate consequence of the granting of religious 
liberty. Although the first groups were set up in Ceuta and Me-
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lilla, leadership at the national level was lead by associations 
established first in Madrid at the beginning of the 1970s and 
then spread across to other cities around the country. Initially, 
it might seem that ethnicity was the decisive feature for the es-
tablishment of Muslim associations and prayer rooms as distinc-
tions were made between the associations formed of Spanish 
converts and those organised by students originally from Mid-
dle East countries (mostly from Syria but also from Jordan and 
Palestine). While ethnicity was an issue, a complex set of other 
features such as ideology, culture, identity, economic reasons, 
personal relations and charismatic leadership also played an 
important role in the formation of these associations. The mem-
ories of those who participated in these very first associations 
and prayer rooms show how ethnicity was viewed at the very 
beginning to be only a minor obstacle for relations between 
converts and Arabs. Arabs were often perceived by converts as 
the portrayers of Islamic knowledge and the “purest” Islam. In 
the Arab’s view, conversion was more important than sectarian 
discrepancies in worship. However, ideology and identity seem 
to be the main reasons for the subsequent rupture or distance. 
Today, witnesses on both sides remember reasons going beyond 
the ethnicity factor to underline sectarian differences and over-
all a diverse idea of Muslim-Spanish identity (Rosón Lorente 
2005). 
Concerning ideology, it is believed that the first Muslim 
associations were organised mainly by Syrian students influ-
enced by the Syrian Muslim Brothers. This early relation to the 
movement is still unclear. The negative image of the Muslim 
Brothers that prevails today in the media (they are often re-
ferred to as a fundamentalist, extremist, or even terrorist organ-
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isation) makes Muslim leaders reluctant to discuss any current 
or past links with the Brotherhood or if their associations were 
at one time officially attached to its international organisation 
in Europe.  While this may be the case in most instances, many 
leaders will admit to a certain intellectual influence by out-
standing scholars linked to or members of the Muslim Brothers.3 
Ideology, together with ethnicity and doctrinal differ-
ences, could be used to explain the fissure between first gener-
ation Muslim leaders from Arab countries and converts. When 
asked about the possibility that converts could bridge the gap 
between Muslims and Spanish society, a nationalised Spaniard 
of Syrian origin who has been involved in Muslim associations 
since the early 1970s, referred precisely to what he describes 
as “heterodoxy” of Spanish converts as an obstacle for leading 
Muslim immigrants of Arab origin in Spain. He does, however, 
acknowledge that they were better prepared at the time than 
immigrants (meaning those established within society for dec-
ades and with a consolidated leadership) to interact with State 
administration. The same objection was discussed during in-
terviews by other Arab leaders with similar profiles and also by 
converts who participated in the development of communities 
during the 70s. 
Dietz (2004) has described how within the last two dec-
ades converts have created small and stable communities 
3 This and following information about associations and leaders is based on in-
terviews conducted during 2004-2006 with a varied number of Muslim leaders 
in Madrid, Valencia, Granada, Ceuta and Melilla. (The main conclusions of this 
field research were published in Arigita 2006). 
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integrated in transnational networks4, which he relates to the 
process of conversion or a (shared) ‘voyage’ in the company of 
other fellows following the same path. These communities are 
closer to other similar organisations abroad than to Muslim 
immigrants in their own cities.  As a result of their particular 
experience, they believe immigrant Islam includes a cultural 
and historical legacy which contrasts with the ‘universality’ of 
Islamic belief. Therefore, what was once perceived by them as 
the ‘purest’ Islam (Islam of the Arabs) is today addressed as a cul-
tural weight or political and ideological distortion of what they 
consider the “true, universal message of Islam”. 
Besides these two mainstream beliefs that were prevalent 
during the first decade after the acquisition of religious free-
dom, a completely different scenario has emerged since the end 
of the 1980s that sets a more complex and varied picture of Is-
lam today. The growing presence of Muslim immigrants has not 
only had an impact on statistics, but it also has stimulated new 
trends in Muslim self-organisation and acted as a catalyst for an 
emerging leadership which aspires to modify the rules of the 
official representation towards the State. 
2.	 A New Political Agenda for State Interaction 
With Muslims After March 11 
The impact of March 11, 2004 on public opinion about 
Islam in Spain, and the change of government three days later, 
4 In spite of the internal splits suffered by the first group of Morabitun, the first as-
sociation founded in 1976 as the Islamic Community of Spain, the Sufi influence 
and the claim of Muslim heritage in Spain (which were the main characteristics 
of this first organisation) remain as marks of identity for Spanish converts at 
large, which they often portray as the future of a successful integration of Islam 
in the West. 
 81 Muslim Organisations and State Interaction in Spain: 
Towards a More Pluralistic Representation? 
called for a reestablishment of relations with Muslim repre-
sentatives. On a different level, the events of March 11 also stimu-
lated a renewed interest in Islam on different fronts and with 
different purposes, sparking internal debates within Muslim 
associations and creating a shared sense that Muslims and Islam 
were being questioned. 
Various debates on Islam and Spanish identity had previ-
ously existed for many years, linked to issues such as the Muslim 
legacy of Al-Andalus, the colonial experience in North Africa, 
and the growing visibility of Muslim immigration since the 
1980s (Martín Muñoz 2002). Nevertheless, the influence of the 
events of September 11 and March 11 in the global public sphere 
have reinforced in Spain the claim of a supposed “culture clash”, 
assuming that a certain Islamic specificity makes integration 
impossible. During the last few years media as well as political 
and intellectual debates have increased sharply: Polemics and 
new understandings of the Muslim legacy in Spain renewed 
interest in how Muslim communities are organised in other 
countries and, most especially, sparked a deep interest by the 
media in features and goals of the Muslim population settled in 
Spain. 
Muslims became a new focus of attention (and concern), 
in the middle of a polarised debate on reasons and responsibili-
ties for the attacks in Madrid. During the weeks that followed 
March 11, leaders of both federations contributed to the discus-
sion with statements to the press condemning the attacks and 
expressing their concern about the possibility that Muslims at 
large could suffer a negative impact from these acts in their 
daily lives. Leaders also acknowledged the generally positive 
response of Spanish society. The associations also encouraged 
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their members to donate blood and to actively participate in the 
demonstration against terrorism that took place two days after 
the attacks. Apart from this, the presence of Muslim representa-
tives in the media was restricted to their personal willingness to 
participate in debates. In spite of these very specific initiatives to 
become more visibly involved, a lack of participation of Muslim 
voices still exists in the Spanish public sphere.5 
In addition to the Muslim representatives, the Association 
of Moroccan Workers in Spain (ATIME) quickly responded to the 
debate after the attacks in Madrid by encouraging all Muslim 
citizens to denounce racial bias and Islamophobic attitudes and 
actions. It also questioned openly the role of imams and referred 
to the danger of spreading radical ideas among the followers 
by uncontrolled preaching. The Association suggested to the 
government the formation of a democratically chosen Islamic 
council based on the pre-existing French model in order to 
counteract the negative influence of radical preaching. 
Since 2004, the issue of controlling imams has often 
been made the center of attention by the media and is usu-
ally coupled with stories about radicalism and the influence 
of donations through Saudi Arabia. Concerning imams, great 
significance was attached to their responsibility and influence 
upon the Muslim population during the months that followed 
the attacks. In some cases, they are acknowledged as a point of 
reference for Islamic religious authority within the communi-
5 The 2003 appointment of a Muslim deputy in the Parliament of Catalonia seems 
to be a prominent exception to this absence. Deputy Mohammed Chaib publicly 
points out the exceptional character of his position when reflecting about his 
political career and Muslim identity. 
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ties owing to their role as leaders of prayer in the mosque. In 
other cases, they are being held responsible for cultural or social 
mediation with the host society.6 A sort of a stereotyped and uni-
form image of imams as leading Islam in Spain contradicts the 
diversity of their religious knowledge as well as the variety of 
their responsibilities within communities. In 2004 and 2005 the 
Ministry of the Interior made different proposals concerning 
strategies to control radical preaching in prayer rooms through-
out the country, but each of them provoked much controversy.7 
An early proposal to explore the possibility of finding a legal 
framework that would enable the State to control religious 
preaching (the Minister included all religious beliefs in order 
to avoid discrimination) resulted in protests by certain Muslim 
representatives. Criticisms by experts questioned the effective-
ness of the proposals in counteracting terrorism and drew at-
tention to the negative consequences that such initiatives could 
have for Muslim citizens when Islam is perceived as potentially 
dangerous in essence.8 As a result, some of the larger mosques 
started to publish the khutbas (sermons) on their websites in 
Arabic, and in some instances translating them into Spanish. 
6		 This is the viewpoint of deputy Mohammed Chaib, who, in a book on immigra-
tion issues stated that “it is necessary to recognize that imams, as citizens and 
religious leaders with duties and rights, carry out work in the neighbourhoods 
and in the town. We should know how to make use of their role in these areas in 
order to reach the community we should learn to make the most of their influ-
ence since the message they transmit to their communities is crucial, and obvi-
ously, this message is not the same when they transmit it in their countries of 
origin or in Catalonia” (Chaib 2005: 176). 
7		 El Gobierno estudia una reforma legal para el control de mezquitas e imames. 
El País, (08/05/2004) http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/Gobierno/estudia/ 
reforma/legal/control/mezquitas/imames/elpepiesp/20040508elpepinac_3/Tes
[Accessed 10 April 2008]. 
8		 Possibly one of the most outstanding declarations was that of Gema Martín 
Muñoz, who appeared in front of the March 11th Commission pointing to the 
fact that controlling imams and mosques would not be an effective way of tack-
ling terrorism but in turn would provoke a deeper sentiment of discrimination 
against Muslim citizens. 
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In relation to the influence of Wahhabism through the 
founding of cultural and religious activities, an economic sup-
port system by Saudi Arabia has certainly existed for a long time.
This can be seen mostly through the distribution of translations 
of outstanding works of Saudi ulamas (scholars), grants for 
Muslim students to complete their degrees in Spain, and, above 
all, in endowments to establish large scale mosques.9 Both the 
World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) and the Muslim 
World League, two international organisations based in Saudi 
Arabia which have official status as NGO’s, have been among 
the principal donors to Muslim associations in Spain. Apart from 
that official support, private donations coming from the Gulf 
States through informal contacts continue to partially finance 
the establishment of some prayer rooms and cultural activities. 
Although this economic influence is visible in some of the big 
mosques, it is less evident when it comes to local associations 
and prayer rooms. With regard to the suggestion that this finan-
cial support has led to an ideological influence on the spread 
of radicalism among young Muslims and linking this trend to 
mosques with Saudi links, interviews with Muslim leaders both 
at local and national level either dismiss this ideological influ-
ence or refute it completely. 
Within an atmosphere of insinuations and mistrust, the 
government elected in March 2004 launched a new phase in 
the dialogue with the Islamic Commission (as well as with the 
9 Worship is performed mainly in small prayer rooms. Some of them have im-
proved their premises through the years and since the end of the 80s, several big 
mosques have been set up with private funding and endowments from Muslim 
countries, mainly Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. The cultural events and activi-
ties organised alongside religious worship attract varied groups of people. 
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other two minorities involved in the same process in 1992). Para-
doxically, this did not gain as much attention by the media as 
the control policies proposed by the Interior Ministry. The result 
of this new discourse resulted in the formation of the Founda-
tion for Pluralism and Coexistence in April 2006. With the aim 
of “promoting religious liberty”, the main task of this new insti-
tution is to guarantee and coordinate the funding of religious 
minorities specifically for socio-cultural initiatives. It seeks to 
overcome lack of funding as the core obstacle to the implemen-
tation of the Agreement of Cooperation. 
However, the crucial issue during this new phase of inter-
locution is the lack of authentic representation on the Islamic 
Commission, a decision which has fallen to the hands of Muslim 
leaders. It is not by chance that the above mentioned request of 
ATIME stressed the necessity of democratic elections to form a 
new Islamic Council, completely ignoring the existence of the 
present Islamic Commission. In fact, the major difficulty in the 
process of talks between the State and the Muslim minority is 
representational gridlock caused by the Islamic Commission 
acting as the representative body for all Muslim communities. 
As a result of this gridlock, the Foundation for Pluralism and 
Coexistence has established a system of financing the activities 
of the associations directly without the mediation of the Islamic 
Commission. This may be understood as an implicit acknow-
ledgment by the administration that the leading role attributed 
by law to the Islamic Commission does not work anymore. 
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3. Towards a Changing (and Challenging) Land­
scape	for	Muslim	Self-Organisation	and	Offi­
cial Representation After March 11 
The new steps taken by the government since 2004 have 
lead concurrently to changes within Muslim organisations. This 
can be easily linked to the unprecedented public interest in Is-
lam and Muslims in Spain after the Madrid train bombings and 
the obvious concern by Muslim leaders about the consequent 
negative and schematic image that was being portrayed about 
Islam. However, the revitalisation of self-organisations would 
not have been possible without the demographic growth of 
the Muslim population and the sociological changes that have 
taken place since the 90s. 
A very recent demographic study commissioned by 
UCIDE10 estimates the number of Muslim citizens based on 
figures from the 2007 census combined with data about na-
tionalisations, education statistics (students attending Muslim 
religious education) and data from the Islamic Commission. Its 
findings corroborate more general estimates putting the popu-
lation of Muslims to be more than one million, most of them 
established in Madrid (196,689) and the South–East regions of 
Catalonia (279,037), Andalusia (184,430) and Valencia (130,471). 
The official census (www.ine.es) also shows that Moroccans 
(621,295) constitute the largest Muslim population, followed by 
10		 Demographic Study about Muslim fellow citizens”, available at http:// 
mx.geocities.com/hispanomuslime/estademograf.doc [Accessed 05 April 2008]. 
However, these figures keep being problematic since the main parameter used 
to obtain them keeps being the nationality of origin. During the last few years 
different researches point to a figure that fluctuates between one million and 
one and a half million. 
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Algerians (50,383), Pakistanis (42,929) and Senegalese (35,875). 
According to the study presented by UCIDE, Muslims originally 
from Spain would constitute the second largest group. This 
includes descendants of immigrants and Spanish converts, the 
largest majority of them being second generation sons of im-
migrants, followed by the Muslim population of Ceuta (30,537) 
and Melilla (34,397). 
What does this growing Muslim population mean in 
terms of public visibility and organisation? If the revitalisation 
of Muslim self-organisation cannot be understood without 
taking into account demographic and sociological changes 
within the Muslim community, the opposite also holds true. The 
current context in which public opinion is heavily influenced 
by a negative, stereotyped image of Islam also influences new 
modes of mobilisation and leadership. Thus, it has a two-fold 
effect with regard to the issue of Muslim representation and 
self-organisation: on the one hand, as previously shown, an 
increase in the Muslim population has had an impact on politi-
cal statements and has urged a new relationship between the 
government and Muslim representatives. On the other hand, 
this new scenario has compelled Muslim self-organisations to 
mobilise, creating new modes of organisation and representa-
tion. However, these types of renovations also lead to question-
ing whether these new modes are truly innovative or, on the 
contrary, validate the rationale of the Agreements of 1992. 
During the last four years, alternatives to the current 
blockage of the Islamic Commission are finally emerging.  
These are in part due to new efforts made by public authorities 
to recognise and tackle the situation, but are mainly the result 
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of internal processes taking place within Muslim communities 
at the local level and the emergence of a new leadership. 
Concerning leadership at the local level, Martín Muñoz 
has showed how, since the 1990s, there is an emerging leader-
ship among Moroccans resulting from the economic immigra-
tion of the 1990s which does not participate at the national 
level. These leaders are described as “new, ‘decentralised’ and 
autonomous” (Martín Muñoz et al. 2003: 113), responding to a 
long established profile of immigrants, from a fairly good eco-
nomic situation, having families (children schooled in Spain), 
and relations or contacts with the host society through their 
work. In short, they are able to solve the difficulties that an indi-
vidual immigrant or a community has to face in daily life and, 
as Martín Muñoz points out, “their leadership was informal at 
first, and then became institutionalised through the creation 
of an association” (Martín Muñoz et al. 2003: 116). Thus, it is rea-
sonable to conclude that this new leadership among Moroccan 
immigrants has followed the same pattern of first phase com-
munities with a more established history within the country, in 
which leadership was based on social and organisational abili-
ties rather than on religious authority. This leadership was in 
fact filling a gap in the absence of better qualified leaders. 
Nevertheless, imams are still predominantly perceived 
as the main reference for Islamic authority in Spain. Following 
this assumption, specific immigration policies have been put in 
place with the aim of reorganising Muslim representation, com-
bining religious authority with a communitarian profile intend-
ed to lead to a successful integration of Muslim immigrants. 
This is the primary goal of the Cultural and Islamic Council of 
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Catalonia, founded in June 2000. Although officially registered 
as a socio-cultural association inspired by a political will, its goal 
is to unite imams whose internal leadership in mosques is con-
sidered a positive role in developing strategies of social integra-
tion. Therefore, the Council would serve as a mediator between 
the Muslim minority and the autonomous government of Cata-
lonia as well as – with city councils - the administration at the 
local level. On a more national scale, it would play an active role 
in the politics of immigrant integration. This new approach re-
casts the role of imams as internal leaders stepping in as media-
tors of immigration issues rather than religious affairs. 
Besides this top-down organisation, other initiatives are 
taking place at the regional and national levels and have defi-
nitely opened debates on the failure of the Islamic Commission 
as it was created in 1992. While UCIDE maintains its stability, 
FEERI has gone through a process of complete renewal which 
has resulted in a leadership change in 2006.11 Not only has FEERI 
been affected by this type of restructuring, but three new feder-
ations12 have also been assembled in different regions with large 
Muslim immigrant communities and are currently claiming 
their legitimacy to represent Muslims to the State by taking part 
in the Islamic Commission. The profile of these new organisa-
tions, in terms of leadership, ethnic and ideological background 
is very heterogeneous and has attracted a large number of as-
sociations (130 out of about 600 inscribed in the official register 
of the Ministry of Justice). All three, together with the Islamic 
11 http://www.webislam.com/?idn=4508 [Accessed 01 February 2006]. 
12  The Muslim Federation of Spain (FEME), the Islamic Federation of Baleares and 
the Islamic Federation of Murcia. See El Mundo 02 December 2007 http://
medios.mugak.eu/noticias/noticia/123280 [Accessed 14 April 2008]. 
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Council of Catalonia, are demanding democratic elections in 
the Islamic Commission in order to broaden official representa-
tion of the Muslim community.  This means that one vote would 
be designated for each separate, participating association with 
the declared aim of ensuring a more pluralistic participation. 
Despite sharp criticism and internal roadblocks the Islamic 
Commission has experienced in the last decade, it remains the 
legitimate interlocutor and representative body to the State.  Ul-
timately, the proposition for democratic elections must endure 
the stability and continuity of the Commission, no matter how 
(in)effective it might be, through to the next leadership change. 
In addition to these steps at the State interaction level, 
post-March 11 has also revealed emerging groundwork for new 
forms of social participation and public visibility for Muslims, 
once again relating to the catalyse of the events of 2004 and 
from the new sociological features of the Muslim population in 
Spain. So, for example, the demographic study by the Observa-
torio Andalusí pointed out the rise of a significant and growing 
number of young Muslims with a university-level education.13 
In spite of the difficulties to get an accurate estimation, there 
is in fact a growing visibilisation of urban, educated groups 
which are mobilising in response to what is felt as a very nega-
tive public opinion of Islam and their identity as Muslims. This 
phenomenon is only at its preliminary stages and is still clearly 
considered marginal when compared to the leadership of more 
13		 According to Riay Tatari, president of UCIDE, "contrary to what happened in 
France, many [of the young Muslims] have completed a University degree or 
have a professional qualification. They will not face difficulties to find a job […] 
and are well integrated into the Spanish society”. See http://www.
elfaroceutamelilla.es/content/view/9689/67/ [Accessed 11 April 2008]. 
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established religious associations with a longer history of par-
ticipation in state representation issues. Nevertheless, the im-
portance of this phenomenon derives from the groups’ purpose 
of exploring new forms of public action and social engagement 
that transcend religious practice to interact with society at large 
(Téllez forthcoming). Thus, although their capacity to intervene 
in public debates is very limited (or even nonexistent today), 
their member profiles and socio-cultural activity points to new 
forms of Muslim public visibility and new demands beyond 
state recognition and regulation of religious minority practice. 
This new form of mobilisation might mean, consequently, a 
rather qualitative shift for Muslim mobilisation and its public 
visibility in the next few years. 
All in all, 1992 and March 2004 constitute the two key 
dates in the process of institutionalisation and increased vis-
ibility of Islam in Spain. While the events of 1992 were the con-
sequence of a political will, post March 11 shows not only the 
consolidation of Muslim self-organisation but also a timid open-
ing for new forms of public participation. In spite of the sharp 
criticism of the agreements by Muslim leaders, the new steps 
that followed after 2004 seem to indicate a continuity in the 
institutional arrangement of 1992 simply through a new shift in 
leadership. 
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From the late 1800s, indeed until the 1970s, Italy was a 
country of emigration. It became a country of immigration only 
during the 1970s. However, since then, immigration has in-
creased rapidly: there are currently 3,690,000 legal immigrants 
resident in Italy, about 5.6% of the total population of Italy (Cari-
tas/Migrantes 2007). As regards their country of origin, these 
immigrants come from 191 different countries. This “migratory 
polycentrism” (Caritas/Migrantes 2003) has been constant over 
time and would seem to be a permanent feature of immigration 
into Italy. Muslims constitute one third of the Italian migrant 
population, i.e. about one million people. The two largest na-
tional groups of Muslims are people from Albania and Morocco 
followed, in this order, by immigrants from Tunisia, Senegal, 
Egypt, Bangladesh and Pakistan. 
The fact that migrants in Italy come from so many dif-
ferent nations explains not only the religious pluralism found 
among them, but also the pluralism within Islam practised 
in Italy. There are not only both doctrinal and ideological dif-
ferences within Islam, such as those between the Sunnis and 
Shi’ites, but also other differences due to the wide variety of geo-
graphical and cultural origins of these migrants, a variety that 
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has produced many diverse ways of living and concretely inter-
preting Islam. For example, Albanian people in Italy rarely go 
to the mosque and do not follow Islamic practises within their 
daily lives, largely because, although about 70% of the members 
of this national group are considered to be Muslim, they are in 
reality almost completely secularised, having largely lost their 
religious roots during the 50 years they spent under a commu-
nist government. Furthermore, for both Albanian people and 
for other Muslims living in the Balkan area, being defined as 
Muslim is more a question of national identity than of religious 
identity (Pacini 2001). On the other hand, Muslim migrants 
from the Indian subcontinent, for example from Bangladesh or 
Pakistan, tend to organise their religious practises separately, 
among themselves, while the Islam practised by people from 
sub-Saharan Africa is mainly expressed through the Sufi con-
fraternities, which differ from codified official Islam as they lay 
great importance on the personal, emotional elements within 
the relationship with god as preached by the founders of the 
confraternities. This spiritual cohesion is matched by a strong 
organisational cohesion among the members of the confra-
ternity, which is usually expressed by opening its own place of 
prayer. Many Senegalese (the fourth largest national group of 
migrants in Italy who come from a country with a Muslim ma-
jority) are further sub-divided: most belong to the Muridiyya, 
some of them belong someto the are Tijaniyya and some, far 
fewer, belong to the Qadiriyya and to the Layennes Movement 
(Mantovan 2006). Daa’ira1 (especially mourid and tijan) have 
been set up in all Italian cities where there are communities of 
Senegalese migrants (Schmidt di Friedberg 1994). This religious 
1 Daa’ira are regular, collective prayer meetings of members of the confraternity 
living in the area. 
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self-organisation is largely unnoticed by the autochthonous 
population probably because the Senegalese tend to present 
themselves in lay terms, preferring to profess a national rather 
than a religious identity within the public space, a habit they 
most likely acquired during the period when their country was 
under French colonial occupation. 
But now let us consider the main “visible” Muslim organi-
sations in Italy. 
1.	 The Representation of Islam in Italy: 
the Main Muslim Organisations 
The Muslim religious field (Bourdieu 1971) is characterized 
in Italy by a conflict among some organisations. These organi-
sations may differ both in their interpretation of the religious 
traditions and in the way in which they see the relationship be-
tween Islam and institutions. The fact that there is no central au-
thority within Islam, one which can offer a definitive religious 
interpretation acceptable to all, has favoured the emergence of 
internal differences, that are often amplified by the migratory 
experience, in which the traditional, local points of reference of 
religious authority are lacking (Guolo 2005). The main Muslim 
organisations in Italy are: 
	 UCOII ( Unione delle Comunità e delle Organizzazioni 
Islamiche in Italia, The Union of the Islamic Communi-
ties and Organisations in Italy), set up in 1990. This is 
the most important Muslim organisation in Italy and 
mainly draws in migrants from North Africa and the 
Middle East. The leading members of the UCOII are 
close to the Muslim Brotherhood, a neo-traditionalist 
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current within the Islamist movement. UCOII controls 
most of the mosques and the Muslim associations in 
Italy, above all in North and Central Italy. The pre-emi-
nence of UCOII within organised and “visible” Islam is 
due to the dynamism of its leadership, which has not 
only a strong religious identity but also excellent or-
ganisational skills. The leadership is mostly made up of 
young educated immigrants, usually originating from 
urban backgrounds, who have grown up during a pe-
riod of an “awakening of Islam” that has often taken 
place over the last three decades in their countries of 
origin (Guolo 2000). They are not the traditional socio-
religious figures, nor are they part of the religious or-
ganisations of the various “Islam of the States”; rather 
they are the expression of a new phenomenon: that of 
European Islam (Dassetto 1994). The reason why these 
new socio-religious figures have been able to win posi-
tions of leadership within the Muslim community lies 
in their ability to “build Islam” at the organisational 
level within the host society. In other words, it lies in 
their ability to construct relations, to negotiate and 
mediate with the society that surrounds them and 
to gain recognition within that society (Guolo 1999). 
Thus the neo-traditionalist leaders have organised 
themselves so as to be able to respond to the demand 
for Islam that has developed in Italy ever since the 
majority of immigrants became or saw themselves 
as permanent, stable, residents and started to offer, 
through their organisations, health, educational and 
food supply services (e.g. distribution of halal meat). In 
a religion “without a central authority”, where the first 
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to organise in an area automatically assumes leader-
ship within that community, it has not been difficult, 
for this “active minority” (Crespi/Mucchi Faina 1988), 
to assume control over a silent and passive majority 
which has no real means for, or experience of, conflict 
management. In order to understand that this is a mi-
nority, one merely has to note that only about 5% of the 
Muslims in Italy attend the mosque regularly (about 
10% during periods of the major festivals particularly 
important for Muslims, for example Id al Fitr).
	 The Rome Mosque and the “Islam of the States” – The 
great Mosque in Rome is directly linked to the diplo-
macy and governments of the Muslim States. The 
Mosque is the seat of the Islamic Cultural Centre in 
Italy. The council of administration at the Centre is 
mostly made up of the various ambassadors of Sunni 
Muslim States, accredited either to the Vatican or to 
the Italian State itself. The cost of building the mosque, 
as for other great mosques in Europe, has for the most 
part been covered by Saudi Arabia, acting through an 
NGO, the Islamic World League. 
	 Both the Muslim States and the Islamic World League 
are involved in many other initiatives that offer sup-
port to smaller Mosques and Islamic centres scattered 
throughout Italy. Here, participation is indirect, simply 
a response to initiatives already set up at the local level. 
Often these mosques and associations have a national 
basis and allow that State to offer help and religious 
support to immigrants from there; it also allows the 
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State to keep a check on and even control the type of 
Islam being practised by its citizens. The State of Mo-
rocco is particularly active in supporting Islam among 
its emigrants, often through prayer rooms, linked 
to the many Moroccan associations that have been 
founded throughout Italy in both large and small 
towns and cities, especially in the North Italian area. 
Tunisia, too, exercises control over its emigrants, es-
pecially in Sicily where, through an agreement drawn 
up with the Regional Government of Sicily, it has taken 
over control of the mosque in Palermo: the Tunisian 
ambassador nominates the Imam for this mosque 
and oversees all activities through an organisation, 
the Associazione Culturale Islamica di Palermo (Islamic 
Cultural Association of Palermo). Egypt maintains a 
degree of influence over immigrants of Egyptian ori-
gin through Italian-Egyptian friendship associations. 
Egypt promotes a non-politicised Islam and often 
comes into conflict with its emigrants who are affili-
ated to, or sympathise with, the various movements 
within political Islam. 
	 AMI ( Associazione dei Musulmani Italiani, the Associa-
tion of Italian Muslims) – was founded in 1982 and is 
the heir of the Associazione Musulmani del Littorio, an 
organisation of Somali Muslims who became Italian 
citizens during the period when Somalia was an Ital-
ian colony. The association essentially supports the 
idea of the relationship between religious identity and 
citizenship and argues that Western democracy offers 
the best guarantee to safeguard the Muslim religion. 
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It considers the other structures and organisations to 
be inadequate to be representatives of Islam in Italy, 
either because these latter do not take citizenship into 
consideration, or because the AMI defines them as 
“heretical sects” (amongst whom they include Shi’ites 
and Wahabiti), or because they belong to an Islamic 
movement, including the Italian neo-traditionalist 
groups, which the AMI considers to be extremist 
(Guolo 2005). 
	 CO.RE.IS ( Comunità Religiosa Islamica italiana, The Ital-
ian Islamic Religious Community) – is a small group 
of Italian converts to Islam who follow Sufism and 
the esoteric Islam of René Guenon. Their leader is Ab-
del Wâhid Pallavicini, a traditionalist Catholic who 
converted to Islam in 1951. COREIS too is in conflict 
with other Islamist groups in Italy and opposes the 
ideological Islam of these groups through their sup-
port and promotion of Sufi spirituality, of the common 
Abrahamite roots and the relationship between the 
great monotheistic religions. Notwithstanding the fact 
that this organisation has good relations with State 
institutions, to the extent that it represents Italy in in-
ternational Muslim meetings, CO.RE.IS, like AMI, is a 
minor organisation, when compared with UCOII and 
the Mosque of Rome in terms of number of adherents 
and of centres in Italy and, consequently, of influence 
(Guolo 2005).
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2.	 Conflict	About	the	Intesa2 
The regime that controls relations between the State and 
confessional religions in Italy is made up of, on the one hand, 
the Patti Lateranensi, Lateran Pacts (stipulated on the 11 Febru-
ary 1929 and revised in 1985), wherein the Catholic Church re-
established peaceful relations with the Italian State, reiterated 
in Article 7 in the Italian Constitution; and, on the other, by in-
dividual Intese drawn up between the State and other religious 
organisations or bodies (Pace 2004), as defined in Article 8 of the 
Constitution (which also guarantees freedom of worship). Those 
religious groups who have not drawn up an Intesa with the State 
are subject to Law no. 1159 of 24 June 1929, which deals with 
minority religions. Currently, a new law regarding freedom of 
worship is under discussion in the Italian Parliament, but it has 
yet to be approved, partly because of doubts and resistance on 
the part of the Lega Nord (Northern League, a xenophobe politi-
cal party). 
Intese have been concluded by the Valdese Church, the 
7th Day Adventists, Baptists, Pentecostals, Jews and Lutherans. 
Muslims however have not, as yet, stipulated an Intesa with the 
Italian State, largely because of the difficulty of identifying one 
organisation that represents all people in this religious group, 
given that it is a “religion without a centre”, i.e., one with no 
central authority. That there is competition between the various 
Muslim organisations to win the right to represent Islam in Italy 
can be clearly seen in the fact that applications to draw up an 
Intesa have been made to the Presidenza del Consiglio (the Gov-
ernment) autonomously by all the main Muslim organisations. 
2 Intesa is the technical term, in the Italian Constitution, to define an official 
agreement between the State and a religious group. 
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The first draft for an Intesa was submitted in 1992 by the UCOII, 
and was followed, almost immediately, by an official letter from 
the Centro Culturale Islamico di Italia asking for the same thing. 
In 1993, the Associazione dei Musulmani Italiani too, drew up and 
sent a draft thus offering itself as the main interlocutor with 
the Italian State. Lastly, in 1998, CO.RE.IS sent in its draft for an 
Intesa. It is emblematic of the divisions that each draft proposal 
presented the applicant organisation as being the only Muslim 
organisation that should be considered the true representative 
of Islam in Italy (Pacini 2001). 
Since then, the desire to reach an Intesa has encouraged 
the two main organisations, the “Islam of the Mosques” of the 
UCOII and the “Islam of the States” of the Rome Mosque, to try to 
come to some agreement. So, in 1998, the UCOII and the Centro 
Culturale Islamico di Italia tried to unite. They set up the Con-
siglio Islamico d’Italia (Islamic Council of Italy) and submitted a 
joint proposal of agreement to the Italian government. But rela-
tions between the UCOII and the Centro were strained from the 
outset, both because of disagreements regarding the criteria 
upon which the various posts on the Council should be rotated, 
and because the Centro, which seeks to present Islam as a force 
for peace and is only concerned about freedom of worship, 
feared that the political attitudes and activities of UCOII could 
damage the case of Muslims in Italy. The Islam Council of Italy 
does still exist, formally at least, but has never been operational. 
The events of 11 September 2001 only served to exacer-bate the 
differences. Furthermore, international questions - Afghani-
stan, Palestine and Iraq - have both further divided the two 
main actors within organised Islam in Italy and further reduced 
the likelihood of reaching an agreement about a common, ac-
cepted Intesa for Islam (Guolo 2005). 
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3. The Consulta for Islam in Italy 
The growing mistrust of Muslims that developed in the 
aftermath of 11 September 2001, created a pressing need, by the 
Italian institutions, to find an interlocutor, to establish commu-
nication with Muslims. The attempts to draw up an Intesa had 
all come to nothing, as had the proposals for a law on freedom 
of worship. Giuseppe Pisanu, Italian Interior Minister in the Ber-
lusconi government, took the initiative and issued a ministerial 
decree on 10 September 2005 in which he stated his intention of 
setting up the Consulta per l’Islam Italiano which can be roughly 
translated as an Advisory Board, or Committee, for Islam in 
Italy. According to the decree, this Consulta is “set up with ad-
visory functions within the Ministry of the Interior, which will 
chair the board” and “should meet at least three times a year”. 
Its main task should be “to carry out the research and in-depth 
investigations required by the Minister, doing studies and mak-
ing suggestions, for improving offering  on how to improve the 
dialogue between the institutions of the State and the Muslim 
community in Italy and for addingshould add to knowledge 
about the problems of integration, in order to identify the best 
solutions for a harmonious insertion of Muslim communities 
into Italian society, while respecting the Constitution and the 
Laws of the Italian Republic”. 
The decree also established that the members of the Con-
sulta were to be nominated by the Interior Minister in a subse-
quent decree, and would be chosen both from among 
“people, who belong to the Islamic culture and religion and 
who, given their experience, would be able to offer expert, in-
formed advice” and from among “scholars and experts”. On 1st 
December 2005, the Ministry published a list of 15 persons who 
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would be part of the Consulta (the President was to be the Minis-
ter himself). Most of the people nominated are from the first cat-
egory, from the Muslim world. About half of those nominated 
are Italian citizens. Some of them simply belong to the world of 
culture and communication, but there are also representatives 
of various associations, including the leaders of UCOII, CO.RE. 
IS and the Mosque of Rome (among the organisations that had 
presented a draft of an Intesa, only AMI was missing), but also of 
other organisations, such as the Associazione Donne Marocchine 
in Italia (Association of Moroccan Women in Italy) and ANOLF, 
the Associazione Nazionale Oltre le Frontiere (National Associa-
tion beyond Frontiers), which is linked to the CISL, one of the 
larger Italian Trade Unions. 
The decision to try to facilitate the development of a sin-
gle representative voice for Muslims in Italy by setting up this 
Consulta through a top down approach, i.e. by the institutions 
co-opting committee members, is in line with the approach 
adopted in Italy to find representatives of migrants in general, 
since the beginning of the phenomenon. The need to identify 
interlocutors within the varied and fast expanding world of mi-
grants in Italy has led to the setting up of consultative bodies at 
national, regional and provincial levels. All these experiments 
have already clearly shown their limitations, and they are cur-
rently in crisis, since the logic of institutional cooptation, which 
mainly focuses on the needs of the society of arrival (such as 
reducing complexity and choosing interlocutors functional 
for dealing with the institutions and for legitimising them) has 
tended to reduce migrants’ level of participation, thus exacer-
bating divisions. (Mantovan 2007). 
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The aims of the Consulta per l’Islam Italiano are much the 
same, but related to a particular target: reassuring the public 
about the “Muslim threat”, by obtaining the help of people of 
Muslim religion and culture in setting up a commission the 
main purpose of which would be to solve problems relating to 
public order and security. One of the main tasks of the Ministry 
involved is, in fact, the maintenance of public order and, tell-
ingly, it is the first issue mentioned and dealt with in the pream-
ble to the decree which set up the Consulta. The Italian State is 
seeking to create an “Italian Islam” which will include only the 
“moderate” Muslims, i.e. individuals who are far from Islamist 
circles, willing to cooperate with the government, and person-
ally chosen by the Minister (Silvestri 2005), reasoning in line 
with the model of the minority which is tolerated because it can 
be better incorporated into our rules of the game (Pace 2004). 
Both the fact that Islam is essentially perceived in terms 
of “a problem of public order” and the “reassurance” function 
ascribed to the Consulta, are confirmed by the fact that, espe-
cially during the first three meetings, convened by the Minister 
Pisanu, attention often focused on condemnations of terrorism. 
During the second meeting (9 March 2006), for example, the 
members of the Consulta were asked to approve a Manifesto 
dell’Islam in Italia (Manifesto of Islam in Italy), in which it was 
stated, among other things, that there was a “rejection of all 
forms of extremism, fundamentalism, violence and discrimina-
tion” and “rejection of terrorism as a means of struggle in the 
name of religion or political beliefs and ideology”. The majority 
of the Consulta approved the document, only two members did 
not. One was the President of UCOII, who had proposed another 
document with a series of demands, some general and some 
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specifically relating to Muslims. Demands about, for example, 
changes that should be made to the laws on immigration and 
citizenship; the possibility for Muslims to set up private schools; 
offering an hour of religion instruction in schools not only for 
Catholic students but also for Muslims; and for changes to the 
hours of work in order to meet the needs of practising Islam. 
In May 2006 the centre-right government, led by Silvio 
Berlusconi, was replaced by a centre-left coalition led by Ro-
mano Prodi. The first time the new Minister of the Interior, 
Giuliano Amato, convened the Consulta per l’Islam italiano (19 
June 2006), he declared that he wanted to give a “new lease 
of life to the work of the Consulta” and directed the discussion 
towards more social questions, announcing that he wished to 
form a working group within the Consulta that would formulate 
concrete proposals for the reform of the norms regarding citi-
zenship (one of the objectives of the Prodi government). 
In August 2006 however, a statement was made by the 
UCOII regarding Israel’s attack on Lebanon wherein it com-
pared the “Israeli massacres” with “Nazi massacres” and served 
to re-focus the attention of the Consulta on questions directly 
connected with terrorism and security. The Minister, Amato, 
immediately convened the Committee against Discrimination 
and Anti-Semitism and strongly criticised what had been done. 
He called another meeting of the Consulta (28 August 2006) in 
which he insisted that “it was time that all members of the Con-
sulta signed a charter which clearly stated the values and prin-
ciples upon which Italian Islam could and would be built” say-
ing that those who would not sign would be expelled from the 
Consulta. The Charter, called Carta dei Valori, della Cittadinanza 
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e dell’Integrazione (Charter of Values, Citizenship and Integra-
tion), was presented by the Minister of the Interior on 23 April 
2007. The first section, entitled “L’Italia, comunità di persone e di 
valori” (Italy, community of people and of values), opened with 
the statement that: “Italy […] has developed within a Christian 
tradition which has permeated its culture and which, together 
with Judaism, has laid the foundations of modernity and the 
principles of freedom and justice”. Among the principles listed 
in the document, particular emphasis has been laid on the 
importance of the human being and of his/her dignity, the pro-
hibition of any “mutilation of the body that is not necessary for 
medical reasons”, equal rights for men and women, a ban on 
polygamy, the right of freedom of worship, and Italy’s commit-
ment to working for peace, especially in the context of the Pal-
estinian-Israeli conflict, where Italy has always been “in favour 
of a solution which allows Palestinians and Israelis living in two 
States and two democracies”. This latter is a clear response to 
the position taken by the UCOII a few months earlier, which had 
appeared to challenge Israel’s right to exist. 
4. Concluding Observations 
Given what has just been said above, the Consulta per 
l’Islam Italiano does not seem to offer the best means of repre-
senting Muslims in Italy. Some scholars have noted that the cri-
teria of the constitution of the Consulta are very like those of the 
CORIF - Conseil de réflexion sur l’Islam en France (Council for Re-
flection upon Islam in France), set up in France fifteen years ago 
but which collapsed after three years because it was not truly 
representative. Some observers have said that the decision to set 
up a Consulta for Islam within the Ministry of the Interior should 
be seen in relation to the fact that Muslims in Italy have not yet 
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stipulated an Intesa with the government: this failure to sign 
an Intesa should be attributed not only to the divisions within 
organised Islam in Italy, but also to the lack of any real effort on 
the part of the Italian government to solve the problem, a re-
luctance that is in part the result of the fear that Muslims might 
gain too much power. This has led to a sort of “dual regime”: 
agreements, Intese, which confirm formal recognition of that 
confession by the State have, so far, only been drawn up with 
the Judeo-Christian confessions, while the State’s relationship 
with Islam, given that it is seen as also being a question of public 
order, is still being managed by Ministry of the Interior. Intese
with both Jehovah’s Witnesses and Buddhists are also currently 
blocked (Colaianni 2006). 
One should also ask oneself whether seeking a united rep-
resentation of Islam in Italy, either through a Consulta or with 
an Intesa, is indeed the right thing to do, at least at the moment. 
Quite a few representatives of Muslims have said that the real 
problem is not the lack of an agreement with the State, but the 
system of relations between the State and the religious groups 
itself: this system tends to impose a degree of homogeneity 
within Islam that simply does not exist, also because the plural-
ism within Islam is enhanced in Italy by the extreme variety of 
migrants’ country of origin. The desire to conduct negotiations 
with just one representative is more a convenience for the State 
than an accurate reflection of the needs of the diverse Muslim 
communities, and also serves to reinforce the idea of a mono-
lithic Islam (Open Society Institute 2002). Furthermore, im-
migration is still a fairly recent phenomenon in Italy, and most 
immigrants are still more occupied with concrete, everyday 
economic and legal (residency, work permit) problems, which 
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means they have little time and energy left to participate in 
other actions (Mantovan 2007). 
Probably, the best path to follow is to operate at a more 
“basic” level, acting on the elements that determine a situa-
tion of material and symbolic marginality for the majority of 
migrants in Italy3, and thus helping an increasing number of 
migrants to acquire the resources which are essential for par-
ticipation, leaving time and space for discussion and debate 
both within the various Muslim organisations and within the 
Muslim migrant community in general, so as to allow a more 
representative leadership to emerge, one that is really able to 
reflect the needs of Muslims in Italy. 
Furthermore, the need for an Intesa would, in any case, 
be less pressing, when the existing laws are applied more effica-
ciously and also if the law on freedom of worhip is passed, as this 
law would probably create the conditions required for a juridic-
ally precise and clear recognition of the Muslim communities 
as regards both their rights and their duties (Pace 2004). This 
would offer a short-term solution to the most pressing problems 
of Muslims in Italy today, and would give the State authorities 
more time to study and discuss further measures with repre-
sentatives of the Muslim population and even, perhaps, to draw 
up an Intesa or even a Consulta that would be acceptable to both 
parties. 
3 I.e. the lack of political rights, the difficulties with the residence permit linked 
to the law 189/2002, the difficulties in accessing citizenship linked to the law 
91/1992, the negative image of migrants in general and Muslims in particular in 
mass media and political discourses. 
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From a Regulation of the 
Religious Landscape to the 
“Preacher State”: 
The French Situation 
Franck Frégosi 
In this paper, I want to analyse critically the link between 
the state and the Muslim religion in France. Is the French Coun-
cil of Muslim Worship (CFCM) a means to represent the Muslim 
form to public powers and authorities? Or, on the contrary, does 
the CFCM represent public powers to practising Muslims? Is this 
organ able to take up the various challenges underlined by the 
settling of Islam in a both non-Muslim and secularised society? 
In other words, is the CFCM limited to be nothing else but a 
grain of sand in the organization of Islam in France, or can it be 
considered as a key point in a process as delicate as necessary? 
I do not pretend to answer all those questions but to 
underline and put in question the legitimacy of the secular 
state intervention into the way the Muslim religion works and 
is organized. The progressive settling of the Muslim religion in 
France becomes more and more controversial, especially when 
it tackles Islam’s ability to integrate into a secular setting or, like 
some wish, to disband into the Republic. 
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1. The “Preacher State” Concept 
For the purpose at hand, I will consider the preacher state 
concept as an ideal in order to clearly deal with the inclusion of 
the public powers in the religious landscape. In other words, it is 
about imagining a paradigm that would emphasise the public 
powers’ temptation to play a part in the religious organisation 
on a long-term basis to transform it. Indeed, the preacher state 
syndrome seems more operating than other concepts like the 
“jacobin-cesaro-papist” (Etienne 1989: 19) or the Gallican State 
(Frégosi 2004: 79-99). These two concepts may be seducing and 
carry both a historical and a rhetorical background. But they 
can be seen as thrown off centre on a geographical ground. The 
first one takes us back to the particular interaction between 
religion and policy in the Byzantine Empire (Dagron 1996) (the 
imperial holiness), while the second one embodies the Gallo-
centrism ideology.  The perks of the preacher state lie in the 
similarities between political actions in administration and the 
working-out of the legitimate religious figure on both shores 
of the Mediterranean Sea, between the secularised country of 
France and the Muslim states. 
The question of universality is also very interesting: what 
we consider as universal cannot always be found where it was 
used to. In other words, laicity is nothing but a juridical experi-
ence among others which is not about to use up all its inter-
actions between religion and policy, the sacred and the social 
link. Its institutional establishment could not be a reason for the 
public power to define a religion politically compatible with a 
republican model (Liogier 2006). The preacher state concept 
seems to be more universal than laicity because it underlines 
the natural tendency of all political power, to interfere in reli-
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gious matters, in order to get control on religious administra-
tion (cleric’s nomination, religious buildings) and even on pro-
ducing religious knowledge whatever the cultural and religious 
background is. Far from the ideal representation of laicity, the 
present situation of Muslim-related policy in France shows us an 
hybrid situation in which on the one side the official ideology 
is still proclaiming separation between religion and state while 
on the other side the State is interfering regularly in islamic af-
fairs (organising Muslim worship, banning out headscarf from 
public schools). This situation is more or less common to several 
European states (Belgium, Greece, Spain, etc.). 
2.	 The State as the Main Control of the French 
Islamic Stage 
The settling of Islam in France and the fact that this reli-
gion has no clear centred organisation are two vectors of the 
emerging role played by the State in the religious landscape. 
First of all, it is because Islam in France is atomised, the different 
Muslim organisations being unable to define a clear represen-
tation of the religious worship, but also because several states 
where immigrants are from involve themselves in considerable 
struggles for mosques. That is the reason why French public 
powers have made the Muslim question to their exclusive field 
of intervention and why they have imagined a process able to 
organise this religion. The question of safety has also been a de-
termining reason and has led the government to consider Islam 
as a religion apart from the others. Thus, in the past few years, 
French public powers have given up their necessary religious 
neutrality, impulsing a structure of the Muslim religion. Either 
the example of the CORIF, created in 1994 on the initiative of 
Pierre Joxe, the Muslim charter in France in 1996, supported 
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by Charles Pasqua, or the national consultation of Muslims of 
France (al ‘istischara), initiated by J.P Chevenement in 1998 (Fré-
gosi 2001: 63-71), the past 20 years have reflected a State more 
and more involved in the internal administration of the Muslim 
religion (Frégosi 2006: 133-162). 
In my mind the State intervention does not seem to be 
illegitimate in so far as its will is to make easier the emergence 
of a necessary interface between different Muslim structures 
and public powers, and to accommodate Muslim practices, or 
to guarantee freedom of religion. After all, the first article of the 
9 December 1905 law requires the Republic to ensure the free 
exercise of worship. 
But a critical point has come when public powers try hard 
to leave them only room for a tailor-made representation and 
intervene in the naming of their interlocutors. Nevertheless, 
this line has been passed in December 2002 at the Nainville-
les-Roches seminary. The Ministry of the Interior prompted 
the three groups of the consultation of the Muslims in France 
(national federations, regional mosques and qualified repre-
sentatives) to confirm the distribution of posts within the future 
French Council of Muslim Worship before the elections. Accord-
ingly, the CFCM was headed by non-elected people designated 
by public powers and supported by foreign chanceries such as 
Algeria, Morocco, etc. While it would be hard to imagine an in-
tervention of public powers in the election of the French Chief 
Rabbi, it seems to be normal with Islam. Public powers chose the 
rector of the Great Mosque of Paris to be at the head of the CFCM 
in order to not displease Algerian authorities who are in control 
of the venerable institution, but also to preserve a refined and 
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almost consensual vision of Islam. The minister said that the 
rector Dalil Boubakeur was the right man for the job because he 
was considered as the best representative by non-muslims. All 
the governments have looked for a Muslim church. It seems that 
they finally found an “ad vitam aeternam” pontiff. The two vice-
presidencies were given to the general secretary of the UOIF 
(the orthodox powerful federation, close to the Muslim brothers 
linked with the conservatives Gulf States and settled in France) 
and to the president of the FNMF, close to Moroccan interests. 
Concerning the secretariat of the CFCM, it was entrusted to a 
representative of the official Turkish Islam care (CCMTF). Ironic-
ally, the first CFCM elections would be marked by the collapse of 
the Great Mosque of Paris to more orthodox and traditionalist 
elements of the UOIF and the FNMF. Such legislation was sup-
posed to change at the end of the first CFCM mandate. But it is 
still on, and has not been contested. 
This phenomenon does not take place in an isolated 
manner. We have to keep in mind that, in the colonial times, 
public powers always refused to encourage the independence 
of the Muslim worship. The 1905 act was passed over in silence 
in Algeria: the imams in charge of mosques annexed to public 
domain were named and paid by the government. The latter 
also forbade interventions by anyone who would be unknown 
to the religious personnel in the places of worship. What is ques-
tionable here is not the involvement of the State in the organi-
sation of a worship representation but its will to weight on the 
composition of the representative organ. One has to wonder if, 
ironically, the current organization supported by the Govern-
ment finally is not an institution representing public powers to 
Muslims. If this is the case, the CFCM would become a legal re-
 116 From a Regulation of the Religious Landscape to the "Preacher State": 
The French Situation 
flection of an official Islam (Zeghal 2005: 97-113), but that would 
be an unbelievable statement in a secularised and neutral State! 
The veil has also been a turning point insofar as it has 
explicitly revealed the public power’s will to work out a both 
pragmatic and republican Islam. When he was in Cairo on 30 
December 2003, Nicolas Sarkozy, like his left-wing predeces-
sors, Pierre Joxe and Jean-Pierre Chevènement, paid a visit to 
the Grand Imam of the Al-Azhar Mosque, Sheik Mohamed Saïd 
El Tantawi. The latter is known to embody a rather pragmatic 
Islam, conciliatory with public authorities, without being lib-
eral. He was asked to talk about the headscarf issue, and more 
precisely he was asked if the head-covering was an obligation in 
a non-Muslim country. He confirmed that women have to cover 
their heads, but he also said that if the head-covering would put 
the women living in non-Muslim countries in a socially difficult 
position, they could do without wearing the headscarves and 
wouldn’t comit a major sin (Zeghal 2005: 97-113). On 3 January 
2004, the French Minister of Interior called a meeting with the 
office of the CFCM and the presidents of the 25 CRCM, to come 
to an agreement on the headscarf issue in public schools. Even if 
the minister personally was not favorable to pass a law banning 
the head covering, he still wanted the locally elected Muslim 
officials to play a part by asking the girls to take off their head-
scarves. But could we have imagined the same minister calling a 
meeting of the national conference of Roman Catholic bishops 
of France, enjoining them to disagree with the Vatican on the 
question of the ordination of women? 
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3. Organising Islamic Worship or Reforming 

Islam?
 
These never-ending discussions between public author-
ities and Muslim organisations underline the Republican dilem-
ma, especially nowadays when the world expresses scepticism 
about Islam. The Government is torn between the necessity to 
help the creation of a body to represent the Muslims, and the 
temptation to completely change Islam. 
Scholars and intellectuals (Muslims or not) agree to say 
that Islam has to change, especially after 9/11 and the terrorist 
attacks in Madrid and London. It is time for those who read the 
founding scriptures as timeless, often with a political motiva-
tion, and those who have a more contextualised and critical 
reading of those texts without neglecting their spiritual sig-
nificance, to have an intellectual debate. The question of the 
relations between violence, Faith and Reason, needs to be asked 
as well, as Pope Benedict XVI awkwardly suggested in Regens-
burg, on 12 September 2006. But it does not mean that it has to 
become a sine qua non condition to the amelioration of the con-
ditions of worship. Especially since the principle of Laicity does 
not allow the Republic to express an opinion on the internal 
elaboration of a religious doctrine, or to organise worship in-
stead of those to whom it matters. The time when Napoleon the 
Great was called “the Lord’s anointed” is over! 
Public authorities have to make sure that worship does 
not lead to public order offences and in particular, that senti-
ments against republican institutions, or against State officers 
are not expressed in places of worship. That is clear and has to 
be understood. If Islam needs to change, it is a decision that can-
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not come from the government. The reform has to come from 
the Muslims, even if it can be counter-productive. That is what 
happened when the Caliph Al Ma’mun, in order to impose the 
rationalist doctrine of the Mutazilite School, created an inquisi-
tion, the Mihna. Then why do we not create a religious police 
for the Republic or even better, why do we not write a Psalter 
or a republican Islamic ritual with an invocation to Marianne? 
When he was in office, Pierre Joxe had imagined that, on top of 
the obligation of speaking French during the Friday Prayers, a 
prayer for the Republic would be included in the Islamic wor-
ship. We still have something like that, in the synagogues of 
France, for the Shabbat worship. Why then, don’t we make the 
Muslims take an oath of fidelity and adopt a civil constitution 
of the clergy, the way the revolutionaries did with the Catholic 
clerks? That would be the end of the religion-neutral govern-
ment and therefore the end of the freedom of worship.As long 
as the legal framework is respected, the State, being secular, 
does not have the tools to judge how individuals practice or not 
their religion. 
Is it justified then to ask Muslim authorities a series of cru-
cial and even uncomfortable questions, the way Napoleon did 
when he reunited the Sanhedrin in 1807? Yet that is what some 
intellectuals suggest should be done (Zeghal 2005: 97-113). That 
is a great idea! But then those questions should be asked to all 
the religious collectivities, and the application of the decision 
should be broader, because the religious collectivities change. 
Generations of believers come one after the other and their 
points of view can evolve, either they become more liberal, or 
they become more orthodox with doctrinal reinforcements. In 
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1807, when the members of the Great Sanhedrin were asked if 
marriages between Israelites and Christians were permitted by 
Judaism, they just answered that such marriages when conclud-
ed in accordance with the civil code are valid but they cannot be 
celebrated with religious forms (Gutman 2000: 41). Their answer 
was in accordance with civil law but it did not really affect their 
religious practice. That is really far from the idealised vision of a 
reformed Judaism that would not follow the laws of the Halakha
anymore and adopt a vision of marriage that would go beyond 
the religious differences. But today nobody would say that Juda-
ism does not embrace republican ideals, then why ask more to 
Islam? 
The way we describe and live laicity has a lot of common 
points with what happens in the Maghreb. It is the question of 
Islam that links the two situations. There, administrations fol-
low a policy of containment of the various political movements 
that use Islam; the State controls the religious sphere. In France, 
the government is supposed to help Islam to be in accordance 
with the institutions of a religion-neutral State. It is also for secu-
rity reasons that the government is worried about the integra-
tion of Islam. A lot of right-wing elected representatives, as well 
as left-wing representatives, would agree to change the 1905 
French Law of Separation of Religion and State, in order to allow 
local authorities to finance the construction of prayers rooms. 
That would allow them to have a role to play in the local con-
figuration of Islam. The perspective would then be the develop-
ment of subsidised municipal Islams. – Neither  in Alger, nor in 
Tunis, nor in Paris, do the Governments seem ready to give back 
to God what belongs to him. 
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But all of that does not only concern Islam. Indeed, if we 
look at the debate on the question of sects in France, it is easy 
to see that public authorities have a tendency to say what is 
religiously correct and what is not. There is a real wish to cre-
ate tailor-made religions, and the parliamentarians are usually 
more maximalist than the Ministry of the Interior. Indeed, the 
Ministry of the Interior has to protect public freedoms, and 
freedom of conscience is one of them. That is where we can see a 
difference with Islam. 
What seems to be logical and acceptable in a system that 
recognises several religious groups (Germany, Belgium, Austria, 
Spain, etc.) or in a country that has a state religion (Norway, 
Denmark, etc.) is questionable in the case of a religion-neutral 
state. At a time when the European Court of Human Rights, in 
several of its decisions, deals with the idea of a religion-neutral 
Europe, it reaffirms the primacy of state rights, the neutrality of 
the state on religious matters and the principle of non-discrim-
ination on the grounds of religion. But the fact that, at the same 
time, the European Court of Human Rights puts forward the 
free exercise rights of religious groups “without any arbitrary 
interference of the State” (European Court of Human Rights 
2000) shows, that the problem does not concern France only, 
but Europe as a whole. 
The best Republican ideas can sometimes hide the old 
dream of the “Preacher State”, that is to say the idea of a State 
that would spread the Word of God, and that would truly be the 
end of the principle of laicity. Now that we have freed the State 
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of religion, now that we have freed the State of Islam, when we 
think about the future of Islam in the European Union, should 
we not keep in mind the idea of Mohamed Charfi (Charfi 2002: 
102-103), and free Islam of the State? That is to say create new 
relations between the Islamic institutions that already exist, or 
that are being created, and the public authorities, following the 
logic of autonomy. The main problem is that even in a secular 
context as the French one, instead of facing some social and 
economical problems (increasing unemployment in suburbs, 
ethnic discrimination, etc.), most of the politicians try to use re-
ligion, Islam in particular, as a political resource, a useful means 
of social control of populations. 
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Seán McLoughlin 
1. Introduction 
In this paper I examine the changing relationship be-
tween Muslim organisations and the State in the United King-
dom. The first part of my analysis presents an overview of the 
ways in which the structure of the British State, in terms of 
legislation, policymaking and the existence of an established 
church, has provided the framework within which Muslims 
have organised themselves since the 1960s. In particular, my 
account examines the New Labour government’s emphasis 
on civic renewal and the related emergence of what I call the 
‘faith relations industry’ at a time of greater securitisation since 
‘9/11’ and ‘7/7’. I also trace a shift in the main focus of Muslim 
leaders’ engagement with the State, from more ethnically-
oriented grassroots networks at the local level from the 1960s, 
to a more ‘professionalised’ national focus for representation 
of Muslims as ‘Muslims’ at the national level since the Rushdie 
Affair in 1989. My paper culminates with an examination of the 
rise and fall of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), a Muslim 
1 The main body of this article is reproduced from sections of McLoughlin 2005a 
although the material has been significantly updated 2007-08. 
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umbrella organisation which was inaugurated in 1997. Despite 
being courted by New Labour prior to ‘9/11’ as a likely solution 
to the stated longstanding problem of finding a single Muslim 
interlocutor for UK government, since ‘7/7’ especially the MCB 
has fallen out of favour with government. Indeed, because of its 
position on UK foreign policy and uncertainties about the Islam-
ist heritage of many of its affiliates, as well as its willingness and 
ability to challenge the rhetoric of radicalisation, the State has 
recently sought to engage more plural platforms for Muslim 
representation. 
2.	 From ‘Race’ to ‘Faith’ Relations: the UK State, 
Multiculturalism and the Established Church 
As members of the Commonwealth, South Asian herit-
age Muslims – who make up around 70-75% of Britain’s 1.6 mil-
lion Islamic population - became de facto ‘citizens’ as soon as 
they settled in Britain during the 1950s and 1960s. However, 
immigration legislation since 1962 has progressively repro-
duced narrower conceptions of ‘citizenship’ (Husband 1994). 
Indeed, recalling the administration of colonial affairs, state 
management of non-European immigrants in Britain has been 
organised in terms of the pragmatic recognition of essential-
ised ‘cultural communities’ rather than individual civil rights 
(Baumann 1999). Anti-discrimination legislation of 1966 and 
1976 established the racial and ethnic basis of this paradigm and 
witnessed the emergence of a so-called ‘race relations industry’ 
to oversee minority affairs. As members of ‘ethnic’ groups, Jews 
and Sikhs were afforded protection by the law, but not Muslims, 
given the multiethnic and transnational nature of Islam. 
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From the 1960s to the 1990s, ‘race’ relations in Britain 
have also been administered in terms of state policymaking 
under the rubric of ‘multiculturalism’. As Parekh (Parekh 2000: 
42) suggested in the report of the Commission on the Future of 
Multi-Ethnic Britain, the main political debate in this respect 
has been between ‘nationalists’ and ‘liberals’, both of whom 
emphasise the importance of social cohesion over plurality. ‘Na-
tionalists’ have advocated an ‘assimilationism’ which maintains 
that ‘minorities’ should conform to British ‘norms’. In contrast, 
‘liberals’ have posited a public space which claims to be ideo-
logically ‘neutral’ but is still overwhelmingly secular and pri-
oritises ‘equality’ at the expense of ‘difference’. However, with 
South Asian heritage minorities especially advancing religion 
as a major basis for public recognition, Parekh (Parekh 2000: 
48) concluded that if Britain was to become a more inclusive 
and harmonious society, it must expose itself to a conversation 
between liberalism and greater pluralism. Indeed, in a postco-
lonial age of ‘transnational citizenship’, he asked the radical 
question, could Britain recognise itself as, a ‘multicultural post-
nation’? (Parekh 2000: 39). 
Perhaps not surprisingly, Parekh’s report was not well re-
ceived by ‘nationalists’ or ‘liberals’. Moreover, the possibility of 
any progressive debate about the future of multi-ethnic Britain 
was quickly overtaken by local and global ‘crises’ when, in the 
summer of 2001, there were disorders involving Pakistani Mus-
lim heritage youth in the ‘northern towns’ of Bradford, Burnley 
and Oldham, events quickly followed by the attacks of ‘9/11’. By 
the end of 2001 the New Labour government had articulated a 
new concern for ‘community cohesion’ in a series of its own re-
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ports.2 Without reference to Parekh (Parekh 2000), Home Office 
Minister, John Denham, proposed the need for a debate about 
‘shared values’ and ‘common citizenship’ in order to ‘minimise 
the risk of further disorder’ (Denham 2002: 1-2). Denham also 
maintained that the aim of the new policy of ‘community cohe-
sion’ would not be to revisit assimilationism (Denham, 2002: 21) 
but rather to promote a commitment to ‘civic identity’ (Denham 
2002: 11-12) and ‘civic renewal’ (Denham 2002: 18). Here, it is 
possible to detect the influence of the ‘communitarian’ politi-
cal philosophy that achieved prominence in the USA under the 
Clinton presidency.3 Indeed, ironically echoing the New Right 
backlash against local authorities’ ‘multicultural’ policies in 
the 1980s (Husband 1994), here was a UK-based communitarian 
critique of the ‘old’ Labour culture of ‘rights’, now said to have 
neglected citizens’ ‘responsibilities’ and so reinforced ethnic 
‘segregation’. 
In such a context, and with Islamophobia and appeals 
to the clash of civilisations on the rise, any remaining taboos 
against publicly challenging aspects of minority culture or 
religion understood to inhibit ‘cohesion’ or represent a threat 
to security were finally broken. In February 2002, a Home Of-
fice White Paper, ‘Secure Borders, Safe Haven’, proposed a new 
citizenship ceremony for Britain and an oath of allegiance (im-
plemented 2004), language tests (especially for ministers of reli-
gion including imams – again implemented 2004) and a debate 
2 These are available at: www.communities.gov.uk/communities/publications/ 
reports [Accessed 25 March 2009]. 
3 For an assessment of the relationship between ‘communitarianism’ and New 
Labour, see Goes 2004 and Bevir  2005. This is further explored in a lecture by 
former Home Secretary, David Blunkett (Blunkett 2003). 
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on transcontinental and forced marriages (Forced Marriage Act 
2007).4 Together with a raft of new anti- and counter-terrorism 
measures, this means that Muslim communities have been sub-
ject to unprecedented levels of intervention and regulation by 
the British State. Building on the already existing Anti-Terrorism 
Act (2000), the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Bill (2001) and 
then the Prevention of Terrorism Act (2005) proscribed specific 
organisations, allowed for increased powers to stop and search 
and of detention, and created the new offences of incitement to 
terrorism and seeking or providing terrorist training (Birt 2005). 
Of course, Britain is somewhat unusual amongst liberal 
democracies in that religion has an ‘established’ position in 
the structure of the secular state (Modood 1997). The Anglican 
Church has a pivotal place in narrations of Englishness and 
its complex relations with political power are reflected still in 
public institutions from the Monarchy to the House of Lords 
and the large number of voluntary-aided state schools. Another 
outcome of Anglicanism’s historical privilege has been that no 
system of formally recognising ‘other faiths’ exists in the UK. 
Even in the context of growing pluralism it has been the Church 
of England that has brokered relations between the State and 
other religions. For its part, and for all its own domestication to 
the State, Anglicanism is distrustful of the secular and can see 
the advantage of ecumenical and multi-faith alliances. Indeed, 
in making claims for public recognition in the spaces and guises 
allowed and encouraged by a secularising society, Muslim or-
ganisations have undoubtedly benefited from the presence of 
4 Available at: www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm53/5387/ 
cm5387.pdf [Accessed 25 March 2009]. 
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an established Church. Thus there is Muslim support for ‘estab-
lishment’ both as a symbolic recognition of God’s sovereignty 
and a more tangible critique of secularism’s presumed ‘neutral-
ity’ (Modood 1997). Lacking the capacities and infrastructure of 
the Church of England, Muslims have learned how to negotiate 
with the State as was the case during the successful campaign 
for a ‘religion’ question at the 2001 Census.5 
Even beyond the specialised sphere of multi-faith rela-
tions, however, there has been a new openness to religion – or 
at least its more social or civic versions (Birt 2006) – in State 
governance over the last two decades or so. Against the context 
of Thatcherism’s disavowal of community and riots in the inner-
cities, the Church of England marked a return to social activism 
with the 1985 report, Faith in the City. While ‘other faiths’ were 
not a major concern of the report it did identify ways in which 
the Church could facilitate their engagement in the public 
sphere. So it was, in 1992, that still under a Conservative admin-
istration, the Department of Environment, in collaboration 
with the Church and the Interfaith Network for the UK (founded 
1987), formed the Inner Cities Religious Council (ICRC) (Taylor 
2002).6 With a view to tapping into religious communities’ re-
sources – people, networks, organisations, buildings – as a part 
of urban regeneration, the ICRC provided the first government 
forum for establishment led multi-faith representation and 
consultation on a national level although it did not command 
significant resources. 
5  See, for example, the MCB’s account of the lobbying process at: www.mcb.org. 
uk/downloads/census2001.pdf [Accessed 25 March 2009]. 
6 See www.neighbourhood.gov.uk/page.asp?id=524 [Accessed 25 Mach 2009]. 
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Since 1997, when New Labour came to power, govern-
ment has engaged ‘faith’ much more publicly and controver-
sially so much so that it is possible to speak of a ‘faith relations 
industry’ (McLoughlin 2005a). ‘Communitarian’ thinking 
regards religious communities as a particular source of social 
capital, especially in deprived areas where other forms of social 
infrastructure may be absent (Putnam 2000). Indeed, in New 
Labour’s first year of office, the Department of Environment, 
Transport and the Regions issued advice to all local authorities 
on ‘involving faith communities’ in neighbourhood renewal.7 
By October 2003, ‘the religious issues section of the Home Office 
Race Equality Unit was reconstituted to incorporate the new 
Faith Communities Unit’ (FCU), suggesting that a civic version 
of ‘faith’ was becoming as important as ‘race’ in the state’s man-
agement of minority ethnic affairs.8 Legitimated by the 2001 
Census, which recorded 76.8 per cent religious affiliation in 
Britain9, the faith relations industry therefore exists to: i) engage 
the many (socially excluded) non-European minorities in Britain 
(especially ‘Muslims’) whose principal mode of communal iden-
tification and organisation has been ‘faith’ based; ii) facilitate 
government consultation with the main faith groups as stake-
holders and bearers of social capital; and iii) promote ‘com-
munity cohesion’ through interfaith activity. In this discourse 
7		 www.odpm.gov.uk/stellent/groups/odpm_urbanpolicy/documents/page/ 
odpm_urbpol_608134.hcsp [Accessed 25 March 2009]. N.B. The ICRC subse-
quently moved to Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM). 
8		 See the recommendations of the steering group on the engagement between 
government and faith communities at: www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/ 
workingtog_faith040329.pdf [Accessed 25 March 2009]. N.B. In May 2006 the 
FCU was moved to the new Department of Communities and Local Government 
(DCLG) and renamed the Cohesion and Faiths Unit. Also based at the DCLG, the 
ICRC was renamed Faith Communities Consultative Council. 
9		 For the main 2001 Census data on religion see www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/ 
pdfs04/hors274.pdf [Accessed 25 March 2009]. 
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‘good’ faith - which promotes integration and convergence in 
the context of continuing domestication by the secular state 
(Baumann 1996; Taylor 2002; Birt 2006) – is also distinguished 
from ‘bad’ religion – which is disruptive and divisive of this 
project and so can not be considered ‘real’ religion at all. At the 
same time, there are still many elements of ‘harder’ secularism 
in government and Britain’s public culture per se, something 
reflected in continued opposition to the legislation on incite-
ment to religious hatred which was finally passed in 2006 after 
two previously unsuccessful attempts.10 
3. From the Local to the National: ‘Old’ and 
‘New’ Muslim Leaderships in Britain 
Various forms of communal organising have been evi-
dent amongst Muslims in Britain since the 1960s, from infor-
mal networks of patri-lineal kinship groups and regional as-
sociations to elected councillors and anti-racist Asian workers 
and youth organisations. However, for Muslims as ‘Muslims’, 
mosques have been the most important grassroots institutions, 
with numbers mushrooming especially since the reuniting of 
families by the 1980s (McLoughlin 2005b). Although it may not 
remain the case in the current climate, the British State has hith-
erto stopped short of officially recognising existing, or creating 
newly elected, ‘Muslim’ representative institutions or bodies 
as in some other European countries. Nevertheless, at the lo-
cal level in the 1980s, and on the national level since the late 
1990s, government has periodically leant public legitimacy to 
10		 The Racial and Religious Hatred Act came partially into force on 1 October 2007 
having had various restrictions placed upon it by amendments imposed in the 
House of Lords. The previous attempts at legislation had been made as part of 
the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Bill (2001) and the Serious Organised 
Crime and Police Bill (2004-5). 
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un-elected Muslim bodies such as Councils of Mosques, mainly 
through consultation but sometimes by channelling resources 
in their direction. 
Not unlike the leaders of the Pakistan movement, lead-
ers representing the Muslim ‘community’ in the public space of 
Britain have usually been ‘lay’ rather than religious specialists 
although, as we shall see, this is beginning to change.11 The ‘au-
thority’ of the lay leadership has drawn upon a ‘cultural capital’ 
(Bourdieu/Passeron 1977) that overlaps with, but is distinctive 
from, the traditional leadership associated with the ‘ulama’ 
and Sufi shaykhs. Amongst the first generation of economic mi-
grants, the men who emerged as the chairmen of mosque com-
mittees in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, and subsequently acted 
as the interlocutors of local government, often shared certain 
characteristics. These characteristics at once reflected their 
South Asian cultural heritage and yet set them apart from other 
first generation migrants, the majority of whom were illiterate 
and of rural peasant farming origin: membership of a power-
ful and well-established regional and/or patri-lineal kinship 
(biradari) group; a reputation as a well connected and effective 
political operator – a ‘strong man’; some limited education, in-
cluding basic competence in English; and, finally, experience of 
engagement with members of ‘wider society’, perhaps through 
a public service occupation (for example, transport) or, more 
usually, a small business (for example, owning a shop or restau-
rant). 
11 However, a number of younger Muslim ‘alims’ (scholars) in the Deobandi tradi-
tion especially - who combine classical training with higher degrees from Brit-
ish universities - now speak on community affairs in their localities and work 
as chaplains in public institutions or through organisations like the MCB on a 
national level. 
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This sort of cultural capital allowed a first generation 
of grassroots Muslim leaders to build up mosque institutions 
which sustained the life-worlds, and maintained the localized 
hegemony, of dislocated male migrants in particular (McLough-
lin 2005b). For this segment of the Muslim population, the ‘re-
sources’ of the Islamic tradition were selectively employed to 
maintain ethnic boundaries, legitimate the authority of South 
Asian cultural ‘norms’ and reinforce conservative adaptation 
strategies. Moreover, within the ‘doing deals culture’ (Ouseley 
2001: 10) operated by some local councils as they sought to rec-
ognise large Muslim populations in public institutions such 
as schools, the engagement of mosques and their leaders has 
routinely been limited to competition for scarce resources, se-
curing ‘rights’ and participating as required in multicultural 
photo-calls to ‘celebrate the community’ (McLoughlin 2005b). 
In this context ‘Islam’ became encorporated as part of the domi-
nant discourse of what Baumann (1999) calls ‘difference multi-
culturalism’ and ‘engagement’ was limited to a rhetorical trans-
action between community leaders and the state. There was 
limited impact on or interest in what went on behind the scenes 
in the privacy of the diasporic public sphere.  
More than any event, however, the Rushdie Affair of 
1988-89 illuminated the strengths and weaknesses of a Muslim 
community leadership grounded in grassroots networks and 
associations. If the early 1980s witnessed the local state consult 
representatives of Islam on questions of public recognition, by 
the end of the decade the numbers of ‘Muslim’ councillors was 
also beginning to rise (Lewis 1994). However, there was not a 
single Muslim Member of Parliament and no national body with 
the authority to represent Muslims to an increasingly central-
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ised government. A national umbrella organisation, the Union 
of Muslim Organisations of the UK and Eire (UMO), had been set 
up in 1970, but as Nielsen remarks it was ‘essentially irrelevant 
because all the major aspects of government which affected 
Muslims were based at local level until well into the 1980s’ 
(Nielsen 1999: 40). 
Having been informed of the offending passages in The 
Satanic Verses by co-religionists in India (Ahsan/Kidwai 1993), an 
alliance of mainly ‘reformist Islamist’ and ‘neo-traditionalist’ 
heritage elites recognised both the realities and the opportu-
nities of this situation. Feeling that they possessed the profes-
sional, scholarly and social skills necessary to do business with 
government ministers, senior civil servants, publishers and the 
media, the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA) 
was formed in London. However, despite the letter-writing, 
petitions, telephone-calls and meetings, the UKACIA’s peaceful 
lobbying failed to make an impact on the Conservative govern-
ment of the day. Indeed, this ‘new’ leadership was eventually 
outmanoeuvred by the ‘old’ grassroots’ leadership associated 
with Bradford Council for Mosques (BCM) which had mobilised 
working class Muslims during the halal meat and Honeyford 
affairs earlier in the decade (McLoughlin 2002). Strategies of ‘ac-
commodation’ having failed, BCM resorted to protest and pub-
licly burned Rushdie’s book, something the UKACIA’s middle-
class leadership neither sanctioned nor approved of. 
Into the 1990s, the UKACIA took its campaigning to the 
legal system, arguing in the High Court that Britain’s blas-
phemy laws, still protecting only the Church of England, should 
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be reformed and extended to defend Islam. While this project, 
too, was unsuccessful, the organisation doggedly persisted with 
engaged representational strategies on the national level, seek-
ing recognition especially in terms of legislation on ‘religious’ 
(as well as racial and ethnic) discrimination (UKACIA, 1993). 
Indeed, all Muslim activists were disappointed by their slow rate 
of progress during this period. However, himself frustrated at 
the continuing divisions between Islamic organisations, Con-
servative Home Secretary, Michael Howard, advised Muslim 
activists to speak with one voice should they wish to exercise 
more influence over government (Q-News, 25 March 1994). 
Within a couple of months this intervention had prompt-
ed the UKACIA to form a National Interim Committee on Mus-
lim Affairs. Having consulted over 1000 organisations on the 
need for a new national umbrella body (The Muslim News, 31 
May 2002), and studied the constitutions of similar organisa-
tions such as the Board of Deputies of British Jews, the commit-
tee finally inaugurated the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) 
in 1997. Regarding its constituency as ‘British citizens with an 
Islamic heritage’, the stated aims and objectives of the MCB in-
cluded ‘a more enlightened appreciation of Islam and Muslims 
in the wider society’ and – consistent with the civic model of re-
ligion modelled by the established Church - ‘better community 
relations and work[ing] for the good of society as a whole’.12 
12		 See www.mcb.org.uk/aim.php [Accessed 25 March 2009] and, more recently, 
Secretary General’s Annual Report 2007-08 www.mcb.org.uk/uploads/ 
SGAGM2008.pdf [Accessed 25 Mach 2009]. 
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4.	 The Rise and Fall of the Muslim Council 

of Britain
 
Ten years after its inauguration the MCB is still run by key 
office bearers and a skeleton support staff who, for the most 
part, work on a voluntary basis.13 Its first two general secretaries, 
Sir Iqbal Sacranie OBE (1998-2000, 2002-04, 2004-06) and Yousef 
Bhailok (2000-02), were able to assume the role only because 
they were prosperous middle-aged businessmen. The present 
incumbent, Dr Muhammad Abdul Bari MBE (2006-08), is an edu-
cationalist, and former airforce officer, with a doctorate in phys-
ics (Open Democracy, 03 July 2006). Indeed, a cursory glance at 
the biographies of its leadership begins to reveal the particular 
cultural capital of the MCB’s most senior leadership all of whom 
were born abroad. Sacranie and Bhailok are of ‘African-Asian’ 
(‘twice-migrant’) and ‘Gujerati Indian’ origin respectively, both 
relatively small but significant ‘ethnic’ segments of the British-
Muslim population exhibiting a more upwardly mobile trajec-
tory than the larger ‘Pakistani’ or ‘Bangladeshi’ constituencies. 
Abdul Bari is of Bangladeshi heritage but hails from near Dhaka, 
the capital, rather than the more peripheral district of Sylhet 
where most British-Bengalis can trace their roots. All three gen-
eral secretaries have experience not only of grassroots mosque 
institutions but also organisations with national profiles in 
sectors such as charity and education (The Common Good 1(2): 
2; The Daily Telegraph, 10 November 2007). Notably, Sacranie – 
13		 My brief account of the MCB here is based mainly upon a mapping of the or-
ganization’s website, www.mcb.org.uk [Accessed 25 March 2009]. The website 
houses general information about the MCB, its press releases, a list of affiliates, 
membership and committee details, news of particular campaigns, weekly 
updates and back copies of its occasional newsletter, The Common Good (now 
discontinued), 
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general secretary for more than half of the life of the MCB – was 
also Joint-Convenor of the UKACIA.14 
While Sacranie and Bhailok have associations with the 
‘neo-traditionalist’ Deobandi tradition - which remains well-
represented amongst on the MCB central working committee 
- many other MCB activists are associated with ‘reformist Islam-
ist’, and especially Jama’at-i Islami (JI) related, organisations.15 
These include UK Islamic Mission, the Islamic Foundation, 
Young Muslims UK (YMUK) and the Islamic Society of Britain 
(ISB). Abdul Bari is also currently chairman of East London 
mosque which has a similar reformist Islamist heritage to these 
organisations in the Bengali tradition of JI. Indeed, based on 
an analysis of the membership of the MCB’s Central Work-
ing Committee available at www.mcb.org.uk in January 2003 
(McLoughlin 2005a), I estimated that one-third to one-half of 
members’ affiliations could be described as ‘reformist Islamist’ 
heritage.16 This is a pattern that remains largely unchanged in 
2007-08, most especially amongst nationally elected appoint-
ments. Moreover, the contents of the MCB’s occasional (now 
discontinued) newsletter, The Common Good, revealed that it 
was the activities of such organisations that had the highest pro-
file (McLoughlin 2005a). 
14		 A national newspaper quickly ‘promoted’ Sacranie to 246th ‘most powerful person 
in Britain’ (The Observer, 24 October 1999). 
15		 JI was founded in pre-Partition India by Sayyid Mawdudi (d.1979), one of the pre-
eminent ideologues of first generation Islamism in the twentieth century. After 
Partition, Mawdudi moved to Pakistan and the movement developed distinctive 
branches in the new nations of the subcontinent. 
16		 N.B. ‘no member body and its branches could have more than five of its mem-
bers elected to the Central Working Committee’ (The Common Good 1(3): 2). 
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Several years ago the British-Muslim magazine, Q News, 
labelled the MCB as ‘lassi Islamists’ (March-April 2002: 22-3) – a 
halal version of New Labour’s ‘champagne socialists’. Such a 
representation is not entirely fair. JI-related organisations may 
be home to a significant body of activists who have the requisite 
aptitude and energy for the MCB’s political work but they are 
undoubtedly in transition in the UK even the label reformist Is-
lamism embraces a number of developing positions. In its early 
days especially, the organisation also provided an outlet for a 
more unaffiliated, new rising middle-class of young, educated 
British-Muslims first politicised by events such as the Rushdie 
Affair, the Gulf War, Bosnia or ‘the War on Terror’.17 To some ex-
tent, then, the MCB created a space for multi-ethnic, cross-sect-
arian alliances which prioritised an overarching Muslim politics 
of identity. However, unable to distance itself entirely from the 
ideologies of the movements in which many of its activists first 
cut their teeth, it has never attracted more than a few activists 
with links to the Sufi and Barelwi heritage which dominates 
amongst British-Pakistanis. 
The MCB’s consolidation of a ‘new’, professionalized and 
media-friendly Muslim representative body coincided with 
the election of New Labour in 1997. As we have seen, the party 
has been committed to an important role for faith in the more 
general project of civic renewal at a time when social capital 
was perceived to be in decline. However, as the elections of 1992 
and 1997 had shown, it was also no longer in a position to take 
the votes of traditionally Labour-voting Muslims for granted 
17		 Telephone interview with Sher Khan, Chair, MCB Public Affairs Committee, 26 
June 2003. 
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(Nielsen 2001). In any case, having received a positive response 
to its initial enquiries, the MCB soon found itself invited to regu-
lar meetings and receptions at the Home Office and the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, even representing the latter as a 
part of delegations to Muslim countries (McLoughlin 2003). 
Various government departments, agencies and civil society 
organisations, all now required to engage multifaith (as well 
as multiracial and multiethnic) ‘partners’ as part of the ‘stake-
holder society’, also started to consult the MCB which provided 
user-friendly access to the necessary Muslim ‘voices’. 
By May 2004 the MCB had 395 affiliates at local, regional 
and national levels.18 Seeing itself as the ‘first port of call’ for 
government19, it could certainly point to an increasing recogni-
tion of ‘Muslims’ on the national level since 1997.20 However, the 
changing place of faith in the policymaking of the British gov-
ernment has been equally, if not more important, in shaping 
these developments. Moreover, the MCB was just one amongst 
many lobbies at Whitehall and was unable to significantly influ-
ence ‘higher’ arenas of debate such as foreign policy (Radcliffe 
2004). ‘Loyalty’ was always going to be part of New Labour’s at-
tempt to incorporate a ‘moderate’ Muslim leadership. So, while 
the MCB supported military intervention in Kosovo during 
18 See MCB Annual Report 2003-04 at: www.mcb.org.uk/downloads/agm2004.pdf
[Accessed 25 March 2009]. 
19 See the Secretary General’s Introduction to the MCB Annual Report 2002 at: 
www.mcb.org.uk/downloads/2002-3.pdf [Accessed 25 March 2009]. 
20		 1998, for example, saw Muslims achieve equality with Anglicans, Catholics 
and Jews when the first state-aided Muslim primary schools were established. 
In 1999 the first civil service post directed at the Muslim community was an-
nounced, an Islamic advisor to the prisons, where Muslim numbers have more 
than doubled in recent years. 
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1999 (The Muslim News, 28 May 1999), and issued a statement of 
condemnation within hours of ‘9/11’, its ‘failure’ to sell the war 
in Afghanistan to British-Muslims in late 200121, resulted eventu-
ally in the government publicly questioning the very ‘authority’ 
it had taken a key role in ascribing. Birt (2005), for example, ar-
gues that while attempts to ‘groom’ the MCB ultimately failed, 
this provoked ‘coded’ public messages from New Labour ‘spin 
doctors’ expressing ‘disappointment’ at the failure of the ‘mod-
erates’ to marginalise an ‘extremist’ fringe. 
For the MCB, such experiences highlighted the problems 
of state patronage. Indeed, all minority leaderships must strike 
a balance between strategies of accommodation and protest 
(Werbner 1991).  So it was then that the organisation was to 
belatedly take a more public role in supporting the Stop the 
War Coalition. One of its own affiliates, the ‘reformist Islamist’ 
Ikhwan al-Muslimun (the Muslim Brothers) related, Muslim 
Association of Britain (MAB), had taken a lead in the alliance 
alongside the Socialist Workers’ Party, the Campaign for Nucle-
ar Disarmament and others.22 At the same time, despite facing 
huge external demands from the state and wider society, the 
MCB was run (and continues to be run) on ‘meagre resources’.23 
From fellow Muslim organisations it was also facing further 
criticism of its tendency to seek to compete with, duplicate or 
exercise control over their work (see, for example, Q-News, June 
21 See ‘press releases’ under ‘media’ at www.mcb.org.uk [Accessed 25 March 2009]: 
‘MCB expresses total condemnation of terrorist attacks’ (11 September 2001) and 
‘MCB opposes War on Afghans – Insists on Justice’ (09 October 2001). 
22 See Secretary General’s Annual Report 2002-03 at: www.mcb.org.uk/
downloads/2002-3.pdf [Accessed 25 March 2009]. 
23 Ibid.  
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2004, in relation to the Commission on British Muslims and 
Islamophobia).24 Certainly, the MCB had exhibited delusions 
of grandeur when it announced its own ‘cabinet’ in June 2003. 
Since its beginnings in the Rushdie Affair, it had played a signifi-
cant role in adapting the liberal public reason of ‘democracy’, 
‘the rule of law’ and ‘race equality’ (Modood 2002; Radcliffe 
2004) to the project of Muslim identity politics. However, like 
anti-racism before it (Gilroy 1992), it had also contributed to the 
fetishising and absolutising of ‘Muslim’ difference in Britain. 
5.	 The UK State and Muslim Organisations 

After ‘7/7’
 
In 2007-08 the MCB remains the largest Muslim umbrella 
organisation but since the London bombings its integrity and 
capability as a ‘moderate’ leadership has been ever more ser-
iously challenged. Despite the organisation’s denunciation of 
the attacks as having no sanction in Islam and its reaffirma-
tion of a commitment to dialogue and non-separation25, the 
MCB has been the subject of a number of media exposes. These 
include an article in The Observer (14 August 2005) and a BBC 
Panorama programme (‘A Question of Leadership’, 21 August 
2005). Such investigations are not entirely new – see ‘Who 
Speaks for Muslims’, Channel 4, April 200226 – but they do reflect 
24		 Both Nielsen 2001 and Birt 2005, for example, report annoyance at attempts 
to assume the ownership of others’ initiatives to establish a Muslim adviser on 
prisons (1999) and a temporary consulate in Mecca for British hajjis (2000). 
25		 See Secretary General’s Annual Report 2005-06 at: www.mcb.org.uk/uploads/ 
SECGEN.pdf [Accessed 25 March 2009]. 
26		 Senior MCB officials including Bhailok were criticised for sharing a conference 
platform with Hamas. The suggestion was that although presenting themselves 
as ‘Muslim moderates’, the MCB actually has within its ranks many with radical 
sympathies. Similarly, younger MCB activists, Mahmud al-Rashid and Inayat 
Bunglawallah, who have come up through the ranks of YMUK and the ISB, 
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the way in which ‘7/7’ has made previously hidden diasporic and 
transnational Muslim public spheres subject to a new level of 
visibility and scrutiny unknown even after ‘9/11’. In this respect, 
the MCB’s failure and/or inability to challenge the moral, social 
and political demonisation of the West in the rhetoric of some 
of its affiliates was seen as especially problematic despite gov-
ernment itself turning a blind eye to the settlement of radicals 
in ‘Londonistan’ during the 1990s. The MCB’s insistence on the 
legitimacy of violent resistance to occupation and injustice was 
also highlighted. Indeed Sacranie himself was attacked for at-
tending a memorial in London for Shaykh Yasin, the founder 
of Hamas, while at the same time refusing to attend Holocaust 
Memorial Day because of Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians. 
In this respect the dilemmas of the MCB reflect the classic pre-
dicament of diasporas (Werbner 2002), a double consciousness 
of local and global political loyalties which finds expression in a 
constant juggling of discourses of both cohesion and dissent. 
Since the election of New Labour in 1997, different de-
partments of UK State have had quite different attitudes to, 
and relationships with, the MCB and other Muslim bodies. For 
example, with its everyday experience of overseas diplomacy, 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) was always seen as 
having a more sophisticated understanding of Muslim affairs.27 
However, following ‘7/7’, while there was an immediate move 
were challenged for their association with the popular Muslim youth magazine 
Trends. It was alleged that during the 1990s the publication published ‘anti-
Semitic’, or at least ‘anti-Zionist’, material.     
27 Indeed, with FCO approval, two MCB representatives went to Iraq in 2004 to 
plead for the life of British hostage Kenneth Bigley before he was eventually 
murdered. 
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to ban organisations whose revolutionary rhetoric was seen as 
glorifying terrorism28, Prime Minister, Tony Blair, also eventually 
moved to adopt a more critical approach to the MCB (The Daily 
Telegraph, 24 October 2006). Shifting from an earlier position 
post ‘9/11’ where Islam was clearly distinguished from terrorism 
in state discourse – and taking his cue to some extent from more 
self-critical Muslim voices29 – he spoke publicly and deliberately 
of a tension between Islam and modernity, as well as the need 
for religious reform and Muslims’ false sense of historic griev-
ance against the West (The Guardian, 04 July 2006). Instructing 
Secretary of State for the DCLG, Ruth Kelly, to work with organi-
sations other than the MCB, she subsequently made it clear that 
government was intentionally ‘re-balancing’ its partnerships 
with, and funding of, a range of Muslim organisations (‘Britain; 
Our Values, Our Responsibilities’, 11 October 2006). Defending 
the accusation that UK foreign policy is anti-Muslim and point-
ing to the state’s commitment to anti-religious hatred legisla-
tion, Kelly insisted that support would be forthcoming only for 
those proactively working for integration and able to tolerate 
offence, as well as exerting genuine influence at the heart of 
their communities.30 
28		 The threat to ban radical Islamists Hizb al-Tahrir (HT) was never imposed al-
though it was on a more vehement offshoot of HT, al-Muhajiroun. 
29		 See Lewis 2007 for short case studies including the City Circle, Q-News and the 
Muslim Youthwork Foundation. 
30		 Groups reflecting other Muslim constituencies in Britain have also begun to 
organise. These include the Fatimah Women’s Network, Progressive British 
Muslims and Muslims for Secular Democracy (Open Democracy, 03 July 2006). 
In Early 2008 former radicals such as Ed Hussain – author of The Islamist (2007) 
- formed the Quilliam Foundation (named after a well-known convert to Islam 
of the early twentieth century) which styles itself as a ‘counter-extremism think-
tank’. 
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Indeed, just a few months earlier, with official support 
and encouragement, a direct rival to the MCB – the Sufi Muslim 
Council (SMC) – had been launched at a high profile event at-
tended by various mainstream politicians (BBC News Online, 09 
July 2006). The SMC has links to the British Muslim Forum (BMF), 
an umbrella organisation for around 300 (mainly Pakistani 
Barelwi mosques) in the Midlands and northern England which 
has also featured in the work of the British Council. Supposedly 
representing the ‘silent majority’ of moderate Muslims who fol-
low expressions of classical Islam rather than its more political 
(or Islamist) manifestations, in anointing the SMC government 
seemed ignorant of the fact that at different times and in differ-
ent places Sufis, too, have been prominent in jihadi resistance. 
It is too early to say whether the SMC can succeed where others 
have failed in aggregating the fragmented networks of loyalty 
organised around particular sub-orders and shaykhs. Neverthe-
less, like ‘9/11’ in America, ‘7/7’ in Britain has been a catalyst for 
the specifically religious leadership of this hitherto reluctant 
constituency to enter the national public sphere in a bid to 
wrest dominant discourses on Islam from violent extremism. 
In the longer term, the SMC is unlikely to be able to avoid the 
predicaments of diasporic double consciousness exemplified by 
the MCB even if it is more prepared to accommodate itself to the 
state. Certainly, it has appeared happy to endorse the govern-
ment view that established Muslim organisations have not yet 
done enough to counter radicalisation in their communities, 
seeing this above all as a problem of Muslims’ access to the right 
theological resources and guidance. Alongside pictures of Sufi 
masters meeting various public figures, the SMC website in-
cludes warnings against the deviant extremism of Saudi funded 
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Wahhabism and variants of Salafism – movements which also 
happen to be known for their anti-Sufi credentials. 
The State’s concern to work with a range of moderate 
Muslim organisations and promote more wide-ranging co-
operation between them has also been articulated in the initia-
tives emerging from various recommendations on how best to 
tackle extremism announced in November 2005. These recom-
mendations were made by the seven ‘Preventing Extremism 
Together’ working groups which were established immediately 
following the London bombings. One such initiative seeking to 
reclaim the idea of radicalism for a more progressive agenda 
is the Radical Middle Way (RMW), a collective of multi-ethnic, 
cross-denominational organisations (including some of broadly 
Sufi and reformist Islamist heritage) which have a track record 
of working with Muslim students and youth.31 Funded in large 
part by government through the DCLG and other means, the 
RMW has organised road-shows of Islamic scholars in the classi-
cal tradition to tour Britain’s cities in an effort to begin to coun-
terbalance Wahhabi and Salafi theology. However, notably, 
most of these scholars – including a number of converts to Islam 
such as the American Sufi, Hamaza Yusuf - are from overseas, a 
fact which the MCB considered ‘colonialist’. 
Another proposal of the working groups was for a 
Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB), an inde-
31 See the very slick and well-resourced website at: www.radicalmiddleway.co.uk/
[Accessed 25 March 2009]. Key players have been Q-News, the Federation of 
Student Islamic Societies and Young Muslim Organisation. 
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pendent, non-sectarian body for the training and accreditation 
of Muslim ministers of religion. On the one hand, preachers 
such as the ‘Afghan-Arab’ Egyptian exile, Abu Hamza al-Masri 
(sentenced 2006), have been prosecuted for soliciting murder 
and inciting racial hatred, as well as radicalising alienated Mus-
lim youth. On the other, although in recent years some younger, 
well-educated imams have been taking up positions as chap-
lains in British public institutions, many more still have limited 
familiarity with the English language or the British cultural 
context. As such, they are not seen as well placed to counter the 
appeal of extremism. Against this context MINAB was finally 
established in 2007 with representation from the MCB and 
MAB, along with the BMF and the al-Khoei Foundation (a Shi’ite 
organisation). However, the future of MINAB is presently uncer-
tain with a government appointing a council of Islamic scholars 
overseen by Oxford and Cambridge universities – seemingly 
being considered as an alternative (July 2008). 
6. Conclusion 
The existence of an established church as part of the struc-
ture of the UK State is such that Muslim religious institutions 
find a voice in the ‘secular’ public sphere more readily than in 
some other European countries. However, the dispersed au-
thority structures of Islam do not approximate that of a church. 
Nevertheless, precipitated by the Rushdie Affair especially, the 
move beyond localised grassroots representation, first by the 
UKACIA and then the MCB, increased the public profile of a 
self-appointed lay national ‘community’ leadership during the 
1990s. Seeking public recognition for Muslims as ‘Muslims’, an 
emergent religious identity politics has both shaped, as well as 
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itself being influenced by, the hegemony of the ‘race’ relations 
industry in Britain. During an initial honeymoon period under 
New Labour faith relations gained a new prominence in public 
discourse not least because of its perceived value in the project 
of civic integration. However, the global conflicts associated 
with the War on Terror soon revealed how difficult it would be 
to domesticate a diasporic Muslim leadership with moral invest-
ments in the idea of the ummah - especially one with Islamist 
leanings like the MCB. Both the capacity/resources and author-
ity of the organisation amongst ordinary Muslims was also 
always an issue. In the wake of ‘7/7’ new levels of securitisation 
further exposed the anti-Western imaginaries of the diasporic 
and transnational Muslim public spheres to new levels of criti-
cal scrutiny. Yet, at the same time, it has also prompted a new 
self-critical reflexivity and willingness to engage amongst a re-
ligious leadership which had always eschewed secular politics. 
Summing up UK State policy, Birt (2006) argues that, overall, 
there is still a preference for facilitating the self-regulation and 
self-organisation of Muslim representative bodies rather than 
direct legal intervention in their affairs. However, this approach 
may be tested to its limits in the coming years. 
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Through the Maze of Identities: 
Muslims in Germany Trying to 
Find Their Way Between Reli-
gion, Traditionalism, Nationalism 
and the Question of Organisation 
Martin Engelbrecht 
1. Introduction 
Though sometimes superficial contacts with Muslims 
may result in a misleading impression the most critical error 
about Muslims is to think of them as a homogeneous group. 
Indeed there is a shared basic frame of unquestionable quan-
tities, including e.g. the joint reverence for the prophet, the 
Koran and some forms of orthopraxy, that constitute what can 
be called a ‘common ground’ for any person considering him- 
or herself a Muslim. But already one level ‘below’ that common 
ground runs the endless process of interpretation, opinion and 
discussion that is the true core of every complex social system 
of meaning. Just as it is the case with people of Christian back-
ground, a considerable minority of the Muslims are “religious 
virtuosos”, while the majority consists of “non-virtuosos” (to use 
Weber’s terms; Weber 1980: 327f).1 And as in any other religion 
1  Weber differentiates between religious ‘virtuosos’ as people for whom religion 
builds the core of their individual lives and biographies, and ‘non-virtuosos’ in 
whose lives and biographies (sometimes even a lot of) religious elements can 
be found, which however do not constitute the core of these people’s lives and 
biographies. 
 152 Through the Maze of Identitities: Muslims in Germany Trying to Find Their Way 
Between Religion, Traditionalism, Nationalism and the Question of Organisation 
spiritual elements and patterns have inextricably mixed with 
local traditions and – since the concept of the modern nation 
has come to fruition in the nineteenth century (Anderson 1991) 
– nationalist ideas. The following article deals with the current 
problems of the Muslims in Germany in trying to find a common 
basis both on the level of identity and on the level of organisa-
tion. Since the Turkish immigrants constitute 78 % of the Mus-
lims of Germany (Brettfeld/Wetzels 2007: 86) and thus are of 
formative effect for the situation, the argumentation will focus 
on them with selective references to the (Sunni) Muslims of Ger-
man and other national backgrounds. Due to the limited space 
the text can give no more than a few very basic outlines of the 
complex situation. 
2.	 Historical	Backgrounds	of	the	Muslim	 
Discourses in Germany 
To understand the historical roots of the current situation 
of the Muslims in Germany one has to start with the breaking 
up of the Ottoman Empire. Like in the other European multina-
tional monarchies the loyalty of the various ethnic communities 
constituting its subjects was based on the double bond of dyn-
asty and religion. After the end of World War I Atatürk and his 
followers succeeded in forging a modern state on the remnants 
of the old one in a combined political and military tour de force 
(cf. e.g. Seufert/Kubaseck 2006; Schiffauer 2000: 41-47). To teach 
the still very heterogeneous population (Zentrum für Türkei-
studien 1998) of the territories now forming Turkey the new 
identity of a ‘Turkish’ nation speaking Turkish (written in Latin 
letters) and living in a new, secular legal framework indeed was 
a “cultural revolution” (Seufert/Şenocak 2006: 32) and had to be 
supported by a massive state-induced and propagandistically 
strengthened Nationalism. At first the Islamic religion was at-
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tributed the role of a counterforce to modernisation and put un-
der strict control of a federal department created specifically for 
that purpose: The “Diyanet Işleri Reisliği” (Schiffauer 2000: 44). 
Several ‘private’ Islamic organisations were founded in reaction 
to that policy, some of which later initiated branches in Germa-
ny (cf. e.g. Zentrum für Türkeistudien 1997). Yet the (Sunni) Islam 
soon was to return to the political stage, if only as an additional 
bond for the fragile new identity (cf. e.g. Seufert 1997). At the 
latest with the Islamic reawakening after the Iranian revolution 
religion returned to the political agenda to stay there as the 
most controversial issue to this day (cf. e.g. Haustein 2006). 
In 1961 the German government initiated a state con-
trolled work migration from several Mediterranean countries 
including Turkey (cf. for the following e.g. Goldberg/Halm/Şen 
2004). The Turkish migrants mostly came from the country’s 
rural and underdeveloped eastern areas. Being neither ethni-
cally nor religiously homogeneous from the start, the only 
things they had in common were a background of a very low 
educational level, a low start in the labour market, and the re-
peated experiences of exclusion they had to face in their new 
environment. In a comparably short time, however, they began 
to pluralise according to their capabilities and their readiness 
to adapt to the situation they found themselves in. During the 
last decades an immigrant middle class developed and by and 
by names of Turkish origin became part of German cultural and 
political life. Entrepreneurs with immigrant background make 
a considerable contribution to the German economy. But not all 
immigrants have been able to establish themselves successfully. 
A significant number of them has not mastered the German lan-
guage beyond a rudimentary competence to communicate ver-
bally in everyday situations, a fact that leaves about one third of 
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the second generation without any professional training (Gold-
berg/Halm/Şen 2004: 31f.). Despite the structural setbacks that 
the immigrants are facing, a decisive subjective factor comes 
into effect, which obviously is closely linked to the people’s
worldviews and attitudes: “In modern societies a large part of 
the educational influence of the children is taken over by in-
stitutions that exercise an integrative effect and impart cultural 
competence as well as the dominating social norms and values. 
Turkish families tend to see this as a partial loss of educational 
influence, a factor that may lead to opposition on their side. 
Against this background parents may develop an ambivalent 
relationship to the German educational institutions and a 
higher professional qualification of their children” (Goldberg/ 
Halm/Şen 2004: 30-31, to the motives behind this ambivalence 
cf. chapter 4).2 
In the field of religion the immigrants entered a place 
void of any infrastructure. Gradually the majority of the impro-
vised, mainly Turkish mosques in apartments and factory build-
ings joined one of the big organisations from Turkey (or were in 
several cases taken over, Schiffauer 1997: 190-211). These organi-
sations (cf. for detailed descriptions e.g. Zentrum für Türkeistu-
dien 1997 or Dietrich 2006) provided the immigrants with a 
broad range of services: hodjas, religious courses, literature (all 
in Turkish language), organized pilgrimages, undertakers that 
offered funerals in Turkey etc. A second, not so obvious effect 
was that they – without exception having their headquarters in 
Turkey – structured the discourses of the immigrants according 
to the Turkish political landscape. 
2  If not explicitly mentioned otherwise all quotations from German sources are 
translated by the author. 
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Besides the Turkish organisations numerous others small 
religious groups developed, mostly organised by other im-
migrants and by German converts. Especially their umbrella 
organisations, e.g. the ZMD (Central Council of Muslims in Ger-
many), successfully tried to act as translators and mediators of 
Muslim concerns to the German public and succeeded in estab-
lishing a small but influential Muslim discourse in German lan-
guage, although they never were able to gain a solid foothold 
among the Turkish immigrants. 
Since the time of the first immigration the way the Ger-
man public looked upon the immigrants changed in two es-
sential aspects. First, both public and government, almost four 
decades late and rather reluctantly, began to acknowledge that 
the immigrants had come to stay. And second, what for almost 
twenty years exclusively was considered to be the ‘Gastarbeiter 
Problem’ shortly after the Iranian revolution underwent an al-
most imperceptible change resurfacing as the ‘problem of inte-
grating Islam’ (cf. Schneider 2005: 67). 
3. The Present State of the Muslim Discourses 
While the older surveys on German Muslims mostly re-
stricted themselves to the Turkish immigrants (cf. Zentrum für 
Türkeistudien 2005) the most recent figures come from a survey 
that looks on Muslims of all national origins including the Ger-
man converts (Brettfeld/Wetzel 2007).3 According to that survey 
the degree of religiosity shows up as follows: 
3  In comparison the figures of both the 2005 survey on the Turkish immigrants 
and the 2007 survey on all the Muslims basically point into the same direction 
substantiating the formative dominance of the Turkish-Islamic discourses in 
Germany. 
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Table 1:	 Meaning of religion in every day life in % 
Item 
totally
insignificant	 
rather
insignificant 
rather
significant 
very
significant 
How	important	is	 
your religion for you 
personally in your 
every day life? 
6.1 12 32 49.94 
Source: Brettfeld/Wetzel 2007: 114f. 
But as stated at the beginning behind this superficial uni-
formity a broad range of opinions about almost any substantial 
issue can be found, e.g. the following: 
Table 2:	 Range of opinions to several issues about living Islam in 
Germany in % 
Item 
I disagree 
totally 
I disagree 
mostly 
I agree 
mostly 
I agree 
totally 
I believe the Koran to be God’s 
true revelation 6.6 4.5 9.4 79.6 
The threat the Western world 
means	to	Islam	justifies	violent	self	 
defence on the Muslim side 
46.7 15 20.4 17.9 
It is important to adapt the 
teachings of Islam to the 
conditions of the modern world 
11.8 8.6 25.4 54.1 
Suicide attacks in the name of 
Allah are a dreadful sin and an 
offence against God 
4.7 2.7 7.8 84.8 
It should be lawfully prohibited 
to make Muslims change their 
religion 
58.7 11.5 7.2 22.3 
Source: Brettfeld/Wetzel 2007: 116,118,176,177. 
4  Figures like these sometimes mislead observers to categorize the majority of 
Muslims as religious ‘virtuosos’ in the abovementioned Weberian sense. This is 
not the case. The figures express the wish to live in a religiously ordered cosmos 
(not necessarily state) and to maintain the corresponding practice. But as Weber 
has shown one can be a perfect religious “non-virtuoso” in a completely reli-
gious world order. 
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Looking at the social structures behind that range of opin-
ions several patterns show the close connection between ‘reli-
gious’ and other factors. 
	 “It is noticeable that the integration into the receiving 
society […] faces enormous problems the stronger the 
religious bonds turn out to be” (ibid.: 139). 
	 A lack of integration (ibid.: 149) and a low level of edu-
cation (ibid.: 147) go hand in hand with a high inner 
distance to the values of democracy. 
	 Language plays a crucial role in integration: Those 
who can be graded as well integrated show an inten-
sive use of the German language (ibid.: 93-98).
Most of the Muslims still do not define themselves as Ger-
mans and maintain close bonds to the countries they came from 
(ibid.: 93). Yet the figures also show that this can go along with 
an integration in the new social environment and does not nec-
essarily imply self-isolation: 
Table 3: Key items to integration in % 
Item 
I disagree 
totally 
I disagree 
mostly 
I agree 
mostly 
I agree 
totally 
Aliens in Germany should 
maintain their culture 
1.6 4 22.8 71.6 
Immigrants coming to Germany 
should adapt their behaviour to 
the German culture 
7.9 9.5 37.2 45.4 
Different ethnic groups 
should live separately 
to avoid problems 
76.4 14.6 4.9 4.1 
Source: Brettfeld/Wetzel 2007: 99 
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4. Reference Points for the Construction of 
Muslim Identities 
Obviously the connections between religion and integra-
tion are anything but one-dimensional. Though there is a link 
between a good integration and a low level of religiosity (Brett-
feld/Wetzel 2007: 138-139) this must not lead one to conclude in 
turn that anyone who is religious necessarily is badly integrat-
ed. Religion is not an unstructured quantity and there are dis-
tinct and complex patterns in the immigrants’ worldviews that 
help or hamper integration. Based on the results of a growing 
number of qualitative research projects done in the last years 
(cf. e.g. Engelbrecht 2006; Karakaşoğlu-Aydın 2000; Kelek 2002; 
Klinkhammer 2000; Tietze 2001 and others) some major ‘refer-
ence points’ for the continuous construction of the religious and 
spiritual identity5 can be described. 
4.1 Tradition vs. Traditionalism 
Migrants carry with them a load of convictions, habits, 
customs and attitudes that ‘go without saying’ or at least that 
‘went without saying’ in the country or region they left behind. 
To counter objections to be expected at this point: As for any-
one it is perfectly normal for migrants to have a profoundly 
positive attitude to their own tradition(s) and to keep drawing 
from them to cope with life. But insisting uncompromisingly on 
maintaining one’s traditions unadjusted in a totally different 
5 It is not possible in the given frame to elaborate on the multiple theories of 
‘identity’ both as an analytical as well as a political term (see e.g. for the discus-
sion in Germany Meyer 1997). While very often identity is conceptualised like 
some sort of rare and dwindling resource that is constantly threatened (interest-
ingly because others do not want it), in the context of this argumentation iden-
tity is seen as an open-ended process of integrating and sorting out both on the 
individual (biographical) and on the collective (discursive) level. 
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society constitutes the attitude of a traditionalist6 and implies in 
the long run the need to create a museum-like parallel society. 
Consequently one of the central and most painful topics of the 
immigrant discourses is the question which traditions are use-
ful or even indispensable and which are superfluous or even 
detrimental for the life in Germany. Of course there is no sim-
ple, one-dimensional direction the passing on of values to the 
next generation takes. The processes of building up individual 
worldviews and values among the immigrants of the second 
generation is complex. Some shake off their parents’ values, 
some hold them even stronger than their parents and a majority 
tries to find compromises that in one way or the other reconcile 
the world of their parents with their own. It is noticeable that 
the range of options grows and shrinks decisively along with the 
language skills. 
4.2 Universalism 
A key pattern in this context is the universalistic under-
standing of Islam. Like Christianity Islam desires to be a religion 
for all mankind regardless of colour, language or nation. Not 
only numerous German converts but also a growing number 
of the younger generations of Turkish immigrants – mainly 
religious ‘virtuosos’ with good language skills – tend to this in-
terpretation. Expressed in their own terms they seek the ‘true’ 
Islam under the ‘traditional’ one. As a young female interviewee 
puts it: “There is a narrow line between tradition and Islam. 
6 A traditionalist ‘confession’ e.g. sounds like this: “The Islamic faith does not need 
any reforms, changes or renewals … The theories of some radicals, converts and 
reformists are completely wrong. There are no reforms in Islam. … Reforms and 
changes can only be carried out in spoiled religions, human ideologies and 
teachings”. (Bundesministerium des Innern 2006: 218, quoting the “Milli Gaze-
te” 9.9.2005: 4). 
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Anything that is not Koran is tradition. Many traditions of 
course may be good, not all traditions are rejected by the Ko-
ran. But if something obviously stands against Islam, you have 
to avoid it, at least for yourself” (Klinkhammer 2000: 170). For 
many immigrant Muslims of the second generation the con-
cept of a ‘true Islam’ offers them a religious and spiritual frame, 
based on which they are able to construct and maintain an 
independent perspective on the values both of their parents 
(plus their organisations) and of the German society. Worldwide 
universalistic Muslim discourses try to find new ways between 
‘modern’ and ‘traditionalist’ values and it is there where the 
discussions take place whether to steer a course of an ethic of 
“conviction” or of “responsibility” – to use the Weberian terms 
(Weber 1997: 328). To counter another set of objections to be ex-
pected at this point: An uncompromising ethic of “conviction” 
tends to lead to what usually is labelled as ‘fundamentalist’ at-
titudes. But while you can discover fundamentalist positions in 
traditionalist and/or nationalist Islamic discourses as well, the 
most promising models of how to be a religious Muslim in an 
open society based on an ethic of “responsibility” can be found 
in the universalistic discourses (cf. e.g. Abou el Fadl 2001). 
4.3 Nation vs. Nationalism 
The nationalist dimension of the second generation 
Muslims’ identity constructions is likely to get lost in the con-
tinuous and agitated discussions on religious fundamentalism 
in Germany (for the historical roots of the Turkish nationalism 
see chapter 2). As in the field of tradition it is necessary to dif-
ferentiate here: It is normal for migrants – even up to the third 
or fourth generation and longer – to maintain strong bonds to 
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the country of their ancestors. But if a constructive commitment 
to the new state and society is hampered or even stopped by the 
conviction that it constitutes a betrayal of the ideological bonds 
to the country of origin, then it is justified to talk of a harmful 
nationalism. Turkish nationalism in this sense exists in a secular 
version (resting exclusively on concepts of ‘nation’, ‘culture’, 
‘language’ and so on) as well as in a religious one, the latter 
mostly combined with a traditionalist version of Islam in the 
aforementioned sense. This attitude has taken the shape of an 
ideology in the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis”. It is propagandised 
by Turkish right wing parties and claims that being Turkish and 
being a Sunni Muslim are like the two sides of a coin: You can 
never be one without the other (Seufert 1997: 83ff.). This fusion 
of nationalism, traditionalism and religion also has a forceful 
and damaging effect on the relationships between Muslims of 
Turkish and other national origin in Germany. 
In a pluralising community like the one of the Muslim 
immigrants there are of course many more reference points for 
identity construction, religious (e.g. mysticism or eclecticism) as 
well as non-religious ones (e.g. economics, youth cultures etc.). 
Traditionalism, universalism and nationalism were described 
here in some detail because they are by far the most relevant 
reference points for the objective of the argumentation: The 
Muslim search for a collective identity and an organisational 
frame in Germany. 
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5. The Introduction of Islamic Religious Educa­
tion in German Schools as a Touchstone of 
Identity Construction 
At the very moment German Islam is entering a new 
stage: Islamic religious education in German language is about 
to be established as a ‘regular’ school subject in a number of 
German states (cf. e.g. Kiefer 2005; Bauer et al. 2006; Reichmuth 
et al. 2006). For several reasons this development means a mo-
mentous change both for the Muslim discourses and their rela-
tionship to the German society: 
	 For the majority of immigrant parents and children to 
find their own religion placed side by side with the re-
ligious education of two big Christian denominations 
as a ‘regular’ school subject is a long awaited signal of 
both public and official recognition of a substantial 
strand of their identity and helps to reduce the am-
bivalence a considerable part of the parents feels for 
the German educational system.7 
	 Since the subject will be taught in German it will last-
ingly strengthen the Muslim discourse in German lan-
guage. For many Turkish speaking Muslims it will be 
the first time to discover that it is possible to think and 
talk about (their own as well as other) religion in Ger-
man. The subject also brings the Turkish immigrants 
in a close and regular contact with the various smaller 
 The question, whether it is the ‘right’ education nevertheless remains a crucial 
problem that asks for continuous conciliatory efforts from the part of those who 
are working to introduce it (see e.g. Behr 2006). 
7
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groups of Muslims from other countries, a contact 
hitherto virtually nonexistent due to the fact that these 
groups did not even visit the large Turkish mosques 
simply because they could not understand the lan-
guage spoken there.
	 In the wake of the introduction of Islamic religious 
education as a standard school subject an academic 
Muslim theology is in the process of development that 
will, being embedded in the academic discourses, 
make room for a both theologically and culturally 
competent self-reliant German-Muslim discourse.
All this will strengthen a tendency towards a universalis-
tic Muslim identity based on an ethic of “responsibility” that is 
ready to find its place in the midst of the German society. This 
development has to face opposition mainly from two sides: The 
first are Islamist positions to be found in traditionalist as well as 
universalistic discourses, who are not ready to give up the vision 
of a state and society controlled by Islamic ideas (cf. for Germa-
ny e.g. Bundesministerium des Innern 2006). 
The second and (in Germany) much more influential op-
position comes from the numerically strong discourses who 
reject a loosening of the bonds between religion and (first and 
foremost Turkish) nationalism. This discourses are strengthened 
by two factors. The first is that a considerable minority of immi-
grants advocates a strong influence of the Turkish government 
on the religious education hoping to control Islamism that way 
(cf. Zentrum für Türkeistudien 2005: 59). The second factor lies 
in the transnational structures of the Turkish-Islamic organisa-
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tions themselves. The ‘structural nationalism’ that is ‘embed-
ded’ in the make-up of these organisations is probably the most 
difficult problem in the current process of establishing Islam as 
a self-reliant religion in Germany. 
But even if it is sometimes difficult to perceive the diverg-
ing aims and strategies behind the immigrants’ publicly dis-
played ‘national unity’ and their genuine emotional bonds to 
Turkey, things are obviously getting in motion. All over Germa-
ny Muslims are making sustained discursive and organisational 
efforts to develop and promote a self-reliant Islam beyond the 
traditionalist and/or nationalist agendas of the big Turkish or-
ganisations (cf. e.g. Engelbrecht 2006 and Johansen 2006).8 The 
necessity of a constructive turn towards the German society 
and language is an increasingly urgent matter brought up not 
only by the German side but more and more by the immigrants 
themselves, especially the economically successful ones among 
them. The local functionaries of the big Turkish-Islamic or-
ganisations increasingly find themselves caught in a dilemma: 
Insofar as they are immigrants themselves (and not delegated 
from Turkey), they are experiencing the necessity for additional 
efforts of integration and language acquisition at first hand, 
but as functionaries it is their obligation to maintain the ‘func-
tional nationalism’ of their respective organisations (apart from 
the fact that their jobs are at stake in this conflict). But they are 
faced constantly with the question whether they really want to 
remain representatives of “subdivision(s) of Turkish parties or 
8  The biggest and most influential of all Turkish-Islamic organisations in Ger-
many e.g. until 2002 held the position that “Turkish Islam can only be taught in 
Turkish language” (Kiefer 2005: 211). 
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movements” or will become part of the immigrants’ “self-organ-
isations” (Zentrum für Türkeistudien 1997: 115). 
In the long run the Muslims (including the Turkish-
Islamic organisations) will have to find a solution for the prob-
lem of the ‘structural nationalism’ both on the level of identity 
and organisation. As Mathias Rohe outlines, the circumstances 
strongly favour ‘bottom-up’ solutions for the construction of 
what eventually may be a comprehensive German-Islamic re-
ligious organisation: “The Muslims will only be able to form a 
comprehensive organisation if they start from the local level 
advancing step by step to the state or federal level” (Rohe 2006: 
85). Even though their decisive position as suppliers of religious 
services for a large number of the Turkish Muslims in Germany 
is out of question, the Turkish-Islamic organisations are in no 
position to take on that task. Neither can they claim to represent 
all German Muslims9, nor are they suited to serve as Muslim 
‘quasi-churches’: “Turkish mosques mainly are frequented by 
Turkish Muslims; one will hardly ever meet people of other 
nationalities. […] the reasons lie in the fact that the mosques 
still serve the function of patriotic and cultural associations” 
(Lemmen 2005: 184). For those and other reasons the signs are 
intensifying that a growing number of functionaries themselves 
is inclined to participate in the aforementioned bottom-up 
processes. Whether they will be able to take their organisations 
along is the key question of the coming years. 
9  Not even all Turkish immigrants, since in fact at maximum about 50 % of them 
feel represented by the existing Turkish-Islamic organisations (cf. Zentrum für 
Türkeistudien 2005). 
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The Turkish Bias and Some 
Blind Spots: Research on Muslims 
in Germany 
Jörn Thielmann 
After forty years of presence, Muslims in Germany enter 
a new stage in the relationship with their host society. First 
of all, a complex and very diverse field of religious actors has 
emerged, covering all kinds of religious orientation and more 
and more overcoming national, ethnic or linguistic barriers. 
The perception by academics, politicians, the media or the 
public does not yet fully reflect this diversity, due to the prevail-
ing Turkish bias. The main argument for that is simple one of 
numbers: Turks are the largest ethnic group among the Mus-
lims, thus they are considered being the most important one. 
But even if the study of Islam and Muslims in Germany has to 
an amazing degree unfolded over the last couple of years and 
become rich and diversified, a lot of questions concerning Mus-
lim life in Germany are not yet answered or even not asked so 
far. Thus, this article tackles with the Turkish bias and addresses 
some blind spots in the research on Muslims in Germany. I start 
with some general information and remarks on Islam and Mus-
lim presence in Germany and the research done until now, be-
fore addressing in particular the blind spots and the main issues 
future research should address. 
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1.	 Islam and Muslims in Germany – some notes 
on their perception 
Even if we find some traces of Muslim presence in German 
territories before the 20th century (cf. Abdullah 1981: 27-31), until 
the early 1960s, however, the number of Muslims in Germany 
has been fairly negligible. Since then, through the massive la-
bour migration following the bilateral recruitment agreements 
with Turkey and Yugoslavia, Tunisia and Morocco, their number 
has continuously increased and reaches today approximately 
3.8 to 4.2 million (some 45 per cent German nationals, the other 
foreign nationals, mainly Turks, but also of other origins), as 
shown in the first nationwide representative study conducted 
by the research group of the Federal Office for Migration and 
Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, BAMF) and 
published recently (Haug/Müssig/Stichs 20091; previous esti-
mates ranged from 3.1 to 3.4 mill., including approx. 800,000 
German Muslims2, see Bundesministerium des Innern 2007, 
Deutscher Bundestag 2000: 4f.). With this study, we have far 
better data than before, due to the fact that the study surveyed 
by telephone a total of 6,004 people aged 16 and above from 49 
Islamic countries (instead of 20 countries looked at until then), 
covering with the information provided about other household 
members data of nearly 17,000 people. Specific methods guar-
anteed the representation of all groups of Muslims present in 
Germany, thus comprising the diversity of Muslim life here. The 
1		 This study will be mentioned below as BAMF-study. 
2		 By “German Muslims” are understood holders of German citizenship, i.e. natu-
ralised Muslims from various origins. Their number nearly doubled since 2000 
thanks to a reform of citizenship law. The number of German converts is un-
known, according to the Federal Ministry of the Interior. 
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overwhelming majority (98 per cent) live in the former West 
Germany, including East Berlin, one third of all live in the state 
of North Rhine-Westphalia. Nevertheless, a high degree of hazi-
ness still remains. 
The ethnic, linguistic and social structures are not known, 
at least not precisely, as is their territorial distribution (nearly all 
research, not only qualitative, is done in bigger cities). The same 
holds true for converts to Islam, converts from Islam to other re-
ligions, and those born Muslims leaving religion altogether, as 
well as for membership figures in Muslim organisations (for fig-
ures of the distribution of mosques in North Rhine-Westphalia 
among the organisations see Chbib 2008: 132ff.). 
Organised by Muslim organisations are up to 20 per cent 
only of the total Muslim population, so that we have an unor-
ganised silent majority, visible in all quantitative surveys, but 
ignored so far by qualitative studies (for a notable exception see 
Amiraux 2006, Otterbeck 2007). 
The situation of the migrant workers or “guest workers” 
(the “Gastarbeiter”), as they were called, changed significantly 
after the recruitment stop in 1973: Being until then mainly 
considered as employees and cheap labour force, the migrant 
workers now got their families and relatives over and settled 
permanently in Germany. This development is reflected in the 
emergence of several religious organisations in the early 1980s. 
However, people having had experience in organising a group 
in their home country, be it on political or religious terms, 
started already in the late 1960s local associations. In the reli-
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gious field, they basically came from the same Sufi milieu of the 
Naqshbandiyya in the case of the Turks, and from the Muslim 
Brotherhood organisations in the case of the Arabs. Since the 
1920s, we find a few organised Ahmadiyya groups as well. 
The Naqshbandiyya milieu is divided into two streams: A 
political active part, represented by the Islamische Gemeinschaft 
Millî Görüş (IGMG; Islamic Community Millî Görüş), founded in 
1985, but active under other names since 1973, and still linked to 
the Islamic Party (best known under the name of Refah Partisi) of 
Necmettin Erbakan – and to some degree also to the AKP of the 
Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan – in Turkey. And a quietist part, 
represented by the Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren (VIKZ; 
Association of Islamic Cultural Centres), the German branch of 
the Turkish Süleymancı movement active since the early 1970s 
(cf. Jonker 2002), by the Nurculus (Şahinöz 2009, Yavuz 2004) or 
the Fethullah Gülen movement (cf. Agai 2004, Şen 2008, Yavuz 
1999). But the Turkish state also tried to get hold of its (former) 
citizens in Germany and to control the religious scene among 
the Turks and established in 1984 a branch of its office for reli
gious affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, which is part of the Prime 
Minister’s office) under the name of “Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam 
Birliği” (DİTİB), the Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Re
ligion (Turkish-Islamic Union of the Office for Religious Affairs) 
(cf. Seufert 1999). All of them reflect the political situation and 
debates in Turkey, as rightly underlined by Martin Engelbrecht 
in this volume. 
-
-
The legal framework for Muslim life in Germany is until 
today subject of debates among Muslims and German jurists 
  
173 The Turkish bias and some blind spots. Research on Muslims in Germany 
and politicians alike.3 So far, they are organised as registered as-
sociations (eingetragener Verein, e.V.) or as foundations (Stiftung). 
All associations seek since the late 1970s to obtain the status of 
a publicly recognised corporation (Körperschaft des öffentlichen 
Rechts), like the Christian churches or the Jewish community. 
This would give them some additional rights (e.g. collection of 
church taxes by the state on behalf of them) and possibilities, 
mainly in the field of education and the state media. Therefore, 
they felt – and still feel – the necessity to form a united repre-
sentation of Muslims in Germany, being able to speak with one 
voice for all Muslims. This has been the general political and 
public discourse over the last decades, even into the very begin-
ning of the Deutsche Islam Konferenz DIK in September 2006, 
and still is prevalent.4 So, the main Islamic organisations – DİTİB, 
Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Zentralrat der Mus-
lime in Deutschland ZMD, Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren 
VIKZ – formed a united body, the Koordinationsrat der Muslime 
in Deutschland KRM in March 2007. Where the Islamic organisa-
tions perceived this as a major step towards legal recognition 
even as a publicly recognised corporation, the reactions by 
politicians and media alike were reluctant. For them, these as-
sociations organised but 10 to 15 per cent of Muslims and were 
therefore not representative (the BAMF-study gives a figure of 
approx. 20 per cent). However, unnoticed by the general public 
and the scientific community alike, in the course of the Deutsche 
3 Cf. for a comprehensive account Rohe (2001, 2008). Also Klinkhammer (2002), 
Oebbecke (2000). 
4 Cf. Friedrich Wilhelm Graf: “Enge Kooperationen, radikale und hinkende Tren-
nungen – Die Vielfalt der religionsrechtliche Verhältnisse im heutigen Europa”, 
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 5 July 2008. 
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Islam Konferenz the Federal Ministry of the Interior gave up the 
idea of a single representative Muslim body and is now willing 
to accept a polyphone and multiple representation of Muslims 
in Germany by several organisations. 
2. The Turkish bias 
It is perhaps surprising that even after more than forty 
years of notable Muslim presence in Germany, no research has 
so far been done on the inner-Muslim discourses and interac-
tions between the various ethnic groups under the specific con-
ditions of the Diaspora, with the notably exception of the work 
of Werner Schiffauer (e.g. Schiffauer 1997). Most of the scientific 
literature which pretend to present Muslim life in Germany (cf. 
e.g. Heine 1997, Spuler-Stegemann 2002, Zentrum für Türkeistu-
dien 1995a & 1995b) give schematic presentations of the, mainly 
Turkish, organisations without giving any information on the 
religious ideas and concepts or the life worlds of Muslims.5 Tak-
ing into consideration the overwhelming Turkish majority, 
Islam in Germany is mainly looked at through “Turkish lenses” 
(cf. e.g. Karakoşoğlu/Nonneman 1997). The basic argument for 
that – if one is given at all – is, as already said above, one of sim-
ple numbers. More Turkish Muslims equal more importance for 
the Islamic field in Germany (here again, the recent BAMF-study 
successfully overcomes the Turkish bias). On this point, I disa-
gree with Martin Engelbrecht in this volume who stresses the 
formative effect of the number of Turkish immigrants for the 
situation of Islam in Germany. 
5 More comprehensive and the best overview so far is Thomas Lemmen (2002). 
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Based on my fieldwork in Rhineland-Palatinate on the 
emergence of differentiated Islamic fields (cf. Thielmann 2003), 
I argue for taking more into account the dynamics caused by 
the smaller parts of the Muslim population in Germany: We 
observe a very strong intellectual presence of Arab Muslim lead-
ers and German converts in the field, most of them active in 
supra-national mosque networks, going far beyond their sheer 
number. We also observe strong influences by global Muslim 
actors and networks that are not yet fully considered. 
3. Some blind spots in the existing research 
Of special interest for the German public is, of course, 
Islamic extremism, which is examined by Peter Heine (1990), 
or in a much-criticised study by Heitmeyer (Heitmeyer/Müller/ 
Schröder 1997), also by Meng (2004). Relatively early, some stud-
ies looked at the situation of migrated Muslim women as well 
as of that of the daughters of the second or third generation (cf. 
e.g. Kandiyoti 1977, Baumgartner-Karabak/Landesberger 1978, 
Ahmed 1992, Nökel 2001 & 2002). The wearing of a headscarf 
or veil, heavily debated in German society over the last years, 
is perceived by Muslims and non-Muslims alike as a distinctive 
symbol of Islamicness, as shown by Mandel (1989), Giannone 
(2005) or recently Amir-Moazami (2007) and vom Bruck (2008). 
Conversion to Islam is also a topic for research (cf. e.g. Hofmann 
1997, Wohlrab-Sahr 1999, Baumann 2003), focusing, however, 
on female conversion to Islam. Schleßmann (2003) looked at 
conversion of Germans to mystical Islam, and Hüttermann 
(2002) established an analytical grid for the “artificial milieu 
centrism” of the same Naqshbandiyya milieu. Some studies ad-
dress the issue of Islamic instruction in public schools from vari-
ous perspectives (Kiefer 2005, Mohr 2000 & 2002, Reichmuth 
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et al. 2006). It is surprising in view of the conflicts provoked by 
mosque building projects, that only a few studies concentrated 
on this issue: Büchner (2000) and Schmitt (2003) – both notably 
cultural geographers – analyse some conflicts, and Leggewie/ 
Joost/Rech (2002) offer a practical guide for conflict resolution 
in this field, in Beinhauer-Köhler/Leggewie (2009) completed 
with an introduction to the institution “mosque” in Germany as 
well as in the Middle East. Kraft (2002) describes several projects 
from an aesthetical and architectural perspective. Recently, 
Petra Kuppinger (2008) presented preliminary findings of her 
study of mosques in Stuttgart and pointed at their struggling for 
space and recognition . 
Some prevailing paradigms can be discerned, and 
Amir-Moazami/Salvatore (2003), Peter (2006), Salvatore/Amir-
Moazami (2002), Schiffauer (2006), and Tezcan (2003) already 
presented them in some detail, stressing also the deficiencies 
and problems of the existing literature. In the early 1970s, the 
focus laid on integration (for a limited period of time, obviously) 
of workers and their assimilation (exemplary, Thomä-Venske 
1981). Religion, especially Islam, was seen as an expression of 
backwardness and as an obstacle for integration. It was nearly 
common sense, that to become modern required giving up re-
ligious orientations and practices. Modernisation meant – and 
still very often means – secularisation. The recruitment stop 
in 1973 and the subsequent move of family members of “guest 
workers” to Germany shifted the interests slightly to the op-
pressed Muslim women, enhancing the perception of Islam as 
a pre-modern religion, and to questions of religious instruction 
for the children. After the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Islamic fundamental-
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ism and radicalism were added to the paradigms for research 
and analysis and dominated the literature far into the 1990s. 
Muslim organisations like Millî Görüş or the Caliphate State of 
Cemaleddin Kaplan were seen as perfect examples of political 
Islam, without real differentiation between the two. Again, 
Schiffauer’s remarkable study of the Kaplan movement (Schif-
fauer 2000) remained an exception. In the context of Islam and 
modernity, some scholars, e.g. Tibi (2000), demanded a specific 
“Euro-Islam”, compatible with Enlightenment, universal values 
and Western way of life. However, this concept appears to a cer-
tain degree as normative, and lacks so far empirical evidence 
(cf. Şen 2008). In the late 1990s and early 2000s, empirical stud-
ies – following qualitative approaches – gained ground, and the 
focus shifted to the modernisation of Islam through individuali-
sation. Here, studies on the individual religiosity among Turkish 
women (Karakoşoğlu-Aydın 2000, Klinkhammer 2000, Nökel 
2002) or men (Frese 2002, Tietze 2001) offer a differentiated 
picture of (Turkish) Muslim life in Germany. Individual Muslims 
are presented as reflective, rational, but nevertheless pious indi-
viduals who seek their places in modernity and German society. 
That does not mean that they are – as is often supposed – liberal 
reformers or insular individuals with only their own respective 
agenda. Most of them are pretty conservative in their religious 
world views, and they are in their majority closely attached to 
a group or embedded in a network. This change in perspective, 
however, follows a general trend in the study of religion (cf. e.g. 
Gabriel 1996). 
Recently, German politics discovered religion and re-
ligious instruction as tools for constructing stable identities 
and integrating especially Muslims into society. The related 
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discourses lead to a melting of religion and culture as well as to 
an ethnicising of Islam. Every immigrant of a (supposed) Mus-
lim background has therefore to positioning her- or himself to 
Islam, being personally a believer or not (cf. Tezcan 2006). Islam 
becomes the kernel of identity (see, e.g. the report of the Inter-
national Crisis Group on Islam and Identity in Germany 2007). 
Neglected are so far, following Tezcan (2003), to a large degree 
the specific theological and religious aspects of Islam in the Ger-
man Diaspora (as exceptions, Mihçiyazgan 1994 or Schiffauer 
1988). The vitality of transnational ties among the second and 
third generations is according to him a fact, but ignored by the 
thesis of a decline of being bound to the country of origin. Tez-
can also points to the phenomenon of organising Islam along 
German traditions of association and stresses the fact that this 
must influence religious communication among the member-
ship in these Muslim associations. 
Religiosity and religious orientations beyond small 
groups in the focus of qualitative research only recently became 
an object of study: The study by Brettfeld and Wetzels (2007), 
commissioned by the Federal Ministry of Interior, focused on po-
tential radicalisation and violence. However, its questionnaire 
shows a certain bias and angled questions, especially with re-
gard to the Muslims targeted, namely mostly young pupils and 
students in big cities who are “by nature” more radical. The Reli-
gionsmonitor of Bertelsmann Foundation (2008a: a world-wide 
survey including several Muslim-majority countries; and 2008b: 
on Muslim religiosity in Germany) is interested in centrality and 
contents of religious beliefs, surveyed on a regular basis in a 
long-term project. According to this study, Muslims are gener-
ally more religious than members of other religions. However, 
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the Religionsmonitor shows a high degree of tolerance and ac-
ceptance of plurality, particularly among the religious Muslims. 
Thus, being a religious or even a very religious Muslim is not per 
se in contradiction with the values of a secular pluralistic soci-
ety. The BAMF-study (Haug/Müssig/Stichs 2009) shows equally 
a strong sense of religiosity among Muslims, but that is not spe-
cific for Muslims and also true for adherents of other religions 
from the same countries of origin. With regard to everyday 
religious practices, the picture is more differentiated: Wear-
ing the headscarf is less widespread in the second generation; 
however, it is related to being deeply religious, even if half of the 
deeply religious women do not wear it. As a surprise come the 
figures for the attendance at swimming lessons or school trips 
by Muslim schoolgirls: the overwhelming majority takes part 
in it, against the perception in the German polity (only 7 per 
cent do not attend swimming lessons, 10 per cent do not partici-
pate in school trips; id.: 181-193). Against Brettfeld and Wetzels 
(2007), cited by Martin Engelbrecht in this volume, the findings 
of the BAMF-study do not establish a clear link between integra-
tion and the fact of being a Muslim, due to the great differences 
between Muslims from different countries of origin. Difficulties 
exist especially in the fields of linguistic and structural integra-
tion, less in the field of social integration, where the picture ap-
pears more positive than often assumed. In education, Turkish 
migrants score less good than Muslims migrants from other 
countries, a fact linked to socio-economic factors and the low 
education of the Turkish mothers of the first generation. Never-
theless, there is evidence of educational upward mobility, espe-
cially among female Muslims. Unfortunately, the BAMF-study 
cannot answer the question, if this educational success is linked 
to related strategies of certain Muslim organisations and net-
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works, in particular the Millî Görüş. It is noteworthy, that the 
study does not proof a separation in daily life between Muslims 
and non-Muslims, against a strong tendency in public opinion 
and the media, speaking of “Parallelgesellschaften”.6 Islamic 
religious education in public schools is strongly demanded by 
Muslims. Its introduction might help developing structural in-
tegration. This is even more needed, when considering that 50 
per cent of the Muslims are Germans.7 
4. Fields for further research 
Organisations, institutions, networks and Muslim  
diversity in a transnational and global perspective 
Thorough analyses of histories and structures as well as 
discourses and practices exist but for a few Muslim organisa-
tions, institutions or networks. DİTİB, the largest Turkish organi-
sation, is so far not properly researched8, as is not the largest 
Arab dominated organisation, the Islamische Gemeinschaft in 
Deutschland (IGD, Islamic Community in Germany) – suspected 
by the German security to be the German wing of the Muslim 
Brotherhood movement –, or the Shi’ite Ahl-ul-Bait movement 
IRAB. The same holds true for the umbrella organisations Zen-
tralrat der Muslime in Deutschland (ZMD, Central Council of 
Muslims in Germany), the Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deut-
schland (Islam Council for the Federal Republique of Germany) 
or the Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland
6 Cf. here Schiffauer (2008). 
7  This expression seems to be more appropriate than the usual “with a German 
citizenship”, because everybody with the German citizenship is German in the 
sense of the constitution (Grundgesetz). 
8  A PhD thesis on DİTİB is actually being prepared by James Gibbon at Princeton. 
181 The Turkish bias and some blind spots. Research on Muslims in Germany 
(KRM, Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany), the super-
umbrella organisation founded in march 2007. For the IGMG, 
Werner Schiffauer will soon publish the results of his long-term 
research project, for the Ahmadiyya, Andrea Lathan works on 
a Ph.D. thesis at the University of Halle. Academic studies on 
the mushrooming Schura-organisations — confederations of 
mosques and associations — on the level of municipalities and 
Bundesländer are also lacking. 
Of particular interest are networks of various kinds, e.g. 
Sufi, Salafi, Nurcu, Gülen, study groups and so on, sometimes 
without any formal membership, often centred on a charis-
matic personality. Some of these networks are based on Internet 
platforms (websites, chat rooms, etc.). Research here is at the 
very beginning, if started at all. Furthermore, the transnational 
and global dimensions involved are rarely investigated in more 
than a metaphorical way. However, the exchange of people, 
ideas, media (books, audio tapes, video tapes, CDs and DVDs), 
and money between various Islamic communities in the world-
wide umma (community of the believers) is obvious. 
The Turkish bias, already discussed above, hinders so far 
proper qualitative research on the diversity of Muslim life, so 
visible in the recent BAMF-study: on ethnic and linguistic issues, 
on power struggles, on differences and varieties with regard to 
theology and practices, but also on the emergence of something 
specifically “German” or “European” in the lives of Muslims in 
Germany, caused by the richness and diversity experienced. 
This is linked to territoriality: No proper research is done 
on Muslims and Muslim life-worlds in the rural parts of Ger-
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many, in the villages and small towns of the countryside, and 
only few studies look at the role of Islam and Islamic norms and 
values for organising local areas in city quarters with a high 
number of Muslim inhabitants. 
Of interest are furthermore the activities of the mosques 
and associations and the professionals and/or volunteers in-
volved. Only a few studies (Kamp 2008, Tezcan 2008) concen-
trate on imams and their increasing professionalising, follow-
ing the demand of the faithful. All other aspects of community 
life (activities and activists) often remain in the dark (an excep-
tion here is Spielhaus/Färber 2006). Local and regional topog-
raphies of Muslim lives and organisational activities (up to the 
level of a Bundesland) would allow for mapping Islamic fields for 
Germany as a whole and also enable the development of struc-
tural help for Muslim associations to foster professionalising 
their work and to integrate them into German civil society. 
Intellectual production and reception of Islamic  
knowledge and sciences 
To my knowledge, there exists no in-depth research into 
the intellectual production and reception of Islamic knowledge 
and sciences in the German context. With the exception of the 
circles of VIKZ and the Gülen movement, nothing is known 
about what Muslims read in the religious field, what they are 
interested in, where exactly they get their Islamic knowledge 
from and what they are producing in the field themselves. Of 
course, Internet is mentioned as an important source of infor-
mation and a mean to disseminate knowledge and opinion, 
but without any detailed proof and examples. This fact might 
be related to the lack of the religious in the studies on Islam 
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and Muslims in Germany, as deplored by Levent Teczan (2003). 
Islamic normativities and norm producing actors in the field of 
Islamic law, morality and proper Muslim behaviour are under-
researched, too. Here, the use of law, be it Islamic, German or 
European, in- and outside courts would be worth looking at, 
apart from studies on the so-called fiqh al-aqalliyat, the Islamic 
jurisprudence for Muslim minorities in a Diaspora situation. 
Related to all this, of course, are always questions of authority, 
legitimacy and representation. 
Muslim media and media use by Muslims 
Some Muslim newspapers and magazines as well as 
online-publications are published in various languages by Mus-
lims in Germany and cited as sources, but hardly studied as ob-
jects in their own right. On media use by Muslims, we also find 
but a few studies (e.g. Pies 2008). 
Religious practices 
With the notable exception of Mihçiyazgan (1994) or 
Schiffauer (1988) and recent studies by Paula Schrode at the Col-
laborative Research Center 619 “Ritual Dynamics” (University 
of Heidelberg) on religious dietary practices among Muslims, 
concrete religious practices and their transformations – for ex-
ample, persistence and change of so-called folk Islam in a 
Diaspora context – are nearly ignored. 
Conversion to and from Islam – and the silent majority 
among Muslims 
Literature on conversion with regard to Muslims focuses 
mainly on conversion of women to Islam, based exclusively on 
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biographic narrative interviews post-factum.9 Male conversion 
and conversion of Muslims to other religions are – also in gen-
eral, not only in the German context – not examined. Of particu-
lar interest, of course, is the silent majority among the Muslim 
population which is not organised, not practising, perhaps not 
even believing, as it becomes visible in all recent quantitative 
studies, but which does not show up in the existing literature on 
Muslims in Germany. 
5. Conclusion 
To sum up, future research in this still emerging field of 
study should try to fill the gaps with regard to institutions and 
networks in a transnational perspective and reflect the eth-
nic, linguistic and cultural diversity of the Islamic fields. Here, 
religious beliefs should be taken more into account as norm-
setting and action-guiding forces. Intellectual productions and 
receptions need strongly investigation. Quantitative studies 
are also needed, but should – like the recent BAMF-study or the 
Religionsmonitor of Bertelsmann Foundation – overcome the 
Turkish bias and integrate existing and already validated items 
on religiosity and religious practices into their questionnaires, 
instead of creating new ones. This would allow comparing data 
in more complex ways, thus creating better data bases for fur-
ther research. Topographies of Muslim life-worlds could com-
bine qualitative and quantitative approaches and produce thick 
descriptions of local and regional settings. 
9 On studying conversion and desiderata in this field see Krech (1994). 
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